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Abstract

Occupy Mall Street?
How the Court Conditioned Public Space
Where People Go
by
Anthony J. Maniscalco

Advisers: Professors Marshall Berman and Thomas Halper

This thesis explores the tension between practicable space and property rights. That tension has
frequently animated legal contests over political expression in privately owned, publicly accessible
marketplaces in the United States. Do American marketplaces function as marketplaces of ideas? Should
they? In order to examine those questions, I survey the Supreme Court’s considerations of expressive
activity on public and commercial property, in particular, shopping centers. I begin by developing
indications of public space, as well as noting the challenges for civic inclusion within the modern political
sphere. Next, I survey historical practices of public space within (Western) marketplaces. Those practices
reveal myriad negotiations over the multi-functionality of urban place, as well as dialectical interplay
between publics and embodied spaces, which appear to impact civic capacity. In an era of
suburbanization, space, spatial practices, and legal interpretations transform significantly, due in large
part to the segregation of private places and purposes from genuine public uses.

iv

I combine social and political theory with case studies of judicial decision-making, in order to historicize
the contest over practices and exclusions of space. I trace the development of the High Court’s public
forum doctrine, focusing specifically on typologies used to regulate expression on public property. Then
I detail the Court’s rulings on free speech and assembly inside shopping centers. After examining the
way in which Supreme Court precedents have been construed in two states, New York and New Jersey, I
argue for revisited First Amendment protections of expressive space inside privately owned shopping
centers. The goal of this study will be to look beyond a zero-sum game between space and property,
towards a more inclusive view of commerce and public functionality.

v

Acknowledgements
This thesis is a bit of a comeback story, one long in the making. I may wind up omitting a
number of people who helped me see it to completion, therefore. I am grateful to everyone who
put up with me while I wrote it, and while I didn’t write it. I would like to thank my father and
my family, including the family I’ve adopted along the way. They all helped me find the
wherewithal to carry this through during Round 2. I thank my yoga instructors, too, for
modeling strength, flexibility, and mental clarity. My tennis buddies always showed interest in
the outcome. I hope they will take my calls to play again, now that this work is in the books, so
to speak. Similarly, anyone and everyone who was willing to indulge me in conversations about
the topic ought to be acknowledged. The ideas herein are more urgent to me than simpler banter
allowed, so I owe them all a debt of gratitude for their patience.
To the faculty at CUNY, who enthusiastically helped me launch this comeback, by reading
abstracts and commenting at various phases: Setha Low, June Williamson, Monica Varsanyi,
John Mollenkopf, Steve Brier, and Ira Bloom, to name some. To Joe Rollins, for permitting me
to finish, something I scarcely thought I would do again. To Frances Piven, for hearing me out
when I decided to give it a go again, after doing so many years ago, when I first sought to
become a PhD student at the Graduate Center. My hearty and heartfelt thanks to Jack Jacobs,
who offered such great encouragement and advice, well before he took on the responsibility of
readership with such warmth and caring. To Tom Halper, copy editor-in-chief and conscience.
This would not have been possible—or remotely coherent—without his interventions. Tom kept
me accountable throughout, and he never admonished me for forgetting that he was responsible
for other things besides my thesis. I cannot say enough about his patience and generosity.
Though I am remiss for not naming them here, I am grateful to all the students I have worked
with over the years. My desire to understand civic engagement is an outgrowth of the work they
put in; from all parts of the City. Beyond its reaches, I would also like to thank Stephen Downs,
the lawyer who was courageous enough to stand by his convictions in 2003, when he was
excluded from a mall in Albany and then arrested for refusing to take off a t-shirt bearing the
controversial message, “Give Peace a Chance.” Ten years later, he was very generous with his
time and thoughts, both about his own experience Upstate and broader questions on privacy
versus publicity in the places we share today.
A special thanks to Gloria. One day, she told me about a lecture at CUNY, where that professor
I always talked about was speaking on a book about Occupy Wall Street. Talk about correlation!
That conversation led me to ideas I never knew existed, and a curiosity I thought I left behind;
finally, the willingness to write what follows. That conversation also led me back to the mentor
and friend to whom this work is dedicated…

vi

Dedication to Marshall

I wish to dedicate this thesis to Professor Marshall Berman. Marshall passed away just two days
after leaving me a voice mail about one final step in the writing process. His message began, “Hi
Tony, I enjoyed your introduction…” Perhaps I should only speak for myself, but anyone who
knew and loved him like I did would have been walking on sunshine after hearing his review.
When his wonderful wife, Shelley, informed me about his death 48 hours later, I felt the air
abandon my effort. Thankfully, I could draw on the things that Marshall always wanted for me:
to be strong, to keep growing. It is in his spirit that I could carry this through, with the help of
those who loved him as much as I do.
Marshall had me at “shalom.” Under his tutelage I read about, thought about, and wrote about
things I never dreamed about, including Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams, which Marshall
let me compare with Orwell’s “Politics and the English Language.” It wasn’t merely that he let
me do it, barely knowing me beyond the shoddy writing I previously handed him during my first
semester at CUNY. It was how open he was to the idea of someone trying something that might
end up messy, at best. He behaved the same way when I proposed to place Rousseau and
Dostoyevsky under Foucault’s microscope, something we both knew he didn’t feel too good
about at the time. He was a good “allower” and a great friend.
Marshall wrote that public space can be “sloppy.” But more than anyone I have ever known, he
was willing to let it be. He embodied everyday freedom and invention, intellectually and
spiritually. He helped me become attracted to the idea of shared space by being the things I now
want that space to be: open, community-oriented, revelatory, tolerant, and, most of all, authentic.
I believe space ought to be compassionate, too, which is something I always felt from Marshall’s
teaching and scholarship. When I approached him about trying to do this again, he let me open
up to him about why I couldn’t succeed the first time, and why I needed to this time. His
involvement was curative for me. And the strength he wanted for all his students is right where I
need it anytime I think about him.

Thank you, Marshall. Shalom.

vii

Contents
Introduction: The Publicity of
People’s Marketplaces

1

Chapter One
Reconciling Built Environments with the
Public Sphere

16

Interdisciplinary Indications:
Connotative Public Space
Openness and accessibility to users
Support for community practice
Visibility and revelation
Diversity, tolerance and accommodation
Authenticity and unexpectedness
Political Theory and the Public Sphere:
The Problem of Inclusion
Chapter Two
Historical Practices of Public Space:
From Agora to Agora-phobia, and Again

18
18
19
20
24
29
33

46

Flow and ebb in the Greek agora and Roman forum
Openness to enclosure:
medieval and early modern markets
American public space before and after
the Jacksonian era
The rise and fall of open-minded space in an
American century
Chapter Three
Lost in Civic Space: Unexpected Activities
and the Arc of the Public Forum Doctrine

49
55
68
79

106

Opening salvo. The traditional public forum
New landscapes, new contests
Non-public space

viii

110
116
122

Chapter Four
Occupied Mall Street?
Case Histories of Property and Space
In American Shopping Centers

154

Prologue: Marsh, public function, and
the preferred position of speech
Public space flows in the plaza:
Logan Valley Plaza
Black and White and Reed all over: the dissents
Speech goes inside the mall, gets turned back:
Lloyd Corporation
The mall is where the people go: Marshall’s dissent
Morphology in the mall and the final unraveling
of public function: Hudgens
A coda on space in the mall:
Marshall’s eulogy to public functionality
Pruneyard and American federalism in the
shopping mall
Robins v. Pruneyard: political space and welfare
in a Californian milieu
Pruneyard v. Robins: a myriad of considerations
Chapter Five
Will Pruneyard Do?
Toward a Second Chance for the
First Amendment in Third Places

157
163
174
178
188
193
202
205
207
212

227

The unbearable lightness of Pruneyard:
declined invitations and status quo in the states
New York versus New Jersey, or state action formalism
versus avant-garde public functionalism
Reimaging property as space in an age of
fluctuating fortunes: state action, the new urban way
Rainbow suburbs and the right to the analogous city

230
235
257
274

References

287

Law Reviews

304

Table of Cases

309

ix

Introduction:
The Publicity of
People’s Marketplaces
“[T]here is a politics of space because space is political”
- Henri Lefebvre 1

While discourses on public space have almost always teemed with allusions to cities, the state
has been harder to find in many accounts of how public and space are joined. In a similar way,
traditional narratives about the public sphere have commonly failed to shed light on the state’s
ability to configure access to space. Scholarship on shared space and state regulation has surely
grown since the start of the 21st century, following the World Trade Center attacks and post-9/11
security apparatuses in New York and other major cities. Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party
protests appear to have raised the watermark in the second decade of the new century. Yet
uncertainty about the durability of the former and speedy conversion of the latter into an
electoral movement requires us to consider alternative examples of public space and its political
uses, absent popular demonstrations like the ones that piqued our curiosities a few short years
ago. Going forward, moreover, we would do well to embark on new discourses about the state’s
power to control rights of access to the contemporary public sphere.
We must likewise expand our inquiries into state interventions and the privatization of
public space. Recent conflicts in the heart of Istanbul, Turkey, precipitated in part by the
planned demolition of that city’s oldest public park, Taksim Square—and slated for replacement
by an indoor shopping mall—are likely to stir further inquiry into these transformative processes,

1

Henri Lefebvre, “Reflections on the Politics of Space,” in Richard Peet (Ed.), Radical Geography: Alternative
Viewpoints on Contemporary Social Issues (London: Methuen & Co., 1978), pg. 345.

1

internationally. 2 At the same time, urban activists in the United States remain dedicated to using
and preserving traditional public spaces against so many private conventions that delimit the
exercise of their personal freedoms. Local battles over community gardens come to mind, as do
business improvement districts and public-private conservancies that restructure the rules of use
in streets and parks, respectively.
Given these phenomena, discourses about space ought to look at property and how it may
be reimagined publicly with the aid of the state. Commercialization of public space remains an
important theme, one that will resurface throughout this study. But perhaps it is time to rethink
privately owned marketplaces as centers of publicity and civic capacity, multifunctional spaces
embodied politically and commercially by people who use them for diverse ends. The idea may
seem farfetched these days. But in fact there is a long history of publicity and civic capacity in
marketplaces. It is a history of emplacement for expressive practices, in which the spaces where
people bought and sold things were the same ones they used to openly participate in conceiving
their public sphere. 3
As Barker has shown, for example, Athenian publics of the fifth century BC designed the
first democratic space celebrated in the Western tradition. It was a marketplace: the agora. The
agora was an amalgam of commercial and political association, where discourse on current
affairs and ideas took place alongside people’s trading activities. After it replaced the Acropolis
as the center of public life—that is, after civic participation replaced passive witness of religious
rites as the quintessence of citizenship—Athens “attained to full self-consciousness” and became

2

Michael Kimmelman, “In Istanbul’s Heart, Leader’s Obsession, Perhaps Achilles Heel,” The New York Times,
June 8, 2013, pgs. A1 and A6.
3
NB: The description here is cursory and anticipatory. A more detailed analysis will follow in the second chapter.

2

a model of “highly developed political life,” as critics of democracy were forced to concede. 4
And one of the defining characteristics of the Athenian agora was its support for publicness
among citizens who met, marketed, and debated there:
In the market-place…the city had its brain centres; and when men met in the
assembly for deliberation, they met to settle matters which had been discussed
before, and on which an opinion had already been formed…The city was not only
a unit of government: it was also a club. It was not only politically self-governed:
it had also (what made its self-government possible) a large freedom of social
discussion…the open life of the market square… In the frequent contact of such a
life, men of all classes met and talked with one another; and the democratic ideals
of equality and of freedom of speech found their natural root. Knots of talkers
and circles for discussion formed themselves from day to day; and in public talk
and open discussion, the business of the community would be a natural staple.
Men would come to know one another intimately, and in the common discussion
of the market-square…would learn one another’s worth. Such a society is the
background and basis of the theory of the Greek philosophers. 5

One of those philosophers, Aristotle, recognized a need for strong ecological overlaps
between the polis and its public spaces. In this sense, it is important that his discussion of the
agora appears in Politics, his treatise on government and political organization.

Aristotle

understood that common space was political at its core. This was something he shared with the
Athenians of his generation, along with a distrust of city planners such as Hippodamus, who
developed a prototype for authoritarian political space, meant to channel spectatorship among its
users. Hippodamus had designed militaristic space, really. 6

4

Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory (London: University Paperbacks, Methuen & Co., 1960), pg. 16. NB:
Among others, Plato recognized this fact of public life in Athens, as Barker points out in his seminal account.
5
Ibid., pp. 21-22. NB: There are objections to this gendered formulation, as well as the exclusionary tendencies of
the Greek polis, specifically, the distinction between the private household, on the one hand, and the public market,
on the other. For criticism of the public-private split in political theories of fraternity, see, for example, Susan
Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1989); Carol Pateman, The Sexual
Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in
Social and Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Okin, Women in Western Political
Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur:
Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).
6
Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), Book II, Chapter VIII,
sections 8-10, pp. 69-70; see also, Barker (1960), op cit., pp. 93-94.
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Yet Aristotle also challenged multifunctional arrangements in the marketplace above.
That challenge seemed quite integral to his broader political philosophy, in fact. Suspicious of
pure democracy, Aristotle proposed that politics and commerce be separated on the Athenian
agora. He thought polity would be better served by splitting the “traders’” agora from the
“freemen’s’” agora, in other words, the marketplace of goods from the marketplace of ideas. 7
Aristotle championed public discourse and private property rights at the same time. When it
came to place, however, he believed that Athens’ policy of blending commerce and politics
would undermine civic engagement in the city-state, by sowing disunity among its citizens and
inhabitants. In the end, however, Aristotle’s cautions failed to convince Athenian democrats to
alter mixed-use space atop the agora. 8 Thus, the marketplace remained the heart of public space
in ancient Athens, its civic nerve center.
Without ignoring exclusions on which Athenian society and economy relied, historical
developments have changed the way politics and markets intersect today. Whether one supports
Aristotle’s positions on practical uses of the agora or not, modern marketplaces are more
regulated than their precursors in ancient Greece. For one, most physical spaces in which
commercial intercourse occurs are now privately owned, unlike squares and town centers where
people who once sold goods and services assembled in common with others who did not, but
who nevertheless wanted to engage their fellow citizens in open debate about controversial
topics. Contemporary property owners have an immediate stake in the way their marketplaces
function. They also possess much greater veto power over civic activity within those spaces.

7

Aristotle, Politics (New York: Modern Library, 1958), Book VII, Chapter 12, Lines 30-35, pg. 302 (in Barker,
1958, sections 3-6, pg. 310).
8
R.E. Wycherley, How the Greeks Built Cities: The relationship of architecture and town planning to everyday life
in ancient Greece (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1962). A more detailed account of Wycherley’s study
appears in Chapter Two.
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That much is plain. But then again, the veto power enjoyed by modern property owners
rests on more than their titles to marketplaces. It is stored within a bundle of legal rights that are
at once safeguarded by the state, based on philosophical and constitutional tenets that go back
hundreds of years in Europe and the United States. At the same time, though, there is a rich
tradition of outspoken dissent in America, as well as toleration for various forms of political
association, though neither is specified in the text of our Constitution. 9 The language of the First
Amendment provides for “the freedom of speech,” of course, and it specifies “the right of the
people peaceably to assemble.” And while it does not say where they may do so, American
history permits us to infer that freedoms of expression were thought in one way or another to
pertain to spaces embodied by publics: public spaces. In view of developments alluded to in the
previous paragraph, however, and legal rights of owners to dispose of their property as they see
fit, the question now becomes, which public spaces?

The principal aim of this study is to explore legal contests over publicity inside today’s
privately owned marketplaces. Following an attempt to better understand public space and its
expressive implications in theory, history, and jurisprudence, I survey legal disputes triggered by
incidences of unauthorized speech and conduct in modern American shopping centers.

I

examine judicial opinions that have emanated from open discourses and organized protests in the
common areas of malls, as well as their exclusion when speech practices have been observed as
threatening to the commercial interests of owners. In light of constitutional rights enjoyed by
property owners, on the one hand, and speakers and activists, on the other, these struggles have
occasioned conflicting interpretations of First Amendment freedoms by the United States

9

John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (New York: Harvard University Press,
1980), pg. 105.
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Supreme Court. Over the course of the past half century, the Court has considered whether and
to what extent expressive activities legally safeguarded in public places are likewise protected on
privately owned property, which is chiefly defended in the language of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Though this is not a study of property rights in America, they play a critical role in the
nation’s constitutional design, and they have often been invoked to temper unwieldy expressions
of civic engagement. After all, it was Shays’ Rebellion and other instances of public protest that
prompted the Constitution’s founders to invest greater power in an expanded government that
could protect property owners and other minority stakeholders from the volatility of popular
majorities who did not possess estates. 10 There was bound to be competition between public and
private rights in an enduring republic as a result. Federalists such as Madison hoped that an
effective constitutional design would contain that competition through divided government and
innovative procedures of decision-making, so that foreseeable conflicts would become objects of
political representation, rather than of pure democracy. 11 Property and substantive concerns
would be addressed through the policy process, while rights of free speech and assembly would
be safeguarded in a Bill of Rights championed by Anti-Federalists and other opponents of the
new central government. 12
Of course, the architectures of representation envisioned by Madison and his fellow
framers predate the growth of professional politicians, lobbyists, and our contemporary
campaign finance system. They also preceded political action committees and myriad covenants
10

James W. Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 39-40.
11
This, of course, was the essence of Madison’s argument in Federalist 10, which is both credited and criticized for
being a sophisticated political defense of property rights vis-à-vis interest group arrangements made possible by the
proposed Constitution. See Clinton Rossiter (Ed.), The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor, 1961), pp. 77-84.
12
Ely, op cit., pg. 47. NB: Ely points out on multiple occasions that the Anti-Federalists, who expressed objections
against a centralized government, never objected to the property protections included in the 1787 Constitution by
their Federalist opponents. See, for example, pg. 51.

6

between public officials and private citizens. These may have seemed unthinkable in the late
18th century, but they have nevertheless restructured contests for control of topography and
people’s access to shared spaces. In at least one review of the current situation, democratic
theorists are reproached for overlooking client relationships between property owners and state
actors, who have final say over what spaces we can use, as well as what practices we are
permitted to engage in legally. According to that charge, too many theorists have touted free
speech as some sort of abstract good or have leaned on their lamentations about its eclipse in
America.

Worse, perhaps, they have analytically detached notions of place from their

discussions about civil rights in the public sphere. Meanwhile, modern real estate developers
have purchased public space, turned that space into private territory, and then deployed it to
enhance their commercial position and political influence on governments at every level. 13
Given these competing approaches to embodied space, the physical landscape in which free
expression finds legal and political protection continues to contract, while practical opportunities
to build civic capacity, such as I have related to the Athenian agora—and others do in the
marketplaces of early America, for example—continue to diminish. 14
This study will be carried out in the context of these developments, and others to be
discussed in what follows. Given disparities in the ground war alluded to above, the modern
representative process seems an improbable one for reopening space on behalf of democratic
association, or for closing gaps that exist between marketplaces and public practices previously,
if imperfectly united.

Neither public nor private rights have ever been absolute in our

constitutional scheme, and it has often been an institutional responsibility of the judicial

13

Margaret Kohn, Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public Space (New York: Routledge, 2004), pg.
80.
14
Timothy Zick, Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First Amendment Liberties in Public Places (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 25-36.
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branch—the one designed to be immune from political pressures—to referee relationships
between marketplaces of goods and the marketplace of ideas. 15 These legal mediations have
frequently been channeled through First Amendment jurisprudence, which will be traced in
much of what follows. Yet, if we are to avoid the misfortune of disembodying expression, or
depriving it of what Justice Brennan called “breathing space,” then the study of civic
engagement needs to transcend what people can do with their speech: it should also be about
where they can do it, and, as we often find, where they cannot.
In Chapter One, therefore, I look to erect a working idea of public space. As I note at the
outset, it is not really possible to define public space singularly. Notions of public and space are
frequently clustered and contradictory. Instead I offer five signposts, which I use to indicate the
publicity of space throughout this study: openness and accessibility to users; support for
community practice; visibility and revelation; diversity, tolerance, and accommodation;
authenticity and unexpectedness. These indications are drawn from a variety of intellectual
sources, and they admittedly warrant further interrogation. They are meant to elicit an ongoing
discussion of public functionality within modern, unconventional gathering spaces, as well as
evoke ideas about individual and collective participation in open political discourses. In this
respect, I should admit at the outset that I am generally referring to participants in those
discourses when I say “public” or “publics” in this study, or when I argue for rights to public
space. This is not the only available usage of such multi-determined notions, of course, but the
indications I develop in the first chapter correspond to my consideration of the normative public
sphere, which follows from them. That analysis focuses on the problem of political participation

15

Any number of observers has questioned the neutrality or apolitical nature of judicial interpretation, including Ely
(1980), op cit., pp. 4-5. I will return to this argument in the conclusion.
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and social inclusion, specifically, in the theory of Jürgen Habermas, in his groundbreaking work,
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.
My approach is topographical, first and foremost. Yet, it should become evident by the
close of the first chapter that our ideas of public space and public sphere are also shaped by
myriad ways in which people endeavor or even struggle to use space for civic engagement. The
modern public sphere theorized and revisited by Habermas and his critics likewise encourages us
to look at how people may successfully use marketplaces as practicable political spaces. But it
also requires us to consider how they have been prevented from doing so, historically.
The purpose of Chapter Two, then, is to trace uses of commercial space and property for
non-commercial activity.

I examine four periods, in which marketplaces have at times

functioned as centers of open discourse and participation. At other times, they have been
architecturally or administratively regulated against public functionality. I begin with the mixeduse, democratic agora, and then transition to Roman forums, where spaces become more closed
off and decentralized. That pattern repeats in medieval and early modern market squares in
Europe, where mixed social classes begin to inhabit space in entirely new and unexpected ways,
eventually triggering misgivings among governing regimes and their land use administrators in
the 18th and 19th centuries. Across the ocean, colonial American markets become epicenters of
revolutionary and post-revolutionary political expression and activism. By the close of the Civil
War, however, concerted efforts to restructure and manage urban space are evidenced in many of
the largest cities of the late 19th century. Following radical resurgences of that space in the first
half of the 20th century, the most significant de-politicization of America’s commercial
landscape, along with the rest of its geography, is embedded in a host of federal suburbanization
schemes launched after World War II.

9

Around the same time—and not coincidentally, as I suggest in Chapter Three—the
impact of topographical rearrangements in the United States begins to play out as a prime
constitutional question, which implicates the protection of free speech, on the one hand, and its
legal exclusion, on the other. That question is addressed through an expansion of Supreme Court
jurisprudence related to expressive practices. In it, the Court constructs a public forum doctrine
from its First Amendment interpretations of public places. The doctrine defines what forms of
public property are legally accessible for purposes of communication, as well as what forms of
communication are allowed on public property. It protects public space for speech and conduct
in its earliest iterations, but the Court begins to classify an ever-growing array of landscapes as
limitedly public, and eventually non-public. In doing so, it gradually applies constructs of
property ownership to places in which citizens gather in an era of suburbanization, and on which
they must rely to participate in political discourse. Grouping publicly accessible spaces via an
increasingly formal typology that distinguishes “public” from “non-public,” the Court relies on
that typology to narrow rights of expression in all but the most traditional venues. In essence,
then, the third chapter shows how free speech is de-spatialized by judicial determinations. That
is, the Court’s rulings establish where public forums are held in trust for popular participation,
versus where place is reinterpreted as property and legally disembodied from the public sphere
and practices encompassed by it.
The arc of the public forum doctrine provides an object lesson on how the High Court
excludes political expression, first by defining spaces where speech is exercised as restricted
property, then by withdrawing First Amendment freedoms therein. This legal phenomenon is
particularly problematic in suburbs, where privately owned shopping centers have become de
facto gathering places for millions of Americans outside cities, where they previously

10

participated in social discourse and activism. In Chapter Four, I turn to the Court’s rulings on
malls. I begin by looking at a seminal speech and property opinion delivered by the Court in
1946. Next, I trace four decisions handed down between 1968 and 1980, in response to legal
disputes over protest and prohibition inside the common areas of modern malls.
Not unlike its genesis of the public forum doctrine, the Court’s initial considerations of
free expression in shopping centers emplaced political discourse and connected it to democratic
robustness.

In Marsh v. Alabama, a majority led by Justice Hugo Black held that civic

engagements required First Amendment places and trumped constitutional rights of property in a
privately owned company town. Two decades later, in Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan
Valley Plaza, the Court opined that changing landscapes demanded a reformulation of embodied
space, as well as legal relationships between private property owners and a rapidly suburbanizing
public. Writing for his colleagues, Justice Thurgood Marshall challenged the constitutional right
of the former to legally exclude the latter. Moreover, he concluded that the state’s imprimatur
for exclusions of speech and conduct needed to be viewed in the context of suburbanization and
transforming geographies in America.
The Court reversed its protections of speech inside malls, however, in remarkably short
order. In Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, decided just four years after Logan Valley Plaza, a
realigned majority concluded that malls offered few, if any public functions besides commerce;
speech unrelated to the private purpose of shopping centers found no public place or protection
inside malls. The Court went much further four years later, expressly overruling its decision in
Logan Valley Plaza and contending in Hudgens v. NLRB that the First Amendment enjoyed no
protection in shopping malls. The majority invoked a doctrine first espoused in the 19th century:
the state action doctrine. It holds that the First and Fourteenth Amendments limit government

11

alone from interfering with free speech. According to the Hudgens Court, the Constitution was
framed specifically to prevent a despotic state from abrogating personal freedoms. The doctrine
therefore did not apply to property owners, who were generally free to make decisions about the
disposal of their private assets. Thus, the legal script that treated malls as publicly functional
spaces had been substantially rewritten when it came to free speech.
In its last major decision on the issue, Pruneyard v. Robins, the Court maintained that its
mall doctrines, in particular, state action, still precluded First Amendment protection for public
expression in shopping centers. But now the Court invited individual states to conduct their own
independent analyses of the matter, and to extend rights of speech and assembly in malls if their
constitutions warranted expressive protections.

Notwithstanding the Court’s relatively new

position, that shopping centers met no threshold for First Amendment protection in light of their
public functions, speech in suburban malls could be reviewed by state courts, under local
conditions. In many cases that meant jurisprudence would derive from affirmative constitutional
provisions in the states, along with the diverse political cultures represented by them. The
Pruneyard opinion therefore signaled a positive turn for public space in malls.
As I argue in Chapter Five, however, the promise extended by Pruneyard has scarcely
been realized since it was handed down. In fact, a preponderance of states has responded to that
1980 ruling by repeating High Court rationales for excluding speech and assembly in shopping
centers, though a small number have done otherwise. Therefore, I try to reimagine the mall as a
space for free expression, in which First Amendment speech might again be legitimated. Given
legal fragmentation and topographical changes that have followed the Court’s adjudication of
mall contests more than thirty years ago, I argue in favor of revisiting the debate about free
speech therein. I take the position that political expression in malls ought to fall within the field
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of federal jurisprudence, given social and topographical conditions that have emerged nationally,
both in and outside of suburban shopping centers.
In order to develop this argument, and contemporize the concerns raised at various stages
in this study, I describe responses to Pruneyard in two states: New York and New Jersey.
Treating their court rulings as case studies of post-Pruneyard decision-making, I suggest that the
state action doctrine, the main source of speech exclusions on private property, is reconcilable
with government support to older, enclosed shopping malls, and innovative mixed-use centers
built after the Supreme Court issued its opinions decades ago. In the main, though, I support a
notion of state action once construed by the Court, when it not only evoked ideas about changing
landscapes to protect expression on private property, but also public functions served by that
property. My rationale for free expression inside shopping centers is based on environmental
swings currently taking place in suburbs throughout the country. Metropolitan areas in America
are being reshaped by major demographic shifts and other ecological changes. In view of these
social and spatial transformations, I borrow the right to the city concept from Lefebvre’s work on
urban space. I try to recast malls as de facto urban centers, where civic engagement ought to
transpire publicly among new and diverse suburban inhabitants, who share more and more
commonalities with their counterparts in cities. Owing to the state’s capacity to condition public
and private relationships inside these centers, I conclude that the Court can regenerate speechprotective iterations of place through First Amendment analysis.

My hope is to encourage ongoing discourse about free expression inside shopping malls,
as well as the Court’s power to shape practices of public space inside privately owned, analogous
cities spread across an ever-changing metropolitan landscape. When Barker and early political
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theorists extolled multi-functionality on the agora, they were not yet thinking about 20th century
zoning or single-use topographies in suburbs. In the 21st century, questions about the role of
courts and their ability to catalyze public space or private property loom large in suburbs. The
commons there has again been the marketplace, in this case, the shopping center, one of the few
places in which suburbanites collect. At the same time, the faces of those suburbanites have
changed profoundly over the last decade, following demographic shifts that are forcing us to
reconsider notions of civil rights in a transforming milieu outside older cities.
This study of publicity attempts to engage with those developments, inside built
landscapes.

It is undertaken in the spirit of a “living Constitution,” which can indeed

accommodate political change through reform of legal interpretations, while protecting breathing
space in newer places where people go. There is little dispute that speech and assembly are
paramount freedoms in our democracy; that they should be defended under most conditions.
Yet, during the last several decades, we have witnessed any number of prohibitions against
expression in publicly accessible places where it might find listeners. As I indicated earlier,
those exclusions have pitted expression against property, including shopping centers. Following
a detailed review of that contest, I wish to argue that the High Court is the most reliable
institution in which to reconcile conflicts between mall owners and outside speakers; that it is
best suited to protecting the public functionality of today’s mall spaces, and the use of those
spaces for free speech and assembly in suburbs.
The irony of my position on the Court—that is, my confidence in the very institution I am
criticizing to secure rights of association—is not lost here. Nor is the fact that I am seeking out
the only unelected branch of government to resolve what I see as a problem in privately owned
malls.

It may be objected that the political process is the place where this issue ought to be
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addressed, that courts ought to leave these concerns in the hands of elected officials, who are
accountable to the people, in deference to our republican scheme. This is a persuasive line of
reason. Indeed, seeking the Court’s intervention to remediate a problem it helped create seems a
long shot. However, if we agree that there is a problem, specifically, the exclusion of speech
from spaces where it might find listeners, then slanted political processes I mentioned earlier
ought at times be superseded by judicial review. When it comes to public participation, if
elected officials engender distrust in democracy, by “choking off the channels of political change
to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out,” then it will make sense to turn to the
Court and our Constitution’s chief “participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing” provision:
the First Amendment. 16 And though that Amendment has been unwelcome in shopping malls
for some time now, the stakes in our changing metropolitan landscape are too high to abandon all
hope that it could be re-invited there in the future. I myself have little doubt that future contests
will issue from changing conditions traced in this study. Thus, the Court will eventually get a
chance to right what it got wrong in places where people go.

16

Ely, op cit., pgs. 87 and 103.
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Chapter One
Positing Public Space:
Reconciling Built Environments
With The Public Sphere
While so much has been written about public space during the last two decades, especially, it
remains an elusive idea. Efforts to articulate that space in a universal manner will likely provoke
spirited responses from not too rare observers or users who convey it differently. Defining the
public sphere proves equally challenging, particularly when we try to do so from a democratic
perspective. Yet, it is plain that public spaces and spheres exist in some way. They are spread
across our topography and human geography, no matter where or by whom they are expressed in
time.

When I think of them, the following comes to mind: individual and collective

participation in open political discourses. Though there are other ways to understand public
spaces and spheres, the arguments here will reflect this communicative iteration, which is traced
to ancient Athens, found in the Middle Ages, and repeated in our modern vernacular. It is also
manifested in Europe, as well as in the contemporary United States. And notwithstanding the
multiple genealogies or protean qualities of publicity and space, expression remains central to
politics and participation. Similarly public spaces and spheres—whether we identify them as
products of environmental design, civic practice, or legal interpretation—are vital to the political
experiences of people who aim to inhabit them.
Recognizing public space and how it functions in law, design, and practice animates this
examination, and this chapter, specifically.

Since exact meanings of that space prove

challenging to distinguish, I would like to start with some scholarly efforts to indicate the idea
across multiple disciplines.

There are signs of cohesion among these efforts, thankfully.
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Similarly, there is shared agreement about the political value of public space to an active public
sphere outside the state. So, in order to prepare for the statements of law to be discussed later, I
will concentrate on design and practice in this chapter and the next, borrowing interpretations of
public space found principally in the work of urbanists and architects, planners and geographers,
sociologists and environmental psychologists, among others.
I would also like to address a debate in political theory over the modern, liberal public
sphere—in particular, whether a normative construct of that sphere can accommodate expanded
civic inclusion and participation in democratic discourses. The disciplinary lines here are fuzzy,
as the interpretations above invariably overlap with political theory, and vice versa. Still, it is
possible to differentiate them in at least one way, in my view. While the approaches referred to
in the previous paragraph tend to locate a wider array of socio-cultural practices within physical
places, political theory traditionally abstracts the legal and historical conditions through which
collective actions manifest vis-à-vis the state, explicitly. For example, the criteria found in
planning and its sister literatures typically emphasize the physical arrangement of public space.
Political theory, more often than not, privileges the publicness of the public sphere. 1 The
distance is steadily closing, and a broader goal of this examination is to continue to enhance
reciprocity between these different fields of research on laws, designs, and practices of publicity
and public functionality.

1

See Michael Rios, “Emplacing Democratic Design,” in Rick Bell, Lance Jay Brown, Lynn Elizabeth & Ron
Shiffman, Eds., Beyond Zuccotti Park: Freedom of Assembly and the Occupation of Public Space (Oakland, CA:
New Village Press, 2012), pg. 134. Let me reiterate that this distinction is essential, rather than emphatic.
Moreover, scholarship in the last decade especially has begun to problematize the difference between public space
and public sphere, seeking to identify the “scale” on which public spheres may be discerned among existing public
spaces. See Setha Low and Neil Smith, The Politics of Public Space, (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 4-11.
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Interdisciplinary indications: connotative public space
In the spirit of its multiplicity and seemingly defiant qualities where any single definition
might be adopted, I suggest that public space may best be indicated by the following signposts,
frequently found within academic and professional expressions: 1) openness and accessibility to
users; 2) support for community practice; 3) visibility and revelation; 4) diversity, tolerance, and
accommodation; 5) authenticity and unexpectedness.

These five indications are hardly

exhaustive. Many more might be added, for example, “the flaneur” artfully extolled in the
streets of Benjamin’s Paris or other European coinages. 2 In other words, public space might just
as easily be indicated by leisurely strolls, people-watching, or private repose in places where
people assemble.

The rudiments above seem equally keen when we explore overlapping

constituents of a participative public sphere, however. I prefer to concentrate on them, therefore,
while considering their effects on syntaxes of civic engagement in advance of what follows.

1) Openness and accessibility to users
In order for a space to be defined as appositely public, it is open and accessible to users.
In this sense, public space is measured by the extent of its invitation to users, and its
inhabitability among them—that is, the conditions under which occupants can use it in most
circumstances. Public spaces offer wide latitude to those who use them. There are numerous
implications when we treat space this way, of course, and problems may easily be imagined.
Even observers who defend this benchmark suggest that unlimited openness and accessibility
may threaten other ones, such as support for community practice. For example, Carr, Francis,
Rivlin, and Stone define public spaces as:

2

See Walter Benjamin, “The Flaneur,” in The Arcades Project (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002),
pp. 416-53.
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Open, publicly accessible places where people go for group or individual
activities…functional and ritual activities…While public spaces can take many
forms and may assume various names…they all share common ingredients.
Public space generally contains public amenities…that support [the above]
activities. It can also be the setting for activities that threaten communities, such
as…protest. 3

Accordingly, openness and accessibility necessitates amenities that are capable of supporting the
widest possible invitation. These amenities produce appearances of public functionality and
rights of entry to any and all prospective consumers of shared space. As we will see in the next
chapter, these conditions have at times inspired conflicts. Yet the periodic clashes stirred by
openness and accessibility have themselves transformed the practicability of public spaces, and
have likewise advanced civil, if unruly negotiations within them.

2) Support for community practice
Next, public spaces anchor the uses to which individuals and groups put them. Public
spaces furnish satisfactory conditions for individuals who seek to use them for repose, reflection,
and deliberation. Yet, they also serve assemblies of people, who are rooted in their communities,
and who seek to act in some collective capacity.

Advocates look to the Athenian agora

described by Barker earlier, as well as modern spaces such as local parks, where neighbors
gather for social, perhaps civic purposes. In this sense, “no individual is sovereign in this sphere,
but each, on entering it, renounces the right to dictate the terms upon which he communes and
conflicts with others.” 4 When they elect to use it in their solitary capacity, individuals may be
entitled to self-determination within public space. If they happen upon collective uses, though,
3

Stephen Carr, Mark Francis, Leanne G. Rivlin, and Andrew M. Stone, Public Space (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), pp. xi and 50. Though protest may (and perhaps should) be disruptive, I question Carr, et
al.’s contention that it represents a threat to community. I will return to this point again in my study, supported by
post-Occupy Wall Street accounts that observe mutual criteria.
4
Roger Scruton, “Public Space and the Classical Vernacular,” in The Public Interest, Winter, 1984, pp. 5-16.
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then they yield their practices to the community. Public space thereby furnishes possibilities for
autonomy, while articulating social sacrifice and inclusion through its dimensional designs and
rules of use. 5 It also blunts hierarchy among the people who use it. Public space is critical to
pluralism, then. When we inhabit it, we create and also translate symbols that state who we are
and where we stand vis-à-vis our community. Public space is a locus of mutual visibility. 6

3) Visibility and revelation
Public space provides its users the opportunity to articulate their values and beliefs. In
this sense, embodied spaces are key sources of publicity itself, where identity and culture may be
revealed to local audiences or others. According to Kohn, public space “create[s] a shared set of
symbols and experiences that create solidarity between people who are separated by private
interests…it is a shared world where individuals can identify with one another and see
themselves through the eyes of others.” 7 J.B. Jackson suggests that every public space be
understood as a place of or for civic identification, regardless of its intended purpose:
It was, and in many places still is, a manifestation of the local social order, of the
relationship between citizens and between citizens and the authority of the
state…where the role of the individual in the community is made visible, where
we reveal our identity as part of an ethnic or religious or political or consumeroriented society, and it exists and functions to reinforce that identity….Every
traditional public space, whether religious or political or ethnic in character,
displays a variety of symbols, inscriptions, images, monuments, not as works of
art but to remind people of their civic privileges and duties… 8

5

See also Lyn Lofland, A World of Strangers: Order and Action in Urban Public Space (New York: Basic Books,
1973), pp. 122-25.
6
Ari Adut, “A Theory of the Public Sphere,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2012, pg. 252.
7
Margaret Kohn, Brave New Worlds: The Privatization of Public Space (New York: Routledge, 2004), pg. 8.
8
J.B. Jackson, “Forum Follows Function,” in Discovering the Vernacular Landscape (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1984), pp. 16-17.

20

Jackson’s conception helps us see public spaces as the physical structures on which people
configure natural or ascribed identity, and then negotiate relationships within—where they locate
their identities within a wider ecology. Public space catalyzes the exposure of commonality,
then, while presenting geographical opportunities for expressions of difference. 9
Public space likewise conveys meaningful openings for collective self-examination and
encounter. It involves others, and it perpetually occasions contact and myriad intersubjective
negotiations demanded within physical environments. While television, radio, and the Internet
may valuably reinforce images of pluralism and integration, the idea here is that I identify who I
am and how I fit in through the reflection of others when we are in physical proximity.
Facebook’s worldwide market notwithstanding, flattened cyber-interaction is biased toward
strategic promotion and capitalization, rather than personal self-reference. 10
Demonstrating the overlapping needs of public space and public sphere outside the state,
Sennett contends that most intimate, and, therefore, pressing human interests must be addressed
visibly. The alternative is a general lack of assembly, which fosters isolation and exclusion,
what Durkheim described as anomie. 11 In the public eye alone, Sennett writes—linking the
needs above to social theory—can individual self-improvement and collective self-fashioning
occur. 12 Relying on this connection (and Habermas’ theory of the public sphere, which I will

9

While I will suggest the limits of her critique of the modern public realm below, the view here does in some way
overlap with the agonistic notion espoused by Hannah Arendt, who posits that realm as an antidote to mass societies
and spaces in which differentiation has become impossible.
10
This view is sure to provoke some dispute, which will not be taken up or resolved here. There is little doubt that
Facebook, Twitter, and other social network/media platforms may prove valuable for rallying collective action
within embodied spaces. The Occupy and Tea Party movements provided impressive evidence in this regard. So,
too, did the “Arab Spring” and other effective protests around the world, when publics assembled in physical spaces.
11
Perhaps demonstrating the point through his dismissal of concern for sociological disaggregation, Koolhaas has
argued on behalf of an anti-architectural notion of public space—suggesting that modern cities have maximized
development through a laissez-faire “evacuation of the public realm,” in which anomie turns into their “main
attraction.” See Koolhaas, “The Generic City,” S,M,L,XL (New York: Monocelli Press, 1998), pg. 1251.
12
Richard Sennett, “The Public Domain,” in The Fall of Public Man (New York: Knopf Publishers, 1977), pp. 3-5.
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consider below), Warren develops the view that public space is the prime site of construction for
what pragmatists such as Dewey called “organized intelligence”:
The public sphere (or, more accurately, spheres) is the space of public judgment
that is supported by the associational structure of civil society….public
spheres…provide the means for forming opinions and developing
agendas…States and markets organize themselves through the media of power
and money, and for this reason limit the communicative logic that inhabits public
spheres. In contrast, the institutionally ‘unbound’ qualities of public [spaces] are
essential for allowing the logics of public discourses to take their course…their
very existence depends upon generating the distinctive resource of influence, or
communicative power. For this reason public spheres should be able to carry
information and enable judgments with more authenticity than those developed
within the state…The public sphere is, in this sense, the spatial representation of
the…notion that social collectivities ought to be able to guide…with their wellconsidered…opinions. 13

Public space is the nucleus of political association, storing self-knowledge and civic capacity. It
is where public opinion is formed and made legible to the members of a political culture. At its
most democratic, it is a medium for communicating rationale perspectives. It may contain the
relationships forged among members of civil society, and it may facilitate mutual transparency
and trust in processes of participation, cornerstones of self-representation.
There may be an unintended consequence here, which at least bears acknowledgement.
While Sennett and the others are saying that public space relies on visibility and revelation, these
ingredients may also pose threats to freedom.

There is sufficient historical evidence to

recommend a cautious approach, therefore. The collective self-fashioning made possible within
visible and revelatory public spaces may also open the door to the forms of peer surveillance that
Michel Foucault traced in Discipline and Punish, Part One of The History of Sexuality, and
throughout much of his later work. In Foucault, the architecture and engineering of shared space
is often conceived in Orwellian terms, particularly as Enlightenment values such as visibility and
13

Mark E. Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pg. 77. Author’s
emphasis.
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revelation yield a contemporary matrix of repressive relationships within the very public sphere
that touted liberty. 14

In this view, the paradoxes of modern public space and sphere are

conveyed within their theories of liberation. The irony is perhaps best exhibited in the political
philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau went to extraordinary lengths to build his ideas
of democracy and justice atop a visible and revelatory landscape.

Rousseau’s dream of

democracy, best expressed in his “civil religion” construct (no less in his glorification of
Geneva), attaches to the most public of spaces. 15 In them, we find the transparency and trust
critical to the creation of a democratic public sphere. But there are other uses for these abstract
tools, and not a few totalitarian regimes in the 20th and 21st centuries have manipulated physical
space, discerned dissent made visible inside, and then revealed their own sovereignty to the body
politic forced to inhabit it. So, too, did post-Revolutionary War Americans, who at times
violently imposed a new conformity on countrymen who displayed residual loyalty to the British
crown. Draft rioters used open public spaces in New York to expose and intimidate abolitionist
reformers, while visibly terrorizing African Americans during the height of the Civil War. 16
Following Tocqueville in the 19th century, and Hannah Arendt in the 20th century,
Sennett answers the concern above by submitting that visible and revelatory public space still
promises a strong defense of freedom via mutual observations within. The transparency that
indicates public space also harnesses the interpersonal responsibility behind checks and balances
of power, while diminishing popular abuses. It is the interdependent ecology of public space that
supports human agency and a spirit of cooperation.
14

This agency and public spiritedness

For Foucault’s arguments in this regard, see Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage
Books, 1977), esp., pp. 143-48, and The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1978),
esp. pp. 15-17. I will return to Foucault in the next chapter, citing additional works in which space is politicized and
turned into a tool of what he calls “micropower.”
15
See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New York: Penguin Publishers, 1968), pp. 176-87; also Politics
and the Arts: A Letter to D’Alembert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pg. 59 and pp. 92-125.
16
See, for example, Lisa Keller, Triumph of Order: Democracy and Public Space in New York and London (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pg. 44.
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transform users into guardians of their own moral codes of “getting along,” helping to reorganize
the “eye of power” traced by Foucault into a paradoxical instrument of civil liberty.
One may reasonably question their orderliness and impact; however, the “General
Assemblies” of the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011 were exemplary in this regard.
Within the space of the Occupy protests themselves, a visible and accountable structure was
routinely practiced, one that was respectful to its participants.

That loose organizational

structure revealed an alternatively modeled, non-judgmental decision-making apparatus under
threatening circumstances. Many movements create this space. As this chapter progresses and
attempts to reconcile built environments and the public sphere, we will see that democratic space
relies on visible and reproducible renegotiations of the social contract. Public space thereby
enhances our capacity to recognize other points of view in spite of our civic pursuits and
prejudices. It serves as a natural check on repression, according to champions like Dewey and
free speech advocates such as John Stuart Mill.

Without visible and revelatory space,

subjectivity retreats inward, individuals abandon agency, and citizens relinquish selfdetermination and their collective freedoms.

4) Diversity, tolerance, and accommodation
Provided that favorable conditions are produced by the benchmarks previously
mentioned, a fourth indicator is the diversity of users and uses of public space, tolerance towards
those users and uses, and accommodation of new users and uses. According to Sennett, it is the
very nature of public space “…to intermix persons and diverse activities” that makes it worth
producing. For environmental psychologists, a chief concern of public space “…is whether
people are free to achieve the types of experiences they desire…most simply, the feeling that it is
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possible to use the space in a way that draws on its resources and satisfies personal needs.” The
corollary is a diverse notion of public space as “a place that accommodates people…and
becomes, over time, a site that people rely on to meet, relax, protest or market.” 17 Crawford
elaborates on the pluralism of public space as an architectural creation:
Public space should be viewed not as a single, unified physical and social entity
but as a situation that can be experienced in multiple, partial, and even
paradoxical ways. Thus there is no single public space but as many different
public spaces as there are different publics. 18

What is interesting about this marker is that it elicits an echo among supporters that nontraditional spaces are often well suited to the demands of diversity in particular, as well as
tolerance and accommodation. Spaces purposefully designated for public use are often poorly
appointed to host diverse users and uses. This may be so because customized place is only able
to tolerate prearranged uses. It cannot accommodate new or heterogeneous use frameworks,
which are frequently isolated from the signs and symbols relied upon by users in the visibility
criterion above. On the other hand, as Glazer and Lilla point out, it is inside unconventional
environments, such as shopping districts (and the interstitial spaces that connect them to noncommercial activities), that a diversity of users may discover opportunity to assemble and
negotiate publicly. 19 Indeed, it may be the mixed activities and rules of bargaining that govern
such spaces that make them so desirable to diverse users and uses. “Everyday spaces,” to borrow
a term popularized by Crawford, represent an attractive substitute to “the carefully planned,
officially designated, and often underused spaces of public use that can be found in most
American cities…” Franck and Stevens describe “loose spaces” as those in which any number of
17

Carr, et al., op cit., pp. 137, 50.
Margaret Crawford, “Suburban Life and Public Space,” in David J. Smiley and Mark Robbins (Eds.), Sprawl and
Public Space: Redressing the Mall (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2002), pg. 22.
19
Nathan Glazer and Mark Lilla, The Public Face of Architecture: Civic Culture and Public Spaces (New York:
The Free Press, 1987), pp. x-xii.
18
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users practice assorted uses, generating collective capacity “with or without official sanctions
and with or without physical features that support those activities.” And in an even more
assertive endorsement of diversity, Jeffrey Hou advocates a distinction between institutional
public spaces—the conventional ones referred to above, such as parks, where people routinely
observe prescribed rules of behavior—and insurgent public spaces, where people may ignore
such guidelines. Most notable among these latter spaces are protests. 20
Events in Lower Manhattan further illustrate how a diversity of users and uses may
redefine unconventional spaces. While post-Occupy scholarship in urban geography, planning,
and architecture raised consciousness about privately owned public spaces (POPS), they were
subjects of consideration prior to 2011. Following Jane Jacobs’ widely celebrated study of
neighborhood streets and community spaces in The Death and Life of Great American Cities, a
leading defense of diversity was developed by William Whyte, who studied POPS in several
American cities, including New York. Whyte conducted what was thought to be a highly
unusual study of publicly accessible plazas, skyways, concourses, and other urban places. He
interviewed scores of planners, developers, architects and, most importantly, users of POPS.
Without putting too fine a point on it, Whyte’s discovery was that spaces designated as public
were problematic, indeed counter-intuitive. They were consistently unaccommodating to outside
users, intolerant of any but the most limited uses, and unlikely to channel any public practices.
Whether it was a matter of uncomfortable appointments, an absence of light and visibility, or a
pervasive difficulty with even locating them, the POPS observed by Whyte categorically failed
to meet their designated purposes.
20

In order, see Margaret Crawford, “Introduction,” in J.L. Chase, M. Crawford, and J. Kaliski (Eds.), Everyday
Urbanism (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1999), pp. 9-10; Karen Franck and Quentin Stevens, Loose Space (New
York: Routledge, 2006), pg. 2; Jeffrey Hou, ed. Insurgent Public Space: Guerilla Urbanism and the Remaking of
Contemporary Cities (New York: Routledge, 2010). I will elaborate on unexpected activities and their defining
power below.
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In Whyte’s view, the failure was most regrettable in New York City. It boasted a series
of zoning incentives given to developers in return for open and accessible public space. New
“bonus plazas” were mandated, as givebacks to the public. They were intended to offset the loss
of open space and light, when office towers grew taller in the City’s central business districts.
Instead, Whyte complained, the towers grew taller, but very little functional public space was
added to the urban landscape. Whyte’s study proved instrumental, prompting revised design
requirements through a new city planning regime that demanded more from developers. The
latter would have to deliver utilizable public places to inhabitants after any rezoning. Open
space development has enhanced the accessibility and visibility of New York’s bonus plazas and
those in other cities, while supporting a surfeit of community uses and practices, even after the
terrorist attacks on 9/11. POPS have been transformed into the highlights of urban business
districts in many cities—helping to fuel metropolitan population increases in the last Census.
From another point of view, however, Whyte’s work may have fallen victim to its impact
on the planning community. The spaces at the heart of his critique became objects of widespread
concern among urban planners, as well as reorganization with respect to their public design.
This is a good thing on its face, but planning improvements on public places may sometimes
diminish their accessibility as diverse, tolerant, and accommodating spaces, an unintended
consequence of the reforms that followed from Whyte’s fieldwork. 21 Police actions undertaken
during the Occupy movement in 2011 reveal a paradox of enhancement within POPS and other
shared urban spaces. The renovation of these places has arguably been encoded with rigid
planning values, aimed at leveraging capital investment and spurring economic development,
rather than the accommodation or toleration of diverse public uses. Echoing criticisms once
21

William H. Whyte, City: Rediscovering the Center (New York: Doubleday, 1988). Whyte’s examination here
follows his earlier volume on such places. See Whyte, The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces (New York: Anchor
Books, 1980)
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leveled by Lefebvre in France, and later by Graham in England, Brash decries the “urban
neoliberalism” that now surrounds post-Whyte reorganizations of public space. As he reminds
us, the claim advanced by the owners of Zuccotti Park in their effort to remove protesters—a
claim heeded and then forcibly administered by the New York Police Department—mostly
targeted littering and problems of aesthetics generated by the Occupy movement, while
eschewing the civil rights of its members. 22
Thus, one may argue that planning itself has channeled misuses of Whyte’s admonitions
in favor of improved public articulation within privately owned spaces. It has animated the
design of fungible spaces, which spurn public practices that do not generate revenue. Absent
real diversity, the optics of these spaces presents opportunities for use that are seemingly
participative for users, yet limited by strict codes of programming. These codes are evidenced
by the regulations posted at the entrances of POPS and other public places once condemned by
Whyte as inadequately planned and hostile to personal or entertainment functions.
An innovation on Whyte’s argument from accommodation is found in the work of J.B.
Jackson. Jackson indicates public space as a nucleus of tolerance, which is engineered not by
planners or environmental designers, but rather by the users who annex it for their own diverse
needs, including civic uses. His work therefore anticipates an emerging canon of thought, which
posits public space as the outcome of client negotiation and, at times, contestation. 23 Jackson,
too, reflects Whyte’s concerns about bonus plazas and the like. However, he aims to transcend
design restrictions, urging those who inhabit shared space to diversify or claim it for civic uses,
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that is, to appropriate environments for collective action. Jackson recommends commercial
establishments as first order public spaces in the making, all the more dynamic insofar as patrons
use them in great numbers. 24 In essence, Jackson politicizes unused space; he recommends that
individuals and groups enhance their citizenship by fashioning practicable public forums:
I think we have finally come to recognize that we no longer know how to use the
traditional public space as an effective political instrument, and that we need a
wide choice of very different kinds of public space… We are better off than we
suppose; our landscape has an undreamed of potential for public spaces of infinite
variety. When we look back a century, or even a half- century, we realize how
many new public or common spaces have appeared in our towns and cities, spaces
where people come together spontaneously and without restraint. 25

This argument from appropriation, specifically, Jackson’s claim that non-traditional
places must be made public, requires further consideration when we examine jurisprudence that
has legally circumscribed free speech and assembly within contemporary places. There is indeed
a history of tolerance and accommodation within diverse spaces. Yet, much of that history
reflects exclusions of the public from spaces that Jackson and other observers use to emplace
civic engagement. In many cases, those exclusions are enacted by competing stakeholders, such
as private property owners. When conflicts ensue between these public and private interests, the
state frequently mediates between them, thereby determining legal access to space, a fact often
overlooked by scholars of design and practice, including Jackson and his successors.
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5) Authenticity and unexpectedness
The last point above raises a complex issue, one that resurfaces throughout this
examination: approved and unapproved functions of publicly accessible space. The geographic
dimensions of an inclusive, participatory civic sphere are also beginning to take shape, I trust.
The continuum between that sphere and its spatiality and functionality where political activity is
concerned may be elaborated further through one last indicator of public space, namely, its
authenticity and unexpectedness. Jackson defined public spaces as those in which people can
“come together spontaneously and without restraint.” Carr, et al. treated public spaces, first and
foremost, as places of association and civic expression: “With the assembly of people, a sharing
and unity are possible that can give expression to communal feelings and an exercise of rights,
sometimes leading to political action.” 26 These notions suggest an intimate connection between
public landscape and popular sovereignty, such as the links observed by Tocqueville, and later
by Dewey. But they also reflect current arguments for a spatialized public sphere, the kind
encouraged by social theorists, such as Wolin and Barber, who both rely on the communal bonds
constructed by people when they act collectively to authenticate the spaces they use. 27
It is the civic production of spaces that makes them both public and genuine in this view.
And it is unanticipated negotiations within those public spaces that can interrupt political inertia,
by stemming the kinds of passive spectatorship in the civic sphere that work against democratic
association. Without active authentication of public spaces, civic capacity is less likely to
develop organically outside state institutions; community is weakened, leaving individuals or
groups marginalized by dominant political processes vulnerable to the weight of majoritarianism,
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ideological orthodoxy, and exclusion. 28 Given authentic public spaces, users are presented with
opportunities to participate in collective processes of their own making, democratic procedures
that feed engagement and allow for negotiation, both of differences and common interests. 29
In turn, authentic spaces may be appropriated in unforeseen ways. Prescribed forms
rarely routinize publicity. Nor is shared space easily encoded with contents prior to common
use. In Carr, et al., “Public space is the stage upon which the drama of communal life unfolds.” 30
Reflecting Walt Whitman’s poetry of urban interaction and democracy, Lofland argues that the
sincerest indicator of public space is what she dubs the “encounter,” noting that users “relish the
adventures and encounters” that occur within. 31 One of urbanism’s greatest champions, Jane
Jacobs, relied on her observations in The Death and Life of Great American Cities to spread the
idea that public spaces are improvised through people’s unrehearsed contacts.

When free

exchanges gird those spaces to their users, interpersonal bonds flourish and become transformed
into chosen trusts, which political scientists generally regard as cornerstones of democracy. 32
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This idea corresponds to Walzer’s expression, “open-minded spaces.” These spaces are
defined principally by the unexpected activities that occur inside. 33 Walzer looks to bridge urban
planning and participation with his communitarian theory of politics, by suggesting that when the
unexpected happens within shared spaces, the public good is diffused more equitably and
democratic relationships ensue among users of different castes. Though he ostensibly grumbled
about diluted discourses on a mixed-use agora, this may be the reason why Aristotle proposed a
split between marketing and civic activities in his Politics. As Lerner notes, Aristotle had a
profound fear of spontaneous collective action, overdriven by egalitarian concerns: read
revolution. 34 Revolution, of course, is characteristically unpredictable.

And it is true, for

example, that medieval and early-modern public markets—Europe’s central civic spaces, as we
will see in the next chapter—hosted extemporaneous food riots and other kinds of turbulences
seen as so distasteful to Aristotle. 35 He may have been eager to segregate any upheavals away
from the agora, then, bifurcating publicly accessible Athenian space and thereby reducing the
likelihood of unplanned contact between commercial and political users.
By definition, the purpose of planning is to ensure that unexpected things do not happen.
Thus, we see a persistent gap between the development and control of accessible public place, on
the one hand, and the spontaneous, practicable space engendered by public appropriation and
legitimation of unsanctioned uses, on the other.

As Staeheli and Mitchell remind us, this

political terrain is always subject to contestation:
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[S]pace is produced out of a struggle between designers, planners, engineers, or
other powerful actors who seek to create a space of order and control, and users of
the space who necessarily perceive space differently and thus act in it in ways not
necessarily anticipated by their designers. 36

Whether we think of it as a product of designation or practicability, this struggle pertains
to a wide range of spaces today. Yet, it has played out over centuries, well before the idea of a
vibrant public sphere was tested against its spatiality in the United States. In Europe, where that
idea was born, the publicity of political democracy has always been contoured by traditions of
exclusion carried over from feudal days. Those traditions have hinged on a dispute over space,
heterogeneity, and inclusion in places where people gather.

This dispute demands further

attention now, if we are to reconcile American law with our designs and practices later.

Political theory and the public sphere: the problem of inclusion
As the indications above show, constructs of public space should address the following
questions: What are its permissible uses, and who are its legitimate users? From the ancient
agora to medieval and modern markets, urban POPS, and the suburban shopping malls that will
concern us later, determinations about uses and users depend on whether built environments are
accessible to and supportive of their adjacent communities; whether they improve visibility for
identity claims; whether they furnish diverse uses; and whether they accommodate publicproducing acts, or at least tolerate unexpected activities by users? As we prepare for historical
examples, I want to relate the question of access to a debate about pluralism in the public sphere.
Should built environments be reconciled with political oppositions among publics? This inquiry
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may be framed in two ways: Is it acceptable to use civic space to animate multiple causes?
Conversely, is it permissible to use any shared space to engage in public discourses?
For the remainder of this chapter, I will address the first question by examining the ideas
of social debate and inclusion in the work of Jürgen Habermas—a contemporary political
theorist who most conspicuously dedicates his intellectual efforts to the desiderata of a public
sphere. The reverse question will be examined more closely in the next chapter, against the
historical backdrop of discursive practices within embodied spaces.
I have elected to focus on Habermas for three reasons. First, Habermas makes the public
sphere a centerpiece of his political thought. 37 Second, Habermas couches his conception of the
public sphere as part of an argument about its degeneration under contemporary conditions, an
idea that reappears in the following chapters. Third, Habermas champions a notion of the public
sphere that implicates modern commercial space, an important advance on Hannah Arendt’s
work, specifically, the “space of appearance” on which she constructs her theory of the public
realm. In this sense, Habermas is engaged in a contest with Arendt over people’s access to the
political domain. That is certainly the case in The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, which he first published in 1962, and then revised thirty years later. 38 Habermas’
criticism of accommodation in Arendt’s public realm sheds greater light on the indications of
civic space above, therefore. Moreover, it requires us to wrestle with the exclusion of conflict, as
well as the practicability of discursive space within publicly accessible environments.
As I noted above, Habermas develops his theory of the public sphere, in part at least, to
overcome intolerance he detected in Arendt’s writings. As the 20th century progressed, and the
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aftermath of the Second World War disclosed the costs of totalitarianism to Europe especially,
political theory began to concentrate on the public domain as vital to the study of governments.
Arendt’s work was instrumental in this regard, since it proffered a view of civic engagement.
However, the “space of appearance” she conceived in The Human Condition turned inaccessible
to citizens of a modern, pluralistic world. 39 So, while Habermas shared Arendt’s concerns with
an eclipse of the public realm in contemporary politics, as well as her conceptualization of public
space as a locus of communication and action, he saw no bridge between her antiquated
construct of embodied space and the demand for diversity, tolerance, and accommodation within
the modern public sphere. Arendt’s agonistic space revealed a disdain for the socio-economic
antagonisms that take center stage in modernity. Concerns of the household might not seem as
principled as abstract moral debates, but the kinds of justice sought by philosophers, including
Aristotle and Tocqueville, recommended a politics based on lived realities, rather than exclusions
of all but the noblest ideas or participants. 40
In Habermas’ space, civic engagement is generated in response to both public and private
conditions, so it cannot segregate them, as Arendt tried to do. Perhaps anticipating the pluralist
critiques of Iris Marion Young and other contemporaries, Habermas defines the relationship
between the public and private spheres with greater fluidity than Arendt, exhibited in the nexus
“between state and economy, freedom and welfare, political-practical activity and production.”
A public realm defined by singularity could not contain the complex and dynamic interplay
among modern polities, economies, societies or liberties. Habermas therefore posts his main
criticism of Arendt, on behalf of a more timely conception of the public sphere, one in which
civic capacity is harnessed by social differentiation:
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Arendt rightly insists that the technical-economic overcoming of poverty is by no
means a sufficient condition for the practical securing of political liberty. But she
becomes the victim of a concept of politics that is inapplicable to modern
conditions when she asserts that the ‘intrusion of social and economic matters into
the public realm…necessarily frustrate[s] every attempt at a politically active
public realm…’ I want only to indicate the curious perspective that Hannah
Arendt adopts: a state which is relieved of the administrative processing of social
problems; a politics which is cleansed of socio-economic issues; an
institutionalization of public liberty which is independent of the organization of
public wealth; a radical democracy which inhibits its liberating efficacy just at the
boundaries where political oppression ceases and social repression begins—this
path is unimaginable for any modern society. 41

Habermas now looks to reinvest a liberal theory of publicity with substance. In The
Structural Transformation, he borrows on the expressions of public space produced during the
Enlightenment, within a “bourgeois public sphere,” made of “private persons assembled to form
a public” inside 17th and 18th century cafes and salons. 42 Private discourse therein relates to the
miscellany of public affairs at the time, when political policy begins to be evaluated outside of
the traditional spaces of royal courts. The public sphere thereby expands its membership.
Where the Arendtian public realm only included elites, practically speaking, Habermasian public
space could at once be accessed by the new bourgeoisie, irrespective of their excluded claims on
formal titles or influence on the state. That access stimulated free debates about existing socioeconomic problems, a form of insurgency that slowly engendered visibility among members of
the bourgeoisie—allowing it to become aware of itself and its shared identity, while using its
newfound consciousness to question an outdated system of economic distributions, feudalism,
and then enact innovations, eventually transforming mercantilism into capitalism. 43
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Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere exhibits four conditions, which distinguish its
geography from previous incarnations. First, it is built on new conditions of access and social
exchange. 44 Groups who inhabit shared spaces in the 17th and 18th centuries enjoy greater levels
of inclusion than their feudal counterparts. That is, membership in the modern public sphere no
longer depends on ranks of royalty. Rather, and secondly, participation becomes a function of
the rationality of members’ arguments. 45 Third, the publicly accessible spaces of the modern
period become sites for the “problematization of areas that until then had not been questioned.”46
Topics such as religion and politics, previously the purview of church and crown, become
subjects of public opinion. Finally, as a result of the conditions above, the emerging public
sphere—its spaces and its publics—becomes less exclusive. Everyone who could acquire what
Calhoun calls the requisite “cultural products,” that is, information and experience that enabled
them to become suitably versed in public opinion, could lay claim to the debates that transpired
in places like English coffee houses and French salons. 47
Using the conditions above to situate the modern public sphere, Habermas goes on to
define it as a normative space, in two ways.

The sphere outlined in The Structural

Transformation is rendered public through the quality of discourse expressed therein, as well as
through the quantity of discourse accepted within. Thus, it is both the nature and volume of
expressive contact within publicly accessible places like cafes that defines the modern public
sphere. Habermas is eager to distinguish these interactions from affairs of state in the strict
44
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sense, as well as from the marketplace.

The modern civic sphere he is outlining is an

intermediary product, a new form of agency built atop emergent public opinions. It exists to
bridge the relationship between the state and civil society, and it does include the economy as an
object. Nevertheless, its key organizational feature, in other words, its driving force, is rational
deliberation about the state. 48 More people can contribute to the body of rational opinion, but
engagement must be structured through civilian discussions of public administration.
Habermas is surely establishing a more moderate public-private division than the one
defended by Arendt, who sought to spatialize political discourses against practices in the
household and the marketplace. However, Habermas appears to produce a different hierarchy,
by assigning a greater public value to rational deliberation about the state, and a lesser value to
economy. 49 In so doing, he may be destabilizing his own construct—specifically, the quality and
quantity signposts he relies on to demonstrate his idea of modern public space. That is, while
Habermas’ public sphere initially promises to reflect indications described earlier in this chapter
and thereby overcome Arendt’s exclusion of heterogeneous discourse from the modern sphere,
the former’s normative account begins to display inattention to the need for visibility and
diversity within embodied spaces. As Villa points out:
Both Arendt and Habermas see the public sphere as a specifically political space
distinct from…the economy, an institutionally bounded discursive arena that is
home to citizen debate, deliberation, agreement, and action. Yet they also see this
sphere as overwhelmed by the antipolitical forces unleashed by modernity…The
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result is the destruction of the space of democratic decision making, a realm now
‘colonized’ by technical-administrative imperatives. 50

In his examination of the evolving public sphere, then, Habermas seems to join Arendt in
lamenting the contemporary corrosion of discursive space, following an earlier, rational heyday.
Habermas’ distinction between “lifeworld” and “systemworld” suggests a more inclusive idea of
agonistic space, but it is nonetheless agonistic—that is, space in which politics ought to be
bracketed from the mix of pluralistic practices ushered by modernity. Habermas is discomfited
by excessive annexation of the public sphere by increasingly well-organized interests inside the
marketplace of ideas. And while Arendt seems to distrust the modern public’s expression of its
organic needs, Habermas is reasonably apprehensive about the engineering of public opinion
through mediated manipulations of demand or the mass marketing of what Calhoun calls
“apolitical sociability,” and “passive culture consumption.” 51 The upshot of these distortions,
Habermas argues, is no less than a diminution of all civic capacity. This result merits attention.
So, too, does Habermas’ reflection on the deliberative quality and quantity of public space.
With respect to quality of discourse and its signal of public space, Habermas elaborates
the modern public sphere emerging in cafes and salons by highlighting its origins in rational
discussion.

Quality in this sense corresponds to the shift in public exchanges during the

Enlightenment.

No longer did the potency of political arguments attach strictly to who

communicated them. It was the logic of what one said that mattered, and this new currency
could be accumulated outside royal courts. As a result, the emergent public sphere began to
influence political development both in and outside government, because the administrators of
fledgling European states started hearing a newer and richer public opinion. It was informed,
50
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and in turn shaped by spaces where objects previously unaddressed by mixed social classes were
now being deliberated. 52 In effect, political deliberation within cafes and salons catalyzed those
same cafes and salons politically. Rational discourse began to yield human geographies that
were at once more accessible and predisposed to question feudal authority. Thus, a modern
public sphere was harnessed through unexpected activities inside environments where people
gathered habitually, producing new forms of civic space that thrived on criticism.
Habermas even suggests that the discourses that transformed the structure of the public
sphere included concerns about commerce and private production:
Because, on the one hand, the society now confronting the state clearly separated
a private domain from public authority and because, on the other hand, it turned
the reproduction of life into something transcending the confines of private
domestic authority and becoming a subject of public interest, that zone of
continuous administrative contact became ‘critical’ also in the sense that it
provoked the critical judgment of a public making use of its reason

And later,
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated
from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate
over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly
relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this
political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s
public use of their reason. 53

These expanded expressions of the public sphere beckon Habermas’ second indicator: quantity
of discourse. They may also signal a pivot in Habermas’ argument, when he exhibits more
unease about the growing synergies between public and private, politics and markets, discourse
and mediation. As he turns his attention to the decline of the modern public sphere, Habermas
detaches civic activity from commercial intercourse and social reproduction. And though he is
52
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critical of Arendt for historicizing a golden age based on a misinterpretation of the ancient agora,
Habermas may himself be guilty of romanticizing the bourgeois public sphere and spatiality
during the Enlightenment. As the structural transformation of the public sphere magnified the
scale of access among new users, the permeable qualities first celebrated by Habermas becomes
the sources of decay within that sphere. In turn, his anxiety over the spatialization of that sphere
in the mass marketplace leads him to adopt a normative view of space, which is exclusionary.
Habermas’ concentration on the modern public sphere shifts from membership in the
discourses that comprise it to the size of the discourses that undermine it. Surges in civic
participation were influenced by democratic upheavals that took place in Europe during the 17th
and 18th centuries. Liberalized access to political spaces in England, and later on within the
Continent, was propelled by the ascendancy of bourgeois social classes—what Benhabib calls
new “autonomous publics” produced by greater diversity among discussions and discussants.
Given these expanded scales of inclusion, the geography and content of the public sphere is
reshaped by multiplicity. Its functionality begins to outgrow its form:
Public space…is viewed democratically as the creation of procedures whereby
those affected by general social norms and collective political decisions can have
a say in their formulation, stipulation, and adoption…The public sphere comes
into existence whenever and wherever all affected by general social and political
norms of action engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity. In
effect, there may be as many publics as there are controversial general debates
about the validity of norms. Democratization…can be viewed as the increase and
growth of autonomous public spheres among participants. 54

This escalation in scale, which Habermas likewise finds in the United States, intensifies
rapidly in the 19th century. And though he hailed the inclusivity of 17th and 18th century public
spaces, such as cafes and salons, these new scales have led Habermas to conclude that the post-
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Enlightenment public sphere has largely deteriorated in proportion to its expanded social and
commercial integration. 55 So, the quality and quantity measures Habermas initially used to build
his theory eventually resist one another. Calhoun notices this opposition, too:
The early bourgeois public spheres were composed of narrow segments of the
European population, mainly educated, propertied men, and they conducted a
discourse not only exclusive of others but prejudicial to the interests of those
excluded. Yet the transformations of the public sphere that Habermas describes
turn largely on its continual expansion to include more and more participants (as
well as on the development of large scale social organizations as mediators of
individual participation). He suggests that ultimately this inclusivity brought
degeneration in the in the quality of discourse… 56

At the heart of Habermas’ interpretation of an escalating quantity of participation, on the
one hand, and degenerating quality of discourse, on the other, is market penetration of public
opinion about state policies and any number of civic concerns. New memberships in the public
sphere excite all sorts of infiltrations into the marketplace of ideas by supply-side interests, along
with innumerable strategies aimed at enhancing competitiveness in that market. Rational input
diminishes, as political space becomes multifunctional and promotional. Proliferating discourses
channel away the logics Habermas first lauded, appropriated by new groups of contributors who
are scarcely “subtle reasoners.” 57 Thus, the public sphere declined as its geography grew more
inclusive, that is, when its spaces became embodied legally on larger scales. 58 The bourgeois
public sphere of cafes and salons is now displaced in Habermas’ criticism of contemporary
discourse, transformed into mass-produced public spaces. Habermas sees a kind of Gramscian
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hegemony playing out in these spaces. 59 Serving so many interests, markets intersect with and
ultimately colonize the public sphere and all rational decision-making. 60 Habermas therefore
turns suspicious about newer, diverse ecologies, in which public goods amount to publicly
marketed ones. As Fraser notes, Habermas’ public sphere becomes universally
distinct…it is not [and should never be] an arena of market relations but rather
one of discursive relations, a theater for debating and deliberating rather than for
buying and selling. 61

In its earliest formulation, then, Habermas’ normative iteration of the public sphere bears
a questionable relation to what Fraser considers actually existing democracy. 62 Bernstein takes
the argument further, urging that Habermas’ exaltations of modern public space recall Arendt’s
reification of an upper agora, where few people can go as a result of its access requirements. 63
Habermas’ effort to historically distill desiderata for publicity decouples economy and polity,
and it may thus elide discourses in spaces inhabited by large segments of that public, who plainly
spend their time and resources therein. Bracketing inclusive, albeit commercial space may
produce a public sphere that satisfies normative objectives, but it may also become insensitive to
the social problems experienced by significant cross-sections of its membership.
Pluralists, perhaps best represented by Young, argue that multiply determined discourses
require ongoing political negotiations among diverse groups. These discourses and negotiations
may actually elevate values of rationality promoted by Habermas throughout his exposition of
the normative public sphere, while safeguarding social difference and ideological heterodoxy for
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purposes of communicative action. 64 As Calhoun points out, social groups commonly form
themselves into movements, who then create or deploy space to press for justice in variable
arenas. 65 Occupy Wall Street used publicly accessible spaces to raise consciousness about
income inequality, while Tea Party activists generated debate about taxation. Notwithstanding
their diametrically opposed positions, they each produced visible public spheres, circulated
controversial opinions through shared spaces, and modeled alternatives to the mass-mediated
discourses criticized by Habermas. As I intend to show in the next chapter, ordinary people have
assembled in marketplaces to press social, economic, and political causes, thereby forging
themselves into the very “autonomous publics” Habermas wants to identify.
As his thought continued to mature, that is, as he gained further independence from the
intellectual pessimism inculcated by his teachers at the Frankfurt School, Habermas
acknowledged heterogeneity and prospects for autonomy within multifunctional public spaces—
spaces extended past the shadows of the early bourgeois public sphere and built on social
differentiations associated with public address among marginalized groups. 66

He also

recognized that the chronicle of access and decline outlined in The Structural Transformation
engendered its own exclusions of existing publics. Challenged by his contemporaries in political
economy, pluralism, and post-structuralism, Habermas amended his views and demonstrated his
openness to diverse practices of public space outside the state. Thirty years after he posited a
highly universalized public sphere, Habermas conceded his initial position:
In fine, my diagnosis of a unilinear development from a politically active public
to one withdrawn into a bad privacy, from a ‘culture-debating to a cultureconsuming public,’ is too simplistic. At the time, I was too pessimistic about the
resisting power and above all the critical potential of a pluralistic, internally much
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differentiated mass public whose cultural usages have begun to shake off the
constraints of class. 67

His construction of the public sphere remains a work in progress, therefore. This is to the good, I
would argue. The need for publicity and place has only grown since he published his seminal
analysis, particularly within the metropolitan environments to be considered later in this study.

In each of the indications above—among the numerous disciplines represented in this
chapter—we see contests over the public functions of shared space. As I hope to show in the
next chapter, these contests transcend the universality of Habermas’ public sphere and its
critiques.

They extend to civic practices within embodied spaces, where people actually

assemble; inside historical landscapes where they have mobilized politically and formed
themselves into publics. Owing at times to inclusive planning and design, contests have been
replaced by continuum, as well as mutual accommodations among stakeholders who inhabit or
practice open space. Yet, at other times, unexpected activities inside built environments have
been met with regulation or outright exclusion, especially in publicly accessible, but privately
controlled space. The face-offs precipitated by Occupy Wall Street in New York and other cities
across the nation suggest that spatiality and contestation will continue to evolve together as
themes within urbanism. However, the challenge to understand or indicate practicable space will
also confront the edges of American cities, where increasingly diverse metropolitan publics or
would-be publics must forge new meanings and expressions of place if they are to successfully
build civic capacity in the 21st century.
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Chapter Two
Historical Practices of Public Space:
From Agora to Agora-phobia, and Again
As we saw in the previous chapter, public space may be indicated in a variety of ways. It is
viewed differently within design circles, among students of urbanism, and throughout Western
social theory. Political theorists seeking to understand the meaning of the modern public sphere
convey no less diversity in addressing its topographical scale and tolerances. I would argue that
challenges to determine the values of public space and sphere have helped shape the historical
arc of civic engagement in the West, not to mention jurisprudence precipitated by expressive
practices in America. While jurists may not debate the work of Jane Jacobs or Jürgen Habermas
for that matter, they do have occasion to weigh questions related to the environment and practice
of public space when they rule on the legality of free speech therein. Similarly, judicial review
of the public sphere speaks in some measure to benchmarks addressed in the last chapter: access,
community, visibility, accommodation, and unexpectedness. And it often does so within the
dialectic between private property rights “enshrined in law,” on the one hand, and public spaces
many regard as essential to democratic processes of participation and representation, on the
other. 1 As Mitchell argues, “The ability for citizens to move between private property and public
space [has] determined the nature of public interaction in the developing democracy of the
United States.” 2 Rarely has such public space and interaction been produced without struggle, as
the events surrounding Occupy Wall Street should attest.
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The first chapter signaled some of the disputes that arise when public space and
interaction ensue inside privately owned locales. As we saw, competing interpretations of public
space and sphere have often fallen along a continuum that includes publicly accessible settings
where politics and markets are mutually inclusive, and those where they are not. This continuum
comes to life in the history of practicable space, where civic access has cyclically expanded and
contracted in the places where people go. As that history has unfolded, it has reproduced its own
dialectics of space, which can help us to understand more fully the relationship between political
exchanges and exclusions within built environments.

As Mitchell argues elsewhere, the

mediation of these relationships in law has radiated in large part from interpretations of history
and practice in publicly accessible but privately owned spaces. 3
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to trace historical examples of public functionality
within commercial spaces—in particular, the use of marketplaces for civic activity. It will
demonstrate that temporal relationships between marketplaces and political practices within
urban spaces have often been characterized by ebb and flow. While marketplaces have at times
supported commercial and civic activities in common, or have at least tolerated some mingling
between them, at other times the evidence points to a lack of accommodation. In all instances,
alternating patterns of amalgamation and separation have reflected historical shifts that are longterm and subtle, rather than abrupt or easily pronounced.
The account here will be a condensed one. Rather than reviewing the entire history of
urban marketplaces in which public practices have been included or excluded, I will survey
selected spaces within defined periods. Beginning in ancient Athens and her contemporary
Greek city-states in the 5th century B.C., I segue to Rome in the 3rd century A.D. I then proceed
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from medieval and early-modern markets in Europe to their latter-modern successors. Next, I
cross the Atlantic Ocean. I examine America’s colonial markets, followed by ones founds
during its democratic transitions in the 1820s and 1830s. Later I look at a rapidly urbanizing
America, still healing from its wounds after the Civil War. Finally, I advance to the 20th century,
specifically, the United States of city streets in the first half, and then a suburbanized nation
marked by massive urban exoduses in the second half. Notwithstanding the 1950s and 1960s,
during which widespread, if short-lived expressions of civic space occurred, the latter 20th
century witnessed a growing chasm between America’s public and non-public domains.
In order to better understand that gap, I will survey America’s urban flight and the
suburbanization of commercial space in the 20th century, both of which ushered decreases of
publicly functional geography in the United States, according to many observers. Likewise,
scholars point to the decline of cities and the growth of suburbs to explain the degeneration of
America’s public sphere. 4 This interpretation of declining civic capacity is found in a variety of
academic traditions, including social and political theory. During the last decade, it seems, there
has been more integration of these theoretical discourses, as well as others through which the late
20th century demise of public space has been historicized. This is an important step forward as
we confront the changes above in the 21st century. However, I believe that the prevailing
literature has committed too little attention to the role of the state in conditioning civic practices
through its organization of space. Evidence of that power will surface in what follows.
Before we begin, the reader should be advised that the timelines I wish to establish are
not entirely linear, nor are they constitutive of any particular methodology. They generally
derive from secondary interpretations of environmental design and spatial practices inscribed in
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architectural histories of ancient and medieval gathering places, themes collected from modern
exposition and theory, and contemporary argumentation. Though I stand by the forthcoming
narratives, and the conclusions drawn from them here, they are in no way intended to serve as
primary sources of data, longitudinal or otherwise.

Flow and ebb in the Greek agora and Roman forum:
According to Carr, Francis, Rivlin, and Stone, it is possible to trace “some form of public
marketplace…to the Mesopotamian cities of 2000 B.C.,” however, “the major precursors of the
latter-day public spaces occurred in the cities of Ancient Greece and Rome.” 5

The most

celebrated expression of these public spaces was the Athenian agora. Yet, the agora did not
become a practicable public space in Greek topography until the fifth century B.C., when it
replaced the Acropolis and the rituals staged upon it as the nucleus of public life in democratic
Athens. What is significant about this secularized space, aside from its openness and importance
to Athenian democracy, is that it served not only as the social meeting place of the polis, but its
central market. Notwithstanding an aggressive divide between politics, militarism, and other
activities in Hippodamus’ city planning, or more measured proposals advanced by Aristotle to
the Athenians, the mix of commerce and civic engagement atop a multifunctional agora became
integral to the environmental and social landscape of Greece’s premiere city-state. 6
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the agora and its open marketplace became the most frequented
gathering place in democratic Athens. The popularity of the agora may be explained by its
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physical centrality, but equally by its spatial toleration for mixed social practices, including
public deliberation. Commercial and political intercourse combined as quotidian attractions,
producing diverse and unexpected atmospherics, as well as a rich communal experience,
described by Barker during my introduction to this study. 7 Wycherley has also celebrated the
geography of the agora in an illuminating portrait of Ancient Greek design within its city-states.
As he argues, the agora engendered unity through its accommodation of multiplicity:
The agora was in fact no mere public place but the central zone of the city, its
living heart…It was the constant resort of all citizens, and it did not spring to life
on special occasions but was the daily scene of social life, business and
politics…The same free space sufficed for all kinds of purposes…in fact the
Greeks thoroughly mixed up the elements of their lives, for better or for worse,
and this fusion is clearly seen in the agora… The true Hellenic agora was the
inner zone, the nucleus, and was closely knit into the fabric of the city. The
Greek did not sort out his life into neat insulated compartments, but let each
element act upon the others, and the agora is a manifestation of this spirit. 8

More to the point, the arrangement of the agora blurred environmental and practical distinctions
between politics and markets:
No clear line was drawn between civic center and market. The public buildings
and shrines were in the agora; meat and fish and the rest were sold in the same
agora…the two areas are not to be differentiated clearly or opposed to one
another in function….The agora was still not clearly divisible according to
function; even less were there two agoras, one political, one commercial. 9

Evidently, Fifth century Athenian designers opted not to incorporate proposals for a
divided agora, though they were aware of the likelihood that market activities might spill into
the public sphere, and vice versa, particularly in the multicultural spaces peopled by new traders
and consumers after the Peloponnesian War in 404 B.C. Their rejection of split zoning schemes
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reflected their distaste for the authoritarianism and popular inaccessibility of Hippodamus’ city
plans, and the political conservatism reflected by critics of Athens’ democracy, such as
Aristophanes. 10

Similarly, their decision to emplace commerce and politics on one agora

suggested a repudiation of Aristotle’s arguments against democracy, and an environmental
commitment to public life among citizens. 11 This pledge to participation and open discourse
fostered conditions through which the Athenian marketplace flourished, while rational
philosophy matured there by 386 B.C. 12 As Wycherley remarks, Socrates used the agora to
engage in his public dialogues; “thus the first step was taken towards the creation of a
philosophical school,” where, ironically, Plato and other opponents of the democratic franchise
could espouse their views. 13 These historical uses seemed to cast doubt on Aristotle’s argument
that commingling marketplaces and political discourses ultimately degraded the latter. 14
The democracy that crystallized within the Greek city-state was more or less articulated
in the unregimented public spaces of the agora. Another Greece develops later in history,
however. Its topographies were characterized by “greater formal structure and architectural
grandeur.” 15 This later Greece, that is, the host of new city-states under the dominion of
Aristotle’s most powerful pupil, Alexander the Great, witnessed expansions of political control
and an overshadowing of public life. As they faded and gave way to the rise of the Roman
Empire, the geography of public life transformed markedly, especially within post-Augustan
landscapes expressed from the first to third centuries A.D. 16 The Roman conception of public
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space was exemplified in its forum. While each forum featured the cultural diversity of its Greek
precursors, it did away with the openness, access, and unexpectedness of the Athenian agora in
which democracy spread during the fifth century B.C. 17 That is because much great formalism
was associated with the architecture of Roman forums, which were supplied with many
monuments and other physical structures omitted from the open space of the agora, particularly
from the third century A.D. onward. 18 That formalism was coupled with a rigid segmentation of
public practices inside gathering places throughout the Empire. 19
Even though plans for the forum positioned market stalls and the Roman civic apparatus
inside what Mumford calls “a whole precinct,” they tended, based on commands from above, to
divorce different spheres of activity by dispersing them to separate zones. 20 Jackson adds that
merchants and craftsmen were excluded from the interior spaces of the Roman forum, which
were “reserved for a superior order of citizens: for political action and the exchange of ideas.” 21
In both accounts, these decisions about space were fundamentally political. Emperors mandated
them, even Augustus, who touted republicanism in his later life. They looked to solidify their
rule within an ever increasingly multicultural landscape by isolating Rome’s spaces of public
engagement from its centers of commercial interaction. 22
While the forum was not divided as a matter of design, Roman planners were infinitely
more faithful to Aristotle’s civic-commercial split than the Athenians he hoped to influence in
his Politics. Whyte and others attribute the spatial separation of market activities from political
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practices in the Roman forum to its distance from city centers, along with its remoteness to
surrounding streets, where ingress often began hundreds of yards away from the interior of the
forum itself. As Whyte maintains, “the agora was part of the street network of the city; it was
not enclosed or segregated from the rest of the city but vitally linked to it.” 23 On the other hand,
“the cities of the Roman Empire were centered around the forum,” according to Carr, et al. They
also “reflected a rigorous spatial order and grandeur beyond that of the Greeks.” 24
As a result, says Wycherley, the city itself “lost something of its old quality” and had “a
less intimate relation with all the varied activities of the community.” 25 It may not surprise us to
learn, then, that segregations of place from assembly in post-democratic Greece and Imperial
Rome led to a “disintegration” of their cities. 26 Not only did city spaces come apart, however; so
did the res publica, which Sennett defines as a form of urban life:
A res publica stands in general for those bonds of association and mutual
commitment which exist between people who are not joined together by ties of
family or intimate association; it is the bond of a crowd, of a “people,” of a polity,
rather than the bonds of family or friends. 27

He also addresses the consequences of splitting this publicity from open political involvement in
Rome and its territories: individual passivity and a decline in civic participation. Roman subjects
went through their communal motions and public obligations, but they abandoned the urbanism
of an earlier democratic era in Athens and retreated into private realms of mysticism:
As the Augustan Age faded, Romans began to treat their public lives as a matter
of formal obligation. The public ceremonies, the military necessities of
imperialism, the ritual contacts with other Romans outside the family circle, all
became duties—duties in which the Roman participated more and more in a
23
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passive spirit, conforming to the rule of the res publica, but investing less and less
passion in his acts of conformity. As the Roman’s public life became bloodless,
he sought in private a new focus for his emotional energies, a new principle of
commitment and belief. This private commitment was mystic, concerned with
escaping the world at large and the formalities of the res publica as part of that
world. 28

This recoil towards privacy and mysticism would eventually lead to the advent of
Christianity and the Christianization of the Roman Empire, which Sennett adds is “a new
principle of public order.” Let me be clear. I do not wish to offer any critique of Christianity. 29
Rather, I want to argue that the eclipse of mixed-use public space in Rome led to a decline in
civic engagement and capacity. In tracing the relationship between public space and political
association within an ever-expanding reach of Roman imperialism, Wolin echoes a theme raised
in the previous chapter: visibility. In his argument, the immediacy of a “visual politics,” once
harnessed through the multifunctional space practiced within the agora, was transformed into an
“abstract politics,” in which “men were informed about public actions which bore little or no
resemblance to the economy of the household or the affairs of the market-place.” The result was
an aggrandizement of power by emperors from Augustus forward, and a polity that largely
functioned to inculcate citizens on the authority of the state, rather than the res publica. 30
This transformation may be juxtaposed with the democracy of Athens. The practice of
public space in the Athenian agora was “sloppy,” as Berman tells us, but it engendered great

28

Ibid., pp. 3-4.
Still, it is worth mentioning the “Grand Inquisitor” parable, in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, which
suggests that Christianity dwells within an infantile populace, divided by religious faith from the self-actualization
needed to fuel civic capacity. Dostoyevsky’s parable shares a thread with Tocqueville’s arguments, i.e., that too
much privacy may lead to despotism unless it is tempered by a rich associational life among citizens. See Fyodor
Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (New York: Penguin Classics, 1973), pp. 288-311; Alexis de Tocquevile,
Democracy in America, Volume II, (New York: Vintage Classic Books, 1990), pp. 316-22.
30
Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1960), pg. 77. NB: Wolin’s account is based on an exponential increase in the size and sheer
number of participants brought on by the Roman conquest of new and amassing colonies.
29

54

political vitality. 31 After the Roman forum succeeded it, stiff arrangement of that space became
mandated and ultimately led to the isolation of political circles from the rest of the community,
citizen participation, and public opinion. Eventually, the disengagement reached critical mass
and no res publica existed to sustain Rome in its last days.

Openness to enclosure: medieval and early modern markets 32
After the fall of the Roman Empire in the Fifth Century A.D., populations dispersed,
moved to the countryside, and left a great void where publicly functioning centers once sat. In
the 10th century, churches and courts began to be built within enclosed settlements, for protection
purposes, and central environments again took shape in Britain and on the European continent. 33
The construction of walled towns generated a revival of open marketplaces. These medieval
markets evolved slowly. They operated one day a week to begin with, then a few days, during
defined hours. 34 As people and technological innovations continued to spread across Europe,
marketplaces became permanent fixtures, though they remained fairly unstructured with respect
to their spatiality and design. 35
These open markets were located within existing street grids. They sparked the return of
urban atmospheres fragmented as a result of Roman environmental planning and architecture.36
The revitalization of medieval towns grew out of “a unique constellation of forces,” according to
Mumford, but it signaled a common thread in European spatial development: an emphasis on
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centralization and multi-functionality. 37 No matter the circumstances that precipitated their
physical arrangement, medieval towns sited their marketplaces within centers, where myriad
activities converged. Marketplaces were adjacent to cathedrals, which bordered civic squares;
these three elements were housed in the town center, in order to maximize common access and
usage. 38 The outcome of this built ecology was a kind of public mosaic, according to Mumford.
People from different social classes shared space in fulfilling their diverse functions:
In the medieval town, the upper classes and the lower classes had jostled together
on the street, in the marketplace, as they did in the cathedral: the rich might ride
on horseback, but they must wait for…the blind beggar groping with his stick to
get out of the way. 39

Mumford’s rendition of the publicness above echoes Jackson, who elaborated on spatial
accommodations in the last chapter.

The latter likewise expounds on the diversity and

unexpectedness of medieval marketplace practices enacted by citizens, the state, and the church.
The markets of this period routinely affected a “geographical congregation,” Jackson maintains.
They hosted any number of impromptu functions along with buying and selling. 40 A guild might
set up a stage for the performance of a play on one day; the next day a criminal might be
punished, or a heretic tortured there; on another day, Sundays for instance, a congregation
exiting the cathedral might hold a public gathering to solicit funds for a nearby almshouse. In
essence, says Jackson, the medieval marketplace “recaptured the function of the…agora.” 41
While it is too intrepid to say that the blend of commercial and social activities in
medieval marketplaces accounts directly for individual and collective participation in open
political discourses there, it is possible that the multi-functionality of these centralized spaces
37
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fueled public attentiveness among people who used them.

Such consciousness is but one

measure of political efficacy, needless to say. Still, the evidence suggests that resurgent civic
awareness generated political accountability in medieval cities. The immediacy of assembly and
expression in spaces that accommodated commerce, religion and politics together nurtured new
conceptions of publicity in medieval towns. Whereas the idea the public previously stood for
something more abstract, as res publica implies, even, under medieval mixed-use conditions it
began to manifest goods that were visible to inhabitants of space. 42 By the 17th century, public
connotations started to evolve and incorporate geography and plurality. Now, diverse strangers
regularly shared space, topographical space, where popular interaction and mutual observation
began to implicate the state and its apparatus. 43 The mix of marketplace and community affairs
inside town centers, where long-dormant civic capacity resurfaced, whetted appetites for political
association. At the same time, the architecture of medieval cities localized institutions of power
and placed them within the gaze of mingling publics.
I do not wish to understate the rampant social inequality or political disenfranchisement
among common people who lived within medieval cities. As I suggested at the outset, linear
connections are dubious, given the evidence available on these historical timelines—in this case,
between an evolutionary public in the Middle Ages, and later constructs of publicity, such as
those assumed in social contract theory. Hobbesian notions of political obligation and Lockean
arguments for government accountability would find reception later, during the modern era,
when urban spaces re-assimilate marketplaces and public practices.

During the interlude,

Renaissance piazzas divorced commerce from civic engagement on behalf of a revisited
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rationale: that the former could undermine the soberness of the latter. 44 Thus, Renaissance era
planners segmented space under the auspices of their new “civil architecture,” according to
Glazer and Lilla.

They subscribed to the view that this architecture demanded formal

designations of the public environment, on the one hand, and the private realm, on the other. 45
Once again, then, politics and commerce were separated in Europe’s built spaces. It is worth
noting, moreover, that the Renaissance split emanated from bolder ideas about privacy.
Renaissance planning appeared to be short lived, though. Pre-Enlightenment commercial
spaces started to mix in public functions again, following the built-in singularity and splendor
that characterized Baroque architecture and environmental design. Evidence of multifunctional
space materialized later, in outdoor markets founded on the European Continent and in Great
Britain during the 17th and 18th centuries. 46 Neither side of the English Channel offered the
grandeur of Renaissance or Baroque public spaces at the time; however, the British markets of
the 17th and 18th centuries are often depicted as particularly unattractive or downright messy.
They are alleged to have hosted congestion, raucousness, and routine depravity. At the same
time, though, they accommodated frequent public debates on administration and policy in the
Parliament and among local governments. Schmiechen and Carls reflect on these forums: “In
addition to an economic locus, the market served as the town’s principal public meeting place,
both formal and informal.” 47 Throughout the heyday of the market, public deliberations and
even squabbles shed light on political controversies and the economy in Great Britain.
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In this sense, early modern markets such as British ones afforded public space—apart
from the apparatus of the state—where locally experienced tensions, stemming primarily from
the nation’s political economy, became visible. 48 They provided de facto centers for exhibitions
of political antagonisms that resulted from economic shortages, thereby underscoring battles
fought by common Britons for fairness, justice, and social inclusion in the broader market
economy that was taking shape at the time. The British market became a locus for political
contestation about that economy, according to Schmiechen and Carls:
As long as the town was not able to guarantee a regular and cheap supply of
goods, the marketplace, as a public space, was apt to become a political
battleground. 49

The authors go on to describe multiple instances of mobilization that occurred throughout
Britain’s markets. One of them transformed from an unexpected activity into something more or
less routine, but it rarely abated in its efficacy: the food riot. One of the most interesting things
about food riots is that neither the individual towns nor the Crown would intervene on behalf of
proprietors, as we might naturally expect in today’s climate.

In fact, local and national

governments tolerated food riots as reliable processes for ensuring fairness in pricing.
The British market offers an example of mutual functionality between politics and
commerce within modern public spaces. It also underscores the significance of centrally located
marketplaces in catalyzing creation of modern publics, as well as accommodating collective
action among once isolated subjects. Food riots were colorful, spontaneous expressions of
public scrutiny over markets, though they became more predictable over time. They were also
tacitly supported by the state. In other parts of Europe, civic activities implicated the state itself.
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They tended to do so in unpredictable ways, in the centers of shared space on the Continent, and
they eventually garnered the attention of its administrators.
This shift is exemplified in a frightful account of modern public space, elaborated by
Foucault. Foucault examines new performances of political association, aided by the existence
of heterogeneous spaces in which unexpected activities occur. The publicity made possible
within these spontaneous spaces animates popular reactions to state policy. By the mid-18th
century, it inspires an array of discernible practices that proceed from those reactions. These
practices, once fragmented in nature, reach critical mass and even transcend the topographical
limitations of town centers.

They turn societal, that is, and imbue France’s larger human

geography with ideation about its regime. They also turn on criticism of its administration,
leading it to conceive the body politic anew; to rethink that body’s physical and psychical
arrangement in chilling ways in the latter half of the 18th century. 50 Foucault is able to convey
much of this transformation in Discipline and Punish. He depicts capital punishment, the
spectacle that surrounds it, and the unforeseen public rejoinders that undermine the French
Crown. He deploys monarchical public space and its forms of visibility. Then he traces the
unfolding of modern political space during the Enlightenment, and in times that followed.
Foucault’s account begins in a Parisian square, adjacent to the cathedral and the open
market. The year is 1757. The public is assembled to witness the execution of Damiens, a
regicide. However, he is tortured first, dismembered, and confessed for all to see. The violence
exacted on Damiens’ body in Foucault’s opening pages continues for what seems like an
eternity, given its graphic depiction. Rather than detailing Foucault’s gory introduction bit by
bit, though, I wish to emphasize the manner in which he historicizes the public square during
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Damiens’ execution, as well as how onlookers are encouraged to participate by the authorities
who carry out his punishment. Foucault phrases this pre-Revolution activity as the “spectacle of
the scaffold.” The scaffold is a political space. It elicits popular involvement and is meant to
bring about recognition of the state’s power. People are intentionally gathered in the city center,
within its heart, no less, to share in the mutilation criminals such as Damiens. 51 Moreover, they
are invited and expected to join the humiliation that befell prisoners before they were finally put
to death in the middle of the city. Public torture, then, is an interactive form. It has its own
morphology: mixed-use space transforms into a determined political sphere.
In Foucault’s reading of this space, and its interior practices, the conduct of capital
punishment within the city’s most peopled area, where its cathedral and marketplace sit, is
intended to exhibit the power of the monarchy. Public torture, the “ritual,” to use Foucault’s
expression, demonstrates that offenses against the Crown—regicide being the worst, of course—
must result in superior bodily harm against their perpetrators. The open and visible spatiality of
capital punishment is really engineered for its witnesses. Foucault imagines the power of the
ancien regime resides in its ability to effectively publicize itself. 52 Therefore, it is the spectacle
of punishment that enables the monarchy and its administration to manifest political power on
the very body of wrongdoers, while inscribing it throughout the burgeoning body politic
described earlier. According to Foucault:
The public execution is to be understood not only as a judicial but also as a
political ritual. It belongs, even in minor cases, to the ceremonies by which
power is manifested…The public execution, then, has a juridico-political
function. It is a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured sovereignty is
reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by manifesting it at its most
spectacular. 53
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Public executions are made into high profile political spaces. They aim to restore the
sovereignty of the state, and rally ritual support for the monarch. They do this by signifying that
there is a danger associated with breakdowns in political obligation. Public space is organized as
a theater of deterrence, of obedience to authority. Public squares and adjacent marketplaces are
selected to magnify the conspicuousness of the Crown. For Foucault, pre-Revolutionary space
serves as the shared experience of a “gloomy festival,” such as the one above, realized through
the spectatorship of all assembled to view the carnage. 54
Things begin to go awry from the point of view of sovereignty, however. A counternarrative starts to form around these political spectacles, borne by the unpredictability of the
space designated for the King’s grisly ceremony.

As capital punishment continues to be

practiced openly in the public square, it stirs the unexpected activities that helped indicate public
space in Chapter One. In one sense, amassing large numbers of people within public squares
rendered the spectacle of ritual punishment more widespread and visible. Yet, those assemblies
likewise fed counterintuitive occasions. For instance, local lawbreakers took advantage of the
mesmerizing display of torture and confession inside the city center. Paradoxically, the staging
of public punishments facilitated criminality: pickpockets and other petty offenders circled the
spectacle in search of easy opportunities to profit from the experience. 55
More troublingly, at least as far as the regime and its administration were concerned,
publics assembled in the Parisian square began to rebuff the Crown on behalf of Damiens and
other criminals subjected to capital punishment, eventually protesting the authority behind those
sentences. Compounding these unanticipated difficulties were the object lessons absorbed about
retributivist expressions of political force: publics grouped together in the city center were

54
55

Ibid., pg. 8.
Ibid., pp. 63.

62

beginning to identify their solidarities and their mutual social status against the backdrop of
despotism and monarchical violence. Similarly, they were beginning to see that that physical
violence was itself an expression of sovereignty. 56 Of course, the latter message was taken to
heart a few decades later, when Louis XVI and countless administrators were enlisted directly in
the bloody spectacles of Paris’ center, on the receiving end of the guillotine.
A detailed discussion of new punishments or practices of regime power in the wake of
these developments is not called for in this history. It does bear repeating, however, that
Foucault relies on them to show that spatial ordering transformed into a strategy deployed by
administrations to manage urban publics after the 18th century. 57 Prior to that transformation, the
Parisian square exemplifies how public space is reinterpreted and made unexpected through its
users’ activities.

Moreover, it vindicates Sennett’s iteration of open space preceding the

Enlightenment, which is shaped by public scrutiny of the state. The messiness and turbulence
generated by the physical diversity and popular spontaneity of that space did not escape the
notice of governments, including those elevated to power by revolutionary and postrevolutionary publics.

Recognizing how volatile they could be, late 18th and 19th century

political leaders redressed the organization of urban spaces, as Foucault points out. At the same
time, city planners meditated in earnest about the socio-spatial relationships of European cities
changed by the ascendancy of an Enlightenment public sphere.
In Paris, a shift towards rigid segmentation and tight regulation of urban topography
emerged immediately after the French Revolution. It grew more conspicuous later in the 19th
century, when Baron Haussmann was charged to arrange meticulous Parisian streets and public
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squares. Haussmann’s designs had the effect of depoliticizing human geography and openings
for association, particularly in the spaces where people entered the economy through buying and
selling.

The spectacle of state power was restored to open spaces, along with audiences

assembled to make that power legible within the body politic. In the mid 19th century, however,
Haussmann’s beautifully widened avenues and strategically appointed plazas also checked
unexpected practices of public space, which plagued the ancien regime of an earlier Paris.
Harvey discusses the political economy of public space under “Haussmannization” in
Paris after the Revolution. 58 A key to Harvey’s interpretation of Haussmann’s Paris is the idea
that control of urban public spaces only becomes significant as a corollary of administrative
decisions about private and commercial spaces. 59 Thus the famous or, as some would urge,
infamous widening and fortification of Parisian streets and plazas impacts the use of public
spaces among common people when Haussmann’s designs drive their marketplaces away from
the city’s central core, dispersing them to its outer edges and eventually forcing them under
arcades.

Now, spatially stratified publics could continue to participate in Paris’ economy,

politics or culture after 1870, but doing so jointly becomes geographically prohibitive, especially
for the poor living on the city fringes. 60 The shift is reminiscent of what took place in Rome
during the third century, when commerce and community were split in deference to the
architectural plans proffered by Vitruvius’ in the first century. Like Haussmann’s environmental
designs for the Parisian center, they privileged public order, not civic engagement.
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Across the English Channel, we find some comparable dissections of publicly accessible
places, starting in the late 18th century and continuing in the 19th century. 61 While politics and
commerce were being split between Paris’ newly widened avenues and its marketplaces on the
metropolitan fringes, civic activity was simultaneously being regulated out of the central market
halls of modern Britain. 62 In a host of movements paralleled on the European continent, and
post-Civil War America across the Atlantic Ocean, English markets underwent substantial spatial
ordering. They began to take on the look of arcades in Haussmann’s Paris, and ultimately
provided the prototypes through which single use zoning would be cemented in the suburban
United States’ after World War II. The separations in Great Britain were intended to move
marketplaces out of its nascent but rambunctious public sphere, as Zukin argues. In spite of
London’s unique and historic commitment to free association, most of England’s planners were
determined to make sure the spirited political assemblies that occurred in public spaces such as
Trafalgar Square and other traditional venues did not transfer to commercial markets or dilute the
“distinct entrepreneurial role” they played in the nation’s economy. 63
The latter modern British market hall, considered a tour de force of commercial design,
introduced many of the geo-political tactics found in Haussmann’s Parisian spaces. It also
displayed traits found within the disciplinary spaces that Foucault has traced in his genealogies.
Newer marketplace developments in England seemed keen on distancing commerce from the
volatility that dogged early modern incarnations, such as the food riots above. Market halls in
late 18th and 19th century Britain were therefore appointed with material features that supported
access control, order, and surveillance. These structural tools made it possible for proprietors to
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police commercial spaces themselves; they included stationary, centralized entrances, narrowed
walkways, and roofs. 64 Determined points of ingress permitted proprietors to circumscribe the
relationship between nearby streets and the market hall as they wished. They could now regulate
the flow of people seeking access to the marketplace, which was previously multifarious and
unmitigated. 65 Similarly, narrow walkways helped marketers manage traffic, while insinuating
spatial restrictions against large assemblages of crowds in the halls. Finally, enclosure from
above, a precondition for today’s surveillance technologies—also found atop the covered arcades
on the fringes of Haussmann’s Paris—helped emplace a sense of order, physically and
psychologically. It also made it easier for proprietors to channel their gaze on patrons, as well as
survey public outbreaks more readily. Along with rain and snow, the unexpectedness associated
with the operation of early open markets could now be combated through new built ecologies of
commercial space. The alterations were totally innovative in places like London. Proprietors
and public officials must have welcomed them alike:
These...enclosed marketplaces were revolutionary, for they freed the market from
the non-marketing activities of the traditional marketplace. Public access was
usually limited to a number of carefully selected points for pedestrians and one
for carts, thus giving the town officials greater control over who and what passed
through the market…It was not unusual for the entire market to be eventually
roofed over…The natural progression of the public market was from the
traditional, open-air marketplace to a combination of marketplace and street
market, to an enclosed market site, to a roofed market hall…Each step in this
process further aided in the separation of marketing from the street. 66

Marketplaces modeled on the Athenian agora functioned to promote commerce and
publicity in tandem. They had “long played a role in communicating local news, providing a
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context for political behavior,” and had, quite literally, yielded “the grounds for demanding
personal and political rights,” says Carr, et al. 67 Following the topographical innovations above,
publicly accessible, privately operated markets could scarcely contribute to dissemination of
news and public opinion about political events, nor could they house appeals for rights or
liberties. Given the political upheavals of the early modern era, it should not surprise us to learn
that detachments of commercial and expressive space were increasingly abided, and indeed
underwritten, by state officials in Europe. Revisiting a social phenomenon evidenced in a
decadent and declining Rome, Mumford argues that a chief byproduct of modern spatial
separations was a diminution of civic engagement, coupled with a growing stress on privacy.68
The idea of privacy would be culturally encoded during the Enlightenment. It would also govern
all basic relationships between the state and civil society after the 17th century:
Privacy, formerly possible only for the upper classes, ‘a luxury of the well-to-do’
up to the seventeenth century, slowly began to trickle down to the lower
classes…In time, privacy became a sacred quality of modern life in Western
society, carefully guarded by constitutional law and public policy. 69

A culture of privacy, spurred by the Enlightenment and gradually embedded within
publicly accessible spaces, was best expressed in the negative liberty theories of Locke and
Hume, among others. No aspersions should be cast on theories of individual autonomy or selfdetermination. Indeed, they ought to be celebrated. However, it is worth recalling Habermas’
Enlightenment public sphere, specifically, the way it was spatialized inside small and somewhat
exclusive locales, such as European salons and cafes, rather than the open marketplaces utilized
routinely by common people.

It seems that a political emphasis on privacy, something

encouraged by the new arrangement and regulation of arcades and market halls, had eclipsed the
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perceived use value of open markets and other organic spaces where publics could discover their
shared interests and civic capacities. The sphere that emerged from the spatial transformations
above arguably produced quasi-public discourses, which more often than not barred the social
groups who historically had the most to gain from freedom and equality. 70 In Europe’s late
modern geography, the spaces previously accessible to publics for functions of face-to-face
assembly were transformed into sites of private management. The arcade and the market hall
had become places where uses were scrutinized by private operators and public administrators,
who now sanctioned commercial exchange to the exclusion of political association.

American public space before and after the Jacksonian era
The changes outlined above were eventually evidenced in the United States, too, though
they commenced at a later time. America’s early public sphere, and its spatiality, was decidedly
multifunctional. Market activity was rapidly fused with civic engagement in unified places,
while the Old World was slowly dividing commercial topography from practices of publicity. In
colonial America, the democratization of political space animated calls for independence,
expressed publicly in diverse arenas that included town squares and marketplaces, along with
commercial ports. Where else in the latter 18th century could a moment of protest like the
Boston Tea Party spark political upheavals that would reverberate through history, while
informing equally impactful uprisings in France and other European nations?
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Civic space in pre-Revolution America seemed to proliferate in terms of use, as well as in
the scale of its users. 71 It was decidedly political space, moreover. The politicization of early
American public space may be explained by colonial conditions, as well as by post-revolutionary
transitions that took place throughout the late 18th century and into the 19th century. It was an
intense stretch, indeed. In the midst of their colonial experience, large and small landowners
made use of space to openly air dissent about British policy.

Others used it to assuage and

acclaim the Crown. Increasingly, all sides reflected on the nature of representation and the
merits of self-government. Following the Revolutionary War, American public spaces were
focal points for deliberation about the Articles of Confederation and proposals for a new
Constitution, particularly in states such as New York, where a new battle over ideas ensued
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. In the early 19th century, newly enfranchised white
male citizens joined political discourses.

First wave immigrants settling towns and

mushrooming cities along the Northeastern coastline slowly followed them.
We tend to imagine 18th and 19th century American discourse inside wealthy residences
or town hall structures, where property owners engaged in haughty debates about political
philosophy; or, alternatively, in outdoor squares where commoners reacted to fees and excise
taxes. Yet a substantial portion of early American discourse unfolded in a communal manner.
Membership in public dialogues often spread across the social strata in widely accessible,
commercial venues. 72 Lofland’s study of public space, as the nexus in which strangers negotiate
myriad relationships in the open, stressed the role of pubs in the making of the American
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Revolution. 73 Oldenburg has devoted much of his celebrated “third place” concept to public
taverns, observing Alexander Hamilton’s comment on their multi-functionality and ability to
deliver “a genuine social solvent with a very mixed company” of groups and classes. 74 We
know that John Jay relied on New York’s Fraunces Tavern for feedback and composition of his
submissions to the Federalist during the nation’s Founding period. Relying on taverns and
public houses, pre- and post-Revolutionary activists also convened on the basis of their
proprietary affiliations, pondering political policies and their implications for trade, according to
Schudson. 75 In fact, American discourses of various kinds were routinely emplaced to harness
marketplace interests, specifically, for example, in Mason’s lodges and other clubs whose
meetings were made visible mercantile association storefronts. 76
Of course, these special discursive spaces were modest in number. They were often
inaccessible to mixed publics that failed to meet their membership requirements. However, they
were supplemented by revolutionary and post-revolutionary discourse in open marketplaces, not
unlike those annexed by self-discovering publics in Europe during the previous centuries. And
like their European precursors, the commercial spaces of 18th and 19th century America
accommodated collective action framed in response to historical conditions. During the prelude
to American Revolution in the 18th century, a series of dissident actions committed in colonial
markets and squares—the Boston Tea Party and Stamp Act protests, for example—echo 17th
century food riots that routinely erupted in British public markets. Colonial responses to taxation
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mirrored those undertaken by their mother country’s poor, who recoiled at price gouging during
the transition from a feudal economy to a mercantile one.
Less dramatic, perhaps, but equally pervasive were public uses of market squares during
the period of America’s founding. In them, we find open and accessible debates over ratification
of the Constitution in and after 1787. The role of republican government was also a source of
deliberation in marketplaces. Jackson argues that these marketplaces functioned publicly like
most public spaces in the post-revolutionary 18th century. They were all “intended to be the
setting for some collective, civic action…civic function characterized them all; people were
present in them to perform some public service or play some public role.” 77
Not too long after the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, and its Bill of Rights in
1791, the United States experienced what many historians regard as its most sustained period of
democratization, beginning in the 19th century. During the 1820s, the new republic expanded its
franchise to property-less white men, who were previously excluded from voting. Suffrage was
nowhere near universal, as we know. Civil rights remained off limits to women and AfricanAmericans bound in involuntary servitude. In the case of white men, on the other hand, most
states waived property qualifications and began to extend voting rights prior to the presidential
election of 1828. 78 The democratic electorate that grew out of representative enfranchisement in
the early 19th century produced a party era by most accounts of American political development.
It also furnished a market for the penny press and other mass media.
The era proved propitious for face-to-face association, too. In a rapidly populating,
increasingly urban, and publicly engaged America, political space was practiced wherever
people could identify accessible topography, especially in the concentrated commercial districts
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sprouting up in new cities and towns. Participatory democracy had originated from the colonial
experience. It continued to flourish during the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods.
Later, it combined with the advent of 19th century urbanism to intensify civic engagement among
newly included participants in open political discourses. Given the history of those discourses, I
believe they were sustained in the first order by publicly functional marketplaces, accessed by
Americans throughout the nation’s townships and evolving cities. 79
There is ample evidence of discursive spaces and public involvement in the first half of
the 19th century, particularly during the Jacksonian period of the 1830s. Civic engagement
occurred in multiple settings, though, including streets, squares, and saloons. Tocqueville’s
observations about voluntary associations in the United States emphasized its New England style
town meetings. Through subtle references to landscape, his Democracy in America situated
widespread public participation in the growing density of early 19th century towns, villages, and
cities. 80 Ryan reads this emergent urbanism and its connection to spatialized democratic activity
in Tocqueville’s fieldwork as a repudiation of the frontier thesis. The latter view held that
Western geographic expansion explained the development of American political culture, as well
as the individualism on which it has always been based. 81 In Ryan’s counterargument, the
proximity of spatial encounters, made possible in towns and cities, determines the shape of 19th
century political practices among Americans. Walt Whitman celebrated these practices of urban
public space.

Throughout his poetry, he introduced the visibility and unexpectedness of
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democracy, renewed daily by the ubiquity of physical spaces and interpersonal associations
inside the “city invincible.” An observer and champion of this diversity, Whitman was also able
to show that the promise of urban democracy would always depend on its accessibility to
common people who worked in and used the public spaces of cities. 82
There are other complementary interpretations of these new American spaces, of course.
I would like to look further at Ryan’s, noted above. Her historical work is particularly useful in
that it is careful not to reify the space or practice of associational democracy in the 19th century
United States. Moreover, she is flexible in conceptualizing an unstable public sphere, during a
tumultuous century. Ryan’s roadmap to historicizing space and sphere is therefore helpful for
reconciling early practices of public space with accounts advanced by social theorists keen on
democratizing it today. This is particularly so for contemporary pluralists, who aim to make
space and sphere accessible to more users, including the historically under-represented. 83 Ryan’s
chronicle is split between the first and second halves of the 19th century, rather than treated as
one timeline. The split is intended to shed light on the disparity of America’s civic landscape
before and after the Civil War—in New York City, San Francisco, and New Orleans. Ryan
never denies the romance of early 19th century American public spaces. Rather, her study is
animated by the goal of tracing the roots of their segregations in the latter half of the century, as
well as discovering the impact of those exclusions on today’s public sphere.
Ryan examines civic uses of public space in the cities above along three timelines: 18251849; 1850-1865; and 1866-1880. I am condensing them to reflect generalized patterns and
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changes in urban political participation before and after the Civil War. Prior to the War,
emerging cities hosted widespread civic activity among increasingly diverse publics using the
political franchise extended during the Jacksonian era. In the years following the Civil War,
however, much of the civic capacity generated in the late 1820s and continuing through the
1850s, roughly, began to fade. The extent of the decline prompted Dewey’s “eclipse of the
public” lament and other negative characterizations of American political life in the second half
of the 19th century. 84 In Ryan’s narrative, the rise and fall of civic participation during the two
halves is explained in large measure by a topographical switch, from more open, heterogeneous,
and spontaneous spaces accommodated within built environments during the antebellum era, to
new syntaxes of order, singularity and predictability found inside those spaces after
Reconstruction. During the intervening period, publicly accessible spaces became objects of
regulation, in response to multiple clashes among socially diverse classes and newer immigrants,
who assembled freely prior to the start of war in 1861. Spaces of association, common or
proprietary, were reserved when the Civil War ended. The geography of open deliberation and
political demand making did not vanish, but it became much less visible after 1865.
In the opening of her book, “Heterogeneous Compounds and Kaleidoscopic Varieties:
Creating a Democratic Public, 1825-1849,” Ryan explores the physical arrangement of big cities.
She describes how urban publics representing diverse identities and interests used the centers of
the cities above to exercise “public sociability and democratic association.” 85
interactions took place in parks and open squares.

Most urban

Yet a substantial portion of American

associational life was practiced within publicly accessible spaces where the new variety of goods
manufactured during the industrial revolution were bought and sold. Ryan’s history reveals an
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abundance of spatial negotiations among different classes, including instances in which
representatives of upper, middle and lower strata openly fraternized and broached political
subjects. 86 As their European predecessors did in early modern marketplaces, urban dwellers
from a vast array of social backgrounds relied on commercial spaces as centers for community
interaction and civic engagement, especially in the 1830s, during the heyday of American
political democratization.
The street proved a chief public asset, too, providing access to multifunctional urban
spaces in an antebellum 19th century. In Ryan’s argument, city streets bridged the “symbiotic
relationship” between economy and sociability in America. 87

The results were oftentimes

untidy, to say the least. Public thoroughfares in all three cities above were “simply a mess.” In
New York, streets hosted rampant gang activity and open collusions with Tammany politicians
in the heart of the five points. 88 Yet, the outcomes were also democratic and participatory. The
publics that assembled in city streets during the first half of the 19th century were allowed to
utilize makeshift spaces of commerce in the middle of sidewalks for “play as well as work.” 89
These urban improvisations brought multiple users together and helped them to acquire what
Ryan calls a “critical civic education in those same public spaces.” 90 The heterogeneity served
to crystalize constructs of a public good under the banners of community interest and visibility,
while simultaneously revealing America’s diversifying human geography. Perhaps it prefigured
today’s multicultural negotiations, which often ensue unexpectedly in metropolitan space.
Distinctions between public and commercial space were less clear in the cities of
antebellum America. In a more turbulent decade immediately preceding the Civil War, however,
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marketplaces grew increasingly difficult to manage. Proprietors, who traditionally welcomed the
overlap between commerce and civic association in open markets, had become apprehensive
about the behavior of progressively volatile publics congregating in and near their storefronts.91
Public volatility frequently turned to violence during the Civil War. So a new urban spatial order
emerged after its conclusion in 1865. Indeed, it may be more accurate to say that spatial order
emerged for the very first time in American cities during the post-War period. It entailed an
early form of commercial zoning of marketplaces by local authorities, aimed at protecting
property from the vicissitudes of crowd behavior. More conspicuously, it contained multidetermined strategies of regulation in which all public spaces became encoded with proprietary
symbols. 92

The creation or systematization of police departments in New York and other

Northeastern cities was an important signal in this regard. It would grow in the two decades
preceding the 20th century. 93 Union soldiers were also assigned to streets and marketplace
boundaries in New Orleans and other conquered Southern cities. Police and soldiers would be
posted in almost every large American city, to survey streets, squares, and parks. Further, urban
space would be micromanaged. By the end of the 19th century, an assortment of local ordinances
proscribed all but the most predictable collective activities. 94
State regulation of post-War urban topography seemed to inhibit the civic engagement
associated with early 19th century democratization. It also combined with alterations in the
arrangement of marketplaces to create new forms of shared space in late 19th century cities. The
idea of the public sphere began to change after 1865. It appeared to be spatialized in far more
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discreet ways throughout most American cities. It remained diverse in one way: it combined the
assembly of large crowds with opportunities for commercial interaction. However, the publicity
of marketplaces became non-civic in nature.

Similarly, the growth of monitoring and

homogeneity within commercial environments made them seem inorganic from the point of view
of accommodation and association. As a result, they began to lose their appeal as free-flowing
and tolerant places for open political discourse.
Specialized indoor venues overshadowed open markets, according to Ryan. So did a new
built environment, the department store, which drew shoppers in with fanciful architectural and
programmed amusements. 95 These structures were encoded with stricter commercial purposes.
Invitations to use were limited to leisurely shopping, along with other members of the public.
Unlike their street-based antecedents, they did not occasion assembly for any other public
purposes. In fact, once people went inside, there was little to no space for any social interaction,
let alone earlier forms of collective action. The spaces and opportunities for political discourse
or association in the marketplaces of the latter 18th century and early 19th century were replaced
by controlled commercial designs that reflected public enticement, while eschewing any sort of
civic ecology. Warner’s study of Philadelphia during the late 19th century seems to express the
fin de siècle American city, which embraced architecture, but excluded space:
The effect of three decades of a building boom…was a city without squares…a
city without gathering places… Whatever community life there was to flourish
from now on would have to flourish despite the physical form of the city, not
because of it. 96

The optics of these environments was infinitely more attractive; the variety of
purchasable products was equally impressive.
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auspicious, on the other hand. The topographical renovation and regulation of American cities
diminished the post-War public sphere. Though its iteration in the years leading up to the Civil
War left much to be desired when it came to orderliness, publicity demanded more than
intermittent contact inside department stores built strictly to entice and then discharge
consumers. The arrangement and management of late 19th century American cities and property
fostered what Sennett lamented as “empty space” or “the paradox of isolation in the midst of
visibility.” 97 Returning to Ryan, post-War spatial ordering spawned a profusion of “border
territories,” within the centers of most cities. These territories engendered rapid movement amid
department stores by the more well to do, and far fewer associations between social classes in
regulated and vaguely public spaces. Urban gathering places were now pre-packaged with
public experiences, where they previously relied on users’ mutual interpretations of public
legitimacy within shared environments. 98

Despite the chronological distance, the result is

reminiscent of what Sennett discerned in Imperial Rome prior to its dissolution:
In sum major spatial innovations of the 1870s were located in neither exactly
private nor fully public spaces but in a border territory marked by the apartment
house, the houses of public amusements, and streets defined by the shop windows
that lined them. This pattern suggests that the changing built environment was
channeling everyday urban life and imagination in a private direction, away from
associated or civic consciousness. 99

Jackson insists that the redesign of post-War public spaces was part of a calculated plan.
In his view, urban public administrators collaborated with the business community to remove
spaces of commerce from the unexpected, “workaday activities” and social disorder that
97
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transpired within multifunctional but scrappier marketplaces of the 1830s through the 1850s. 100
Reversing Arendt’s space of appearances, planners and architects delivered the appearance of
space, while detaching users from one another and any discursive public realm. Urban practices
became more predictable after 1865, absent myriad accommodations required within mixed-use
city spaces. The price for that predictability was a loss of heterogeneity, Zukin argues. 101 PostWar cities rationalized these spatial negotiations, confining them to commercial exchange, which
had largely displaced open political discourse from places where people previously assembled
and formed their associations.
Visible practices of civic space would be reanimated by changing socio-political
conditions in the United States during the early 20th century, particularly in the wake of the First
World War. Indeed, heterodoxy was sometimes publicized in more tolerant public spaces that
bordered department stores and commercial districts built in the late 19th century. However, the
intimacy between marketplaces of goods and those of ideas was scarcely revitalized within
central city spaces. As the 20th century unfolded, physical and ideological constructions of
public space had to compete with post-World War II urban development, and then adapt to it.
Urbanism itself would be forced to reckon with the advent of suburbs and the attractions
they were able to deliver following considerable federal spending and what I consider to be state
supported appeal of privacy.

Cities experienced harsh impacts as a result of post-War

disinvestment, though they have bounced back following many suburban triumphs. Yet, the
adaptations of shared space both in cities and suburbs during the latter half of the 20th century
have undermined its publicity and diminished the overall quantity and quality of political
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association in the United States. Some work needs to be done, therefore, to better understand the
historical process by which space was eclipsed if we are to reimagine conditions under which
democratic assembly and civic capacity may again be emplaced in America.

The rise and fall of open-minded space in an American century
Visible political association in the 20th century transformed from high intensity to wide
scale disengagement within America’s built environments. In the first half of the century,
multifunctional public spaces flourished in poor and immigrant enclaves on the fringes of
evolving cities.

In their centers, however, a combination of street policing and fully

commercialized districts—replete with large department stores erected during the late 19th
century—enforced regulation and segmentation of publicly inhabited spaces. The transition was
akin to Haussmann’s reorganization of Paris. A gap in practicability split major downtown
zones from the spaces of remoter communities in which less affluent, more marginal members of
the public lived. Yet, the reorganization of political geography within early 20th century urban
space would pale in comparison with the decentralization of public topography instigated by
suburbanization during the latter half of the century.
In the first half of the century, specifically, during the stretch between World War I and
II, dissent was commonly expressed in streets and adjacent marketplaces on the urban fringes.
The sheer volume of these makeshift demonstrations prompted some of America’s prudish social
activists, such as Jane Addams and the founders of Hull House, to sue for peace in the streets and
lobby for community centers and settlement houses, thereby bringing political association
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inside. 102 In a New Deal counter-movement, FDR’s Works Projects Administration (WPA)
organized the “Forum Division.” It put indigent men to work building visible centers of patriotic
sociability. Open exchanges of discourse would buoy civic education and channel diverse
opinions, in order to “inoculate American democracy from the authoritarianism overtaking
Europe.” By 1937, there were over one thousand open forum projects across the nation. A few
were even sited on the immediate borders of urban business districts. 103
The Forum Division and efforts that preceded it aimed to restore opportunities for
democratic association eclipsed by the spatial arrangements of the late 19th century. They also
reflected a counterattack on the ideology of those arrangements, led by public intellectuals in the
1920s and 1930s. Responding to the patent criticism of American participatory democracy that
peppered the philosophies of publicity espoused by Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann, who
both pressed for esoteric administrations of government in spite of public opinion, a school of
pragmatic theorists and reformers campaigned “to re-found democracy in face-to-face
communities.” 104 The champions of this latter approach—John Dewey, for example—were
themselves inspired by leaders such as Woodrow Wilson, who held that political participation by
laymen required more than individuated reaction to daily newspapers:
He cannot be said to be participating in public opinion at all until he has laid his
mind alongside the minds of his neighbors and discussed with them the incidents
of the day and the tendencies of the time.

Wilson maintained that the “plain fellows…the fellows whose muscle was daily up against the
whole struggle of life” needed, in fact, were owed, public places in which to express and educate
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themselves, openly and in concert. The project of democratizing civic engagement in America
meant expanding access to public space among these plain fellows, in other words, members of
the working-class. Wilson aimed to unify publicity and opinion in common space:
[T]here is the place where the ordinary fellow is going to get his innings, going to
ask his questions, going to express his opinions, going to convince those who do
not realize that the vigor of America pulses in the blood of every true American,
and that the only place he can find the true American is in this clearing-house of
absolutely democratic opinion. 105

Dewey took up Wilson’s mantle. The former postulated an inclusive public sphere prior
to World War II, in The Public and its Problems. His definition of a diverse public realm, an
aggregate of every place where people assembled and concertedly resolved the consequences of
other people’s actions, made face-to-face democracy adaptable to any number of shared
spaces. 106 Dewey seemed to accept that his public realm encompassed the practices of ordinary
people, who might take to the streets to protest American policy abroad or social conditions at
home. He also appeared to take it for granted that the publicity he had theorized would engender
heterodoxy; that public space was defined by civic expression, not popular amusement; that it
might produce inconvenience or even conflict.
There were inconveniences in the first half of the 20th century. There was even conflict
and violence in public places frequented by people looking for merchandise or repose. Kohn and
Zick each detail how the “Wobblies” agitated in crowded city streets throughout the early 20th
century, for example. 107 The IWW movement contested rules established for public space in the
wake of the Civil War, and wound up loosening that space for heterodox expression, despite
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growing signs of police power or what Keller calls a “triumph of order” in cities. 108 Public
markets near New York City’s Columbus Circle and Times Square later became hubs for
political demonstration throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 109 Even though those spaces eventually
fell out of use among the City’s left wing, Gratz and Mintz point out that Union Square remained
“New York’s answer to London’s Hyde Park, the favorite site for political orators and
protesters.” 110 On the West Coast, in Los Angeles, where Frankfurt Scholars, Adorno and
Horkheimer stockpiled their Arnoldian impressions about the wretchedness of American political
culture, one could find marketplaces where citizens representing various trades assembled and
advocated for workers’ rights from the 1920s through the 1940s. 111

Civic space dotted

America’s urban landscape throughout the first half of the 20th century. At times, it included
neighborhood commercial centers, where political association was tolerated.
In another example, Zukin remarks on her own neighborhood in North Philadelphia,
where a diversity of spaces was sprinkled prior to 1950. She muses on popular “shopping
streets” in Philadelphia, observing that they nurtured “a thousand different social interactions in
public space, from face-to-face relations to more abstract transactions of commercial
exchange.” 112 These mixed-use spaces became academies of social inclusion, of cultural identity
and visible negotiation, where diverse groups were able to reveal and celebrate their differences,
while collectively uncovering sources of accommodation and tolerance. Similarly, neighborhood
streets and marketplaces served jointly to facilitate civic engagement. They stressed pluralism
and enabled it to develop spontaneously. Multifunctional spaces of the early 20th century thus
108
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played an educational role in American culture.

They provided opportunities for urban

inhabitants to model their own interpretations of community, publicity, and democratic
association to one another.

Perhaps this is why Zukin adds that the supermarkets of her

childhood were always located close to public libraries.
Gratz and Mintz view the spatialization of an urban public sphere through the lens of
planning and architecture. In a pre-1950 “communal landscape,” marketplaces played a chief
role in furnishing chances for publicity. ”Public markets had an intentional, broader public
purpose beyond the commercial function,” including “stimulating social interaction…[and] any
number of public goals.” 113 Markets stimulated the growth of other public spaces. In fact, they
spatialized communities, turning neighborhood-shopping streets into main streets across the
nation. These diverse spaces assembled, “in the most democratic of atmospheres, the groups of
people that” (as I intend to show below) “development patterns have been separating in recent
decades.” Though they may have been removed from city centers, marketplaces catalyzed urban
civic capacity by bringing people together from many walks of life. Public markets in the United
States of 1900-1950 were loose, political spaces:
Genuine ‘public places’…where planned, chance, formal, and informal meetings
occur, the opportunity for people to come together, to hear about new ideas, share
concerns, understand the dilemmas of others, listen to differing opinions, debate
proposals for change, and, perhaps, even resolve differences. 114

The openness and accessibility of urban public space rested largely on its relationships to
streets. In the 1920s and 1930s, shopping streets and public markets were still immune from
encroachments posed by urban expansion schemes calibrated to the anticipation of auto
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traffic. 115 In the 1940s, however, public marketing and other forms of interaction would begin to
be affected by changes attendant to the motor age. After the explosion of automobile use in the
1950s, urban growth would itself be revolutionized, while planning for suburbs became the
principal determinant behind almost every topographical development in a post-World War II
United States. If Dewey and American Presidents with whom he was philosophically aligned
created public space for political movements such as the Wobblies before World War II, now it
was Robert Moses and the officials who got the 1956 Interstate Highway Act through Congress
that spatialized the nation’s public sphere. 116 And the fate of public spaces, along with the civic
engagements they helped realize, would change dramatically in light of the automobile boom and
their rapid advances through more uniform metropolitan landscapes. Seeming to heed Croly and
Lippmann’s calls for a public sphere built on policy expertise, rather than civic input, a new
generation of planners epitomized by Moses accomplished awesome feats of urban and suburban
development without holding elective office. Notwithstanding a host of accomplishments on
behalf of popular recreation in his earlier career, Jones Beach, for example, Moses appeared to
view the public and its political associations as obstacles to administration and planning, not its
ends. This seemed particularly evident after 1950. 117
It may be impossible to consider open and accessible public space or a socially inclusive
public sphere after World War II without reflecting on the rise of automobile use, government
funded highway construction or the political geography of both phenomena. This is true for
suburbs settled during the post-War population boom, as well as for cities from which the
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American people out-migrated in staggering proportions. Historical accounts developed by
Jackson and Fishman, to name two, pivot directly from the post-War evolution of automobile
reliance to the spatialization of built environments catered to individuals zooming about a vast
suburban layout that valued motion above all else. 118 Critics of the post-War public realm
frequently connect suburban and highway development to the decline of urban economies and
spaces. Downtown development and attendant spatial arrangements were no longer emphasized
in older metropolitan areas, which were defunded in favor of liberally financed highway
constructions intended to take people out of the city, starting in the 1950s.
The correlation above seems highly plausible, given the history of suburbanization to be
summarized below. However, I would like to caution against over-emphasizing an historical
ideal of urban public space and sphere, lest we understate ongoing topographical and
geographical overlaps between cities and suburbs—to be visited in greater detail during the final
chapter. For one, human geography has changed significantly in suburbs. Indeed, large numbers
of suburbanites do not even own cars today. Further, topographical arrangements in cities,
business improvement districts, for example, continue to privatize of delimit the public
functionality of urban spaces. My point is that public spaces and spheres are not monolithic, in
cities or suburbs. What remains to be seen is how highways and other innovations influenced
civic space in suburbs, as well as why suburban landscapes seem to evidence a resilient split
between commerce and publicity.
The goal of this chapter has been to historicize the emplacement and displacement of
political practices within publicly accessible markets. I would like to devote what remains to the
spatialization of privately owned commercial property and public intercourse in suburbs.
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Following heterodox political expression by radicals and other activists in city streets, squares,
and public markets during the early 20th century, and then civil rights and antiwar protests in
downtown public spaces and college campuses during the 1950s and 1960s, tolerance for civic
practices declined precipitously in the 1970s and 1980s. The slide coincided with an intense
upward trajectory in demographic migration to America’s suburbs. Ever since the expansion of
federal highway construction programs during those decades, suburbs have continued to sprawl,
posing topographical impediments to practicable public spaces associated with early 20th century
cities, while urban redevelopment strategies have tended to imitate the architectures of those
suburbs, along with their limited tolerances for unorthodox public spheres. 119 As the abrupt
conclusion of Occupy Wall Street protests suggests, cities may resist public space, too. As the
dénouement in Zuccotti Park and countless shared spaces in cities across the country also
indicate, a growing split has ensued between privately owned places associated with commercial
development, on the one hand, and publicly functional spaces where political association and
unexpected activities are possible, on the other. As I intend to argue for the duration of this
chapter, this split has widened in an era of suburbanization.
American suburbs were established well before the 1950s. The earliest ones were built
during the early 19th century, in places like Brooklyn, New York. Wealthy families sought
repose from the mounting bustle of city life by hopping aboard one of Robert Fulton’s steam
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ferries on the East River. 120 By mid-century, inner ring suburbs had grown further, although the
development of “streetcar” or “railroad” suburbs coincided with electric trolleys and locomotives
in the 1890s. 121 This was merely a prelude to mass exoduses that took place after World War II,
when millions of Americans settled in expanding outer ring suburbs. Fishman dubs this time an
“age of suburbs.” 122 Major waves of suburbanization were made possible by automobiles in the
late 1940s, but exploded in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, owing to new highways and housing. 123
Families able to escape from congested and deteriorating cities saw the American dream realized
in suburban landscapes. As suburbs grew, government land use policies and budgets followed
them, generally at the expense of central cities, which saw their resources shrink. 124 A cycle
emerged in which older cities were unable to attract funding increasingly lavished upon newer
suburbs. Revised spending formulas enacted in federal legislation were dedicated to suburban
highways, housing, and economic development, while excluding urban roads, neighborhoods,
and business districts. For example, federal “reinvestment” funding was applied strictly to
undeveloped communities, where new population and infrastructure needs had grown. 125
The effects of these transitions upon public space may not be obvious at first glance, but
they were substantial. I will look at the expression of contemporary suburban public space in a
moment. As for cities during this period, sustained cycles of federal disinvestment wrought
abandonment by middle class whites, which in turn led to retrenchment of local budgets. The
attentions once afforded urban public spaces by government authorities and user publics declined
substantially. Centers associated with civic engagement and open political discourse became
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nuclei for anti-social behavior.

The changes eventually embroiled working classes in the

depreciation of urban public space after 1950, in one way or another:
[W]orking-class people as well were able to buy a piece of the American dream in
the new higher-density suburbs, aided by Veterans Administration loans and
massive federal highway funding. There began to be widespread concern about
the ‘flight’ to the suburbs and ‘abandonment’ of the center cities to poor
minorities. There is little doubt that the severe financial problems of many cities
and the resulting lack of attention to public space were due, in part, to this exodus.
Without middle-class support, the growth of [public] space systems was halted
and they began to go into decline as other social demands on scarce public funds
came to the fore. Rules of use in existing spaces were relaxed, and sometimes, as
in the infamous case of Detroit’s Belle Isle in the 1950s, public spaces became
battlegrounds in the growing social and racial conflict between less successful
members of the white ethnic working class and people of color. 126

Urban public spaces fell into disrepute or were disused entirely. Where they transitioned
from hubs of expression among Suffragettes, Wobblies, and many other social activists by the
1930s, to battlefields on which sizable movements fought for civil rights or against war in the
1950s and 1960s, they became largely desolate as the 1970s dawned. Suburban space did not
offset the changes. Rather, the suburbanization of America’s landscape arguably fed a decline in
publicly functional space, since sprawling urban peripheries contained so little of it. 127
It did not begin that way. Many original post-War suburban planners hoped to reproduce
the sociability and public energy of urban life in the early 20th century, while leaving behind the
grime and grievances expressed within the city’s shared spaces. The first design team in New
York’s Levittown on Long Island—generally regarded as the quintessence of post-War suburban
settlements—believed that communal and civic life would be principal features of its
environmental plan. 128 In fact, the initial commitment to explicit community architecture in
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Levittown was driven by market analysis. This calculation suggests, at least to some extent, that
its creators anticipated a demand for public space among the families to whom they wished to
sell private property. 129 Similar projections were evidenced in the planning for Bucks County,
Pennsylvania, Willingboro Township, New Jersey, and a host of suburbs outside Philadelphia
and Boston. 130 Likewise, the new metropolitan suburbs built around fledgling Sunbelt cities in
the American Southwest were intended to provide space in which ethnic whites returning
stateside after World War II could build civic capacity. 131
Any agenda for publicity in Levittown and other suburban developments was short-lived,
however. At the behest of both government officials, who earmarked considerable public sums
for suburban development, most environmental designers segregated suburban topographies into
discrete “use zones” after 1950. 132 These zones increasingly scattered the layout of post-War
suburbs, commonly called “bedroom” suburbs. Representing the reverse of what I described in
the previous chapter, they generated what Walzer regards as single-minded spaces; for instance,
residential spaces that were designed separate and apart from commercial ones, commercial
spaces separate and apart from recreational ones, and so on. This plotting was based on a kind of
self-fulfilling prophesy about automobile use. Anticipated demand for driving from place to
place meant that it would ultimately be necessary to do so. Use zones therefore required
suburbanites to drive their cars from one single-minded environment to another. The policies
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behind them weighed against the construction of mixed-use environments. 133 For some who
criticize a dearth of civil architecture in suburban design, the abandonment of multifunctional
space likewise undermined opportunities for public engagement. According to Fishman, for
example, single-minded spaces spread throughout post-War suburbs have tended to “exclude the
liberating openness of genuine public space,” topographically thwarting the possibility of an
authentic public sphere therein. 134
Notwithstanding an early interest in planning civically oriented suburban communities,
late 20th century segmentation of suburbs along single use zones was hardly the consequence of
public policy alone. The private developers who ultimately built Levittown and other suburbs
were unconcerned with generating civic capacity among their inhabitants. Indeed, they were
often motivated by suspicion and enmity towards political association, as Gans points. 135 The
development of most suburbs disaggregated spaces in which that association might be possible,
therefore.

Despite initial projections of consumer demand for shared space in burgeoning

suburbs, their physical development would be filtered through supply-side rationales obfuscated
by advertising on the radio and, eventually, television. Aimed at countering public perceptions
of suburban sterility, uniformity, and homogeneity, marketing and promotion campaigns allowed
developers to reimage built suburbs as idealized communities, distinct from their disembodied
iterations on the ground. 136 Validating Habermas’ cautions about a mediated public sphere, it
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seems that post-War suburban developers relied on the airwaves to camouflage their divestment
in all but the most negligible spaces where people could congress.
In the following decades, suburbs grew exponentially, both in scale and population. In
1950, less than a quarter of the American people lived in suburbs; in 1960, roughly one-third
called them home; by 1970, more Americans resided in suburbs and metropolitan outskirts than
cities. 137 In the 1990 Census, fully 54 percent of the population lived in suburban areas. The
figure grew to 58 percent in the 2000 Census. It dropped a few raw percentage points in the
2010 tracts, owing to a burst housing bubble in the outermost reaches of the “exurbs” after 2007,
along with stagnation in middle ring suburbs built between 1950 and 1980. 138 Overall, however,
the American population now lives in metropolitan areas, with a growing share resettling cities
and their inner ring suburbs.
These suburbs witnessed significant demographic shifts, particularly during the last
decade. They have grown more racially, ethnically, and economically diverse than ever before.
In fact, the human geography of inner ring suburbs is comparable to that of central cities today.
Many cities recorded majority-minority compositions in the 2010 Census. So, too, have a small
number of suburbs throughout the country. The average minority population of inner ring
suburbs is now 35 percent. That growth owes to massive “black flight” from cities, as well as
significant growth among Latino and Asian communities in the metropolitan United States.139
The image of homogenous post-War suburbs, peopled by middle and upper-middle class whites
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fleeing inner cities for detached houses and private lawns, is a far cry from the demographic
diversity that characterizes metropolitan America today. 140
Yet, the man-made ecologies of suburbs are just beginning to adapt to their changing
demography and social needs. Relatedly, the degree to which practicable space is available for
interpersonal association in these sprawling landscapes remains modest. The inertia has led
Barber to complain that suburbs have come to signal the “destruction of community” within the
metropolitan United States. 141

These criticisms persist, despite attempts to promote infill

development in suburbs. The idea of infill mostly coincided with arrival of the new urbanism, a
design canon that looks to reestablish early 20th century values of socio-spatial exchange inside
suburban landscapes. Responding to sprawl and an absence of place on the peripheries of most
cities, combined with post-suburbanization defenses of open and accessible social space by
Jacobs and others such as Whyte, and later, Kayden, the new urbanism encourages the creation
of “town centers” within suburbs. It promotes main street pedestrianism, which many of its
boosters call “walkable urbanism.” It also eschews development patterns that have resulted from
more than a half-century of resistance to mixed-use space in post-War suburbs. 142 Not unlike
seminal suburban planners, who wanted to indulge market demands for communal space, new
urbanists have arrayed to enhance architectural density, human proximity, and elevated levels of
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environmentalism. They continue to advocate centralized topographies and the feel of smaller
towns in sprawling suburbs in need of ecofriendly retrofitting and emplacement. 143
While Congress for the New Urbanism imaginaries proposed reduced sprawl and vehicle
miles traveled (VMTs) in multifunctional spaces on the edges of central cities, the embodiments
of this suburban design canon have almost always tendered rules of use that drastically inhibit
popular assembly within their common areas. For example, new town centers such as Disney’s
Celebration, Florida, which was developed in 1996—with inspiration from new urban ideals first
advanced in the 1980s—always ranked orderliness as its top priority, not publicity. 144 Codes of
conduct were posted at the entrances and throughout the length of such centers, which were
frequently located in middle ring suburbs and largely accessible to upscale visitors alone.
Developments like Reston Town Center, outside of Washington, D.C., or Easton Town Center,
near Columbus, Ohio have displayed written rules all along their pedestrian ways. Today, those
rules continue to prohibit photography and other seemingly harmless social activities. They also
exclude unauthorized expression. 145 Surveillance of public space is patent in new town centers,
where all facilities are monitored. These are controlled spaces, first and foremost, many say.
There are no unregulated spaces; no places for the unexpected. 146
Its goals are laudable; however, the new urbanism has seemingly unfolded as a tool for
capital development, rather than revitalization of practicable public space that will tolerate
diverse uses or users. In this sense, new town centers model the publicity of gated community
environments, which have signaled stricter privatizations in residential landscapes, owing to
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covenants against autonomy and prohibitions on political associations beyond boards of directors
meetings. 147 The spatial development of suburbs during the last few decades has been skewed
towards gated communities on the residential side, new town centers on the commercial and
leisure side. In both cases, newer suburban forms cosmetically patch public squares and other
simulacrum together, in order to stimulate growth and capitalize investment. Practicable space is
treated as a zero sum game within these models, and uncontrolled assembly is considered a threat
to stable economic development. 148 Add ongoing auto commutes to and from select single use
environments, which Jacobs and Sennett addressed in their critiques of post-War
suburbanization, and it may be fair to question the existence of any spaces where suburban
publics can form and practice publicness. 149 The skeptical conclusion, that Americans drove out
of the city en masse to escape publicity and raise families in the spirit of tranquility, is belied by
visible and enduring community conventions in suburbs, not to mention soccer moms and other
middle class artifices that reflect desires for association and participation.
This study is at least partly animated by concerns about the utility of those artifices in the
context of today’s suburbs, however. It seems that civic spaces of the past may be outmoded by
social conditions of the present. In particular, the demography of suburbs is now comparable
with the heterogeneity of central cities, both economically and culturally. Suburbs are more
racially and ethnically diverse, and the baseline incomes of their residents are much lower than
they used to be. Social needs that have catalyzed public space in cities, historically, will evolve
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in suburbs, too. What remains to be asked, though, is where do increasingly diverse suburbanites
localize public space?

Where do they articulate social and political demands, given the

persistence of sprawl and the exclusivity of environmental innovations alluded to above?
In light of privately enforced covenants in most gated communities, and micromanagement of public conduct in homogenized new town centers, shopping centers appear to
offer the most inclusive social access for diverse suburbanites, who might seek out
heterogeneous assembly in multifunctional spaces. Suburban shopping malls remain popular and
well-populated, notwithstanding recent declines spurred by a retail economy shifting towards
online commerce and “big box” operations that siphon millions of erstwhile patrons. Indeed, the
mall paradigm has penetrated urban design and development. Numerous cities now rely on
shopping centers to anchor commercial revitalization initiatives, including the nation’s largest
cities. 150 Following a brief outline of shopping mall characteristics, and the projected legacy of
malls within suburban landscapes, I will begin to take up the issue of publicity inside these
commercial spaces, as well as how their private ownership bears on civic practices inside. 151
Shopping malls are generally acknowledged as the de facto public spaces of American
suburbs, if only by default. Two observations from scholars cited above may demonstrate this
point. In their study of public space, Carr et al. submit that the rapid growth of suburbs after
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1950 “brought to prominence a significant new forum for public life—the shopping mall.”152
Zukin suggests that most Americans born and raised in the suburbs agree that shopping malls
have become the “preeminent public spaces of our time.” 153 A third, by Garreau, who coined the
term “edge city” in his description of metropolitan suburbanization, recommends that shopping
malls serve as the “village square” of inner ring suburbs. 154
Like agoras and other urban environments, shopping malls bring together commercial
and community activity in ways once identified with public marketplaces. The difference is that
access and invitations are conditioned by the fact that malls are privately owned. Thus, an
appreciation for shopping malls as public spaces in suburbs must be tempered by cautions about
accommodation and tolerance towards diverse association there.

The community comforts

delivered inside malls are often far reaching. Moreover, they continue to expand in response to
the commercial disadvantages faced by mall owners in an age of online shopping. Public
permissions to use malls for unexpected activities, however, remain lean.
Nevertheless, shopping centers have become vital to suburbanites in search of social
space. Once people enter malls, they are pedestrians. They visit the common areas of these
commercial centers for sustained periods, though lengths have diminished in recent years. In
response, many malls offer a variety of amenities to stimulate consumption inside, such as post
office annexes, notaries and tax preparation offices, even voter registration tables. Similarly, to
enhance their competitiveness, owners and operators have retrofitted malls with playgrounds,
carousels, daycare facilities, and other non-commercial services, including libraries. Malls have
been adopted by teenagers and by seniors alike, who use them as after school hangouts and
recreational exercise spaces, respectively. They are used as Girl Scout camping grounds, dating
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and dining establishments, and meeting places for single adults. 155 The nation’s largest, the
“Mall of America,” outside Minneapolis, provides direct shuttles to the city’s airport and a fully
appointed international business center. A major tourist attraction, it houses the world’s largest
indoor amusement park. At 4.2 million square feet, it functions like a fully independent city.
Historically speaking, suburban shopping malls assumed a host of functions associated
with downtowns. In fact, most have availed some space for public activity, even political
addresses by presidential candidates and other government officials. Originators of America’s
first regional shopping centers figured civic practices into their designs. The most renowned of
them, Victor Gruen, an Austrian architect with strong socialist leanings and a history in the
performing arts of his native country, fled to the United States to avoid Nazi persecution prior to
World War II.

Gruen designed enclosed shopping centers in the mid-1950s to be

multifunctional. His malls would respond to the inner city department store arrangements that
carried over from the late 19th century designs described earlier, which segregated commerce
from the street and an unregulated public sphere too unpredictable for urban administrators and
planners at the end of the Civil War. 156 Gruen’s malls would environmentally harness social
inclusion in his adopted home country, while centralizing suburban landscapes he believed
hospitable to automobiles, rather than the American people:
An architect rather than a developer, Gruen attempted to redesign the suburban
mall to recreate the complexity and vitality of urban experience without the noise,
dirt, and confusion that had come to characterize popular images of the city.
Gruen identified shopping as part of a larger web of human activities, arguing that
merchandising would be more successful if commercial activities were integrated
with cultural enrichment… He saw mall design as a way of producing new town
centers or what he called ‘shopping towns.’ Thus he encouraged mall developers
to include in their plans as many nonretail functions as possible, adding cultural,
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artistic, and social events. He called this integration of commerce with
community life ‘environmental architecture.’ 157

Other mall designers shared Gruen’s seminal visions. James Rouse, perhaps most wellknown for renovating Boston’s Faneuil Hall, adopted Gruen’s philosophy early on, allying with
the latter to design New Jersey’s Cherry Hill Mall, the East Coast’s first indoor shopping
center—and its largest by far when it was opened in 1959. Rouse was inspired by Gruen’s work
throughout his own efforts to blur “the boundaries between the mall and the urban setting.”158
Most developers did not share a vision of malls as mainstays of community, however, and their
properties omitted interior spaces that were not fungible straightaway. Gruen’s groundbreaking
influence was short-lived, therefore. The centers he planned never did counteract sprawl or
privatization in the environmental and social landscapes of suburbs. Eventually, a disillusioned
Gruen abandoned his hopes for an urban renaissance shaped by shopping malls. In the end, he
deserted the United States altogether, returning to Vienna in the 1960s.
As Gruen’s story suggests, though, the design arc for shopping centers initially entailed
public functionality. That mixed-use ideal is belied by what generally happens when people
practice association or attempt to engage in unexpected activities within malls.

While an

assortment of community gatherings are allowed inside, Kohn argues, they are distinguished
from public practices that may violate acceptable behavioral standards, which are formulated by
mall owners and management. 159 Far from operating like the open-minded spaces advocated by
Walzer, shopping malls have therefore tended to reproduce the use zones sprawled around
suburbs more generally. They mirror single-minded spaces, in other words. As Mattson argues,
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“the purpose of the mall as a one-dimensional environment for shopping is highlighted when
citizens try to use malls for something else.” 160
If that singularity is any indication, then developers and owners seem to scoff at the
multi-functionality that Gruen and Rouse imagined in malls. Rather, they administer something
finite, with rules that are legible according to critical geographers. They show a propensity to
enact what Blomley calls “cuts” in property—in this case, marking off the common areas of
shopping centers from unexpected activities, territorializing space, and defining unsanctioned
association as illegal trespass. 161 All of this takes place while owners underwrite community
experiences such as the ones above, in order to maintain competitiveness with online and big box
markets. Developers overlook the inconsistency, too, as the malls they build express syntaxes of
antipathy toward public space and association comparable with most privately owned
environments in the suburbs. The effect is de-spatialization of publicity, as Crawford claims:
Shopping mall design [has] reinforced the domestic values and physical order of
suburbia. Like the suburban house, which rejected the sociability of front porches
and sidewalks for private backyards, the malls looked inward, turning their back
on the public street. Set in the middle of nowhere, these consumer landscapes
reflected the profound distrust of the street as a public arena… 162

The histories above include instances in which commercial space was at times peaceably
united with political discourses, and at other times unpredictably destabilized by them. Through
a combination of design and technology, and with law on its side, mall management has been
able to stem unwanted forms of open publicity. Using regulatory tools unavailable to Vitruvius,
Haussmann, or even designers of late 19th century American department stores, suburban
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shopping center developers and owners are able to totalize their environments. They deploy
surveillance devices and security personnel. Interactions are closely monitored inside malls,
while public use is confined to commercial intercourse and authorized assembly. As I hope to
show in subsequent chapters, scrutiny and the threat of exclusion has the effect of structuring
relationships within the mall. It has
…privatized the domains in which large numbers of strangers come together…It
brought its quasi-public spaces in behind high walls, into the atria, open to the sun
streaming through the skylights of the courtyards. There, patrol and control can
operate at a high level…‘It’s pretty hard to walk on my property without seeing
some sort of highly visible security,’…Guards wear uniforms that look like those
of the Marines. ‘I don’t want them to be shy and subtle. I want them to be very
overt. 163

Observation and contact strategies used by shopping center management were unseen in
multifunctional marketplaces of the past, yet they are beginning to inform use guidelines within
cities, too. Neighborhoods and shopping streets celebrated by Jacobs and later Zukin tolerated
diverse practices.

So, too, did colonial marketplaces, which buttressed the democratic

association remarked on by Tocqueville during the 19th century. Malls exclude unregulated
public space, on the other hand. Unspecified invitations notwithstanding, their policies treat as
prohibitive the use of common areas for most non-commercial activities. At the former Carousel
Center, now “Destiny USA,” outside Syracuse, a mall manager speaks to the single-mindedness
of that space, juxtaposing it with the multi-functionality of the city’s downtown:
We have the ability [to control functions in the mall]. It is private property. You
probably get to the point where everybody thinks that it ought to be like a street
corner and everybody can do what they want. But the mall is not a street
corner… If I look at a downtown corner in the city, I think anybody could go
there and stand on the corner and do what they want… I’m not sure that’s
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something we want… There’s a lot of people here. They feel that they’re not
shopping downtown. They’re shopping here. 164

Notwithstanding the communality expressed by Gruen and Rouse, or the natural
opportunities for assembly they may otherwise offer in a sprawling suburban landscape that
continues to dictate against association, malls often seem designed to conflate shopping with
public space and democratic choice. 165 Barber shares this conviction, reprising Marcuse’s One
Dimensional Man and his own “MacWorld” of commercialism and conformity. Shopping malls
colonize civic capacity, Barber charges. They transform agency into consumerism:
The mall stands as a powerful embodiment of the privatization and
commercialization of space…Identity itself is increasingly associated with
branding and commercial logos…This consumerist one-dimensionality achieves a
palpable geography in the controlled and controlling architecture of the shopping
mall. Malls are the privatized public squares of the new fringe city ‘privatopia,’
which uses secession from the larger common society—deemed vulgar,
multiethnic, and dangerous—to secure a gated world of placid safety…The mall
refuses to play host to…community…to political speech or civic leafleting…On
entering an enclosed mall, we are asked to shed every identity other than that of
the consumer. 166

Public space may be fairly indicated by the signposts I tried to establish in the last
chapter: openness and accessibility; support for community; visibility; toleration and
accommodation; unexpectedness. In spite of the millions of Americans who frequent them, and
their periodic incorporation of some indications above, the regulation or exclusion of all but the
most anodyne non-commercial exchanges in shopping malls compromises their capacity to serve
as much needed public spaces in suburbs. I believe those denials of space for diverse practices
of publicity in malls have actually produced unintended, negative consequences for the

164

Quoted in Staeheli and Mitchell, The People’s Property, op cit., pg. 80. NB: Carousel Center was converted
from a regional center into the super-regional Destiny USA. I will discuss that conversion further in the last chapter.
165
Miles, Spaces for Consumption, op cit., pp. 104-07.
166
Benjamin R. Barber, “Civic Space,” in Smiley and Robbins, op cit., pp. 31-33.

102

marketability of older malls, which I will discuss later. They have certainly encouraged no
shortage of cultural criticism against older malls, which are often lumped in with other dead
spaces in suburbs. Finally, they have dashed hopes that shopping centers will help suburbanites
realize Gruen’s promise of renewed civic capacity inside improved downtowns:
[M]alls can never replace the public realm. A public street is a place of activity
owned by its users; a mall is a private real estate and retail investment owned by
its investors. No one can be in a privately owned mall, or engage in any activity
that would be legal on a public street, without the tacit or written permission of a
private landowner…Urban downtowns and town centers are by definition
inclusive. Malls by definition are exclusive. It is no more complicated than
that. 167

But it is more complicated than that, I think. At a time when malls have proven to be less
durable than expected, moreover, it is possible to imagine at least two future scenarios. In one of
them, shopping center owners meet continuing changes in suburban demography and the
growing commercial anxieties they face with continued scrutiny and exclusion of unexpected
activities.

They obscure indications of public space and practicability in malls, based on

property rights recognized in the law. Among those are the rights of owners to dispose of their
property as they see fit; further, to maintain relationships with their guests—pursuant to or
structured by those property rights. These entail the right to exclude unwanted speech and
activities, which may threaten bottom lines financially. Malls are commercial properties, first
and foremost. Unauthorized public activity inside may interfere with pedestrian traffic flows or
patronage inside the businesses housed by shopping centers. Customers who do not wish to
participate in public activities or listen to non-commercial expression may avoid malls where
such practices are permitted, which would adversely impacting commerce and profitability.
Malls where civic activity takes place may also bear additional expenses. Public space and
167
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sloppiness have combined consistently throughout history, going back to the agora. 168 Should
financially insecure developers and owners be required to subsidize political speech and
assembly by paying for attendant costs, such as sanitation and insurance liability?
Owners enjoy constitutional protections, too, including rights to due process and
safeguards against any takings of their property without just compensation. They also enjoy
freedoms of expression, which entail freedoms from expression. And that raises a more complex
question, perhaps: should shopping mall owners or their properties be required to speak on
public subjects, even when they prefer to remain silent? Or should they be forced to provide
space on their private property for dissemination of viewpoints with which they disagree?
Patrons and passersby may logically associate ideas publicized inside malls with the opinions of
owners perceived to permit expression of those ideas. What happens when political heterodoxy,
for example, the radicalism of early 20th century streets runs counter to the convictions of mall
owners or their intended customers? Shopping center owners express community values all the
time, when they invite seniors in for exercise or permit Girl Scouts to rally. Still, they are private
citizens. As such, they enjoy freedom of speech and silence, along with a right of refusal in the
context of controversial expressions or practices.
In a second scenario, suburban shopping center owners facilitate publicity on their
properties.

They expand openness and accessibility in the common spaces of their malls,

providing support for community interactions and discourse, even when it is an anathema to their
ways of thinking. They accommodate or at least tolerate visible, diverse, and unexpected uses of
their property. If current policies in most malls serve as any indication of the future for such
expressive license, then prospects seem grim. Things appear more likely to proceed according to
the first scenario, frankly, given positions taken by owners for decades now, coupled with the
168
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ones articulated by their interest group organization, the International Council of Shopping
Centers (ICSC). Thus, expanding public space inside shopping centers will require outside
intervention. Arguments for that intervention, that is, for an amelioration of public space in
suburban malls, will comprise the focus of the final chapter in this study—after the property
rationales above had had their day in court, so to speak.
The reciprocity between practices of public space and environmental design remains
central to understanding how civic capacity may be harnessed for democratic participation and
representation. However, when practice and design come into conflict, as they did during
Occupy Wall Street protests throughout the nation, we must look beyond civil society, to the
state, which has the unique ability to condition space in publicly accessible environments, while
extending or withdrawing legitimacy among contestants within those environments. “To be
public implies access to the sphere of private property,” Mitchell argues. 169 But he also observes
that the ability to use space publicly for assembly and association “is always vetted through…a
geography of law….” 170 Thus, the practice of space in any landscape is never guaranteed. It
often

competes

with

countervailing interests

and

rights

engendered

by American

constitutionalism, specifically, property ownership, whether by government or private
citizens. 171

If we are weighing individual and collective participation in open political

discourses in places built during an era of suburbanization, then we must consider legal
determinations about which spaces are suited to free expression. The next chapter will therefore
trace how contemporary spaces have been legally construed as forums for communication and
association.
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Mitchell, “The End of Public Space?” op cit., pg. 116.
Don Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space (New York: The Guilford
Press, 2003), pg. 46.
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Chapter Three

Lost in Civic Space:
Unexpected Activities and the
Arc of the Public Forum Doctrine
“Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into
a judicial question.”
- Alexis de Tocqueville 1

Having traced indications of public space in design and theory, and its historical practice in the
marketplaces of Europe and metropolitan America, I trust we are ready to address the ways in
which it has been conditioned by the state; likewise, that we are ready to incorporate Mitchell’s
admonition that rights to public space are always mediated through the “geography of law.” 2 As
the previous chapters showed, we are dealing not only with mutual, but also competing rights to
public, discursive space. Starting in this chapter, therefore, I would like to turn my attention to
legal interpretations of space and publicity, as supplied by the United States Supreme Court,
which has repeatedly ruled on political expression in public places. Judicial review did not
pertain for much of the history examined in the last chapter. By the time the 20th century came
to a close, however, it became pivotal, especially when socio-economic shifts and new built
environments transformed much of America’s landscape into a suburban one.
The Court’s interpretation of publicly accessible space in an era of suburbanization
results from two forms of consideration, in my view: legal doctrine and extra-legal environment.
With respect to environment, the Court developed much of its free speech jurisprudence in the

1

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), pg. 74.
Don Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space (New York: The Guilford Press,
2003), pg. 46.
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midst of major topographical change, particularly after World War II, when huge urban exoduses
ensued in a post-War America shaped by significant social and political upheaval. Judicial
decision-makers reviewing expressive practices within environments being built after 1950 had
to factor in the transformation of urban space, as well as the evolution of new places and modes
of assembly. Those changes, which included the eclipse of downtown business districts, have
reconfigured the relationship between commerce and publicity in large part, as I hope to show in
the next chapter.
Before I do that, I would like to explore a key legal doctrine through which the Court has
endeavored to reconcile political expression with the suburbanization of American space: the
public forum doctrine. 3 Beginning in the late 1930s, many of the Court’s free expression
decisions have hinged on where individual and collective participation in open political
discourses may attract Constitutional protection, rather than on whether the First Amendment
affords protection to speech and assembly, absent spatial considerations. In response, the Court
has generated an evolving doctrine through which expressive activity is refereed according to the
types of fora where it ensues. The difference may not seem significant at first, but it is.
Moreover, the Court’s rulings on speech in shopping centers and new public places where people
go are often rooted in the public forum doctrine, so it is important as we look ahead. It is
comprised by a spectrum, ranging from quintessentially public places to exclusively private ones,
with a constitutional middle ground that has proven more difficult to classify as American
topography has changed. It is articulated through the syntax below:

3

Since this is the first use of the term “public forum” in this study, it is fair to question whether I intend to treat that
term synonymously with “public space.” While I sometimes use them interchangeably, as do many observers, the
Court has delineated public space from public forum. In Lehman v. Shaker Heights, discussed below, the Court
noted that a city bus was public space. However, it withheld any designation as a public forum where political
advertising was concerned. Vernacular is key, of course. Whether the Court characterizes a public space as a public
forum depends on its considerations of communicative content within that space.
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•

Traditional Public Forum: publicly accessible places that have always been associated
with political expression and civic activity; streets, sidewalks, and public parks, for
example;

•

Designated Public Forum: publicly accessible places not traditionally associated with
political expression and civic activity, but ones that government affirmatively opens to
such practices, for example, student centers at public university campuses or municipal
theaters. Rights and liberties that inhere within traditional public fora attach to these, too;

•

Non-Public Forum: limitedly accessible places neither associated with, nor opened by the
government to political expression and civic activity, for example, military bases; 4

•

Private Property: places fully owned and operated by private interests, where permitted
expressive activities are determined exclusively by controlling authorities, for example, a
private home. 5

Using the typology above, I will devote this chapter to recounting key rulings used by the
Court to establish its public forum doctrine. My aim is to elaborate the legal parameters within
which it has decided contests over political expression in publicly accessible spaces deemed by
governments at varying levels to contain some sort of proprietary value, following civil rights
movements in the 1950s and 1960s. Before I begin, it is worth noting that the Court itself has
postulated a relationship between expression and the publicity of space:

4

The Court codified these three classifications in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 473 U.S.
788 (1985), though it made practical use of them in previous rulings, including Perry Education Association v.
Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). See below.
5
G. Sidney Buchanan, “ The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum,” in University of Illinois Law Review, U. Ill. L.
Rev. 950, 1999.
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Although American constitutional jurisprudence, in light of the First Amendment,
has been jealous to preserve access to public places for purposes of free speech,
the nature of the forum…[has] remained important in determining the degree of
protection afforded by the Amendment to the speech in question. 6

While a complete chronicle of High Court rulings in this area would vastly outnumber those
summarized here, the cases to follow are intended to demonstrate the evolution of the public
forum doctrine as a response to unexpected activities within built environments turned prominent
gathering places in an era of suburbanization. Thus, the doctrine can supply a useful signal of
the Court’s accommodation towards political association inside shopping centers and other
publicly accessible spaces on America’s modern topography.
In the preceding chapters, I invoked criticism of a declining public sphere, treating the
problem as one of narrowing space in which civic engagement is possible. That problem is now
endemic to both urban and suburban landscapes in the United States. While marketplace and
attendant socio-economic transformations play a part, the Court has also underwritten a
weakening of the public sphere. It has given way to proprietary imperatives proffered by the
state as somehow tantamount to public interest, while failing to support the nation’s expressive
architecture. In fact, the historical arc outlined near the end of the previous chapter parallels a
contraction in judicial protection for public space. The public forum, once encompassed within a
far-reaching doctrine that pertained to downtown streets and sidewalks, grew narrower, judged
along the typology above, itself shaped by dictates of comfort, order, and government budgeting.
As the Court cultivated its doctrine, the protections afforded speech and assembly faded, even
within spaces originally considered sacrosanct for purposes of publicity. 7

6

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 302-03 (1974). My emphasis.
Timothy Zick, Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First Amendment Liberties in Public Places (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 167-71. See also, Zick, “Speech and Spatial Tactics,” Texas Law Review,
84 TX. L. Rev., 2006, 587; “Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography,” George Washington Law
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Opening salvo. The traditional public forum
Most observers trace the origins of the public forum doctrine to 1939 and Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO).

Hague turned in large part on the Court’s

rejection of a late 19th century ruling, Davis v. Massachusetts. 8 In Davis, the Court borrowed
from an opinion by then Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Justice (and future High Court
jurist), Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose later defense of free speech in the 20th is still celebrated
today. Both Courts upheld a Boston ordinance barring anyone from public speaking on city
grounds without having been granted a permit by the mayor. The Court sustained the ordinance
on the grounds that the Boston’s public spaces were, in effect, the property of the local
government. The majority used that property analogy to temper its view of publicity in the
streets of the city:
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a
highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of
the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. 9

In effect, the Court maintained that the public interest was best served by fidelity to notions of
municipal ownership, such as the one above, as well as what one observer claimed was s a “neartotal deference to state prerogatives inherent in…government power to restrict the use of public
streets and parks by public speakers.” 10

Review, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., 2006. In addition, see Don Mitchell, “The Liberalization of Free Speech: Or, How
Protest in Public Space is Silenced,” Stanford Agora, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2004, pp. 13-14. Zick and Mitchell each argue
that the doctrine established in Hague v. CIO set a standard by which rights to public space could always be
subordinated in the interests of “general comfort,” even though the majority upheld the use of streets, sidewalks and
parks for political expression. See also, Steven G. Gey, “Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to
Cyberspace,” in Ohio State Law Journal 58 Ohio St. L. J., 1536 (1998).
8
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). NB: The Hague Court did not expressly overturn the previous ruling,
however.
9
Ibid.
10
Gey, op cit., 1539.
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Forty years later, however, the High Court distinguished the political background in its
Hague decision. It also departed from a blanket defense of government property ownership,
particularly when expression by individual citizens and groups was excluded from public spaces.
The facts in Hague were straightforward. The Board of Commissioners of Jersey City passed an
ordinance forbidding any meeting on streets and sidewalks, in parks and public buildings—
including parades and other assemblies—without a permit first distributed by the Director of
Public Safety. The Director was authorized to refuse applications for permits if he deemed it
appropriate to do so. The ordinance was intended to quell expression by organizations that
advocated the obstruction of government or its change by unlawful means. It subjected violators
to fines and/or imprisonment by the police. 11
The fledgling CIO, an umbrella group of labor unions that promoted collective
bargaining and sought to recruit new members through dissemination of information outlining
workers’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), was denied a permit. The
organization was subsequently excluded from city streets on the grounds that it membership
included communists, who attempted to spread propaganda and proselytize others into
committing revolutionary acts. Relying on a second municipal ordinance, which prohibited
distribution of subversive newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets and other printed materials, local
officials routinely removed and arrested CIO organizers from Jersey City public spaces,
compelling them to leave the city limits in many instances. 12 Citing the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, the CIO challenged the first ordinance, specifically, its exclusion of free speech
and assembly in the City’s public places. The CIO contended that it disseminated materials
11

Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 at 501.
Ibid., at 502. In several instances, protesters from the union were forcibly escorted to board ferries headed to New
York, or were likewise relegated to remote areas well outside the city limits. The CIO also alleged that its members
were subject to unreasonable searches and seizure by Jersey City police. I am confining my summary to actions
against assembly and expression.
12
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protected by the NLRA, too, and those materials advocated peaceful, legal methods of collective
bargaining, pursuant to established workers’ rights.
The Court concurred with the CIO, supporting its claim that members were engaging in
legal political advocacy, while observing the spirit of the labor act. A plurality of the Court
focused on two aspects of the controversy. First, the Organization and its affiliates enjoyed
constitutional and statutory rights to assemble and share information about workers’ benefits, as
well as circulate discourse about collective bargaining:
[T]he findings sustain the allegation, that the respondents had no other purpose
than to inform citizens of Jersey City by speech, and by the written word,
respecting matters growing out of national legislation, the constitutionality of
which this court has sustained…it is clear that the right peaceably to assemble and
to discuss these topics, and to communicate respecting them, whether orally or in
writing, is a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United States…The very idea
of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a
redress of grievances. 13

Second, and more importantly for my purposes, the Court held that Jersey City could not legally
exclude the use of public space traditionally associated with political expression. Hearkening
back to ancient history and the agora we saw in previous chapters, the Court articulated a
practical overlap between people’s associations and public fora.

It thereby spatialized the

Constitution’s protections of free speech and assembly:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. 14

13
14

Ibid., at 512-13.
Ibid., at 516.
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The plurality expanded on its geo-political argument. It rejected Jersey City’s ordinance, along
with its prima facie authorization of unchecked government control over space:
We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance…void upon its face.
It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard
of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere
opinion that such refusal will prevent ‘riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage.’ It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of
arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the
prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly ‘prevent’ such eventualities. 15

The Court had issued its first significant public forum ruling. It also re-articulated the
relationship between civic practices and shared spaces, delivering the most extensive defense of
place in First Amendment jurisprudence to that point in American history. From the perspective
of free expression and its constitutionally protected emplacement, the New Deal plurality had
now endorsed public space and its discursive value in a democracy. Reservations lurked in the
background, however. Notwithstanding the new overlap between place and speech, Hague did
not provide for unrestricted access to the most traditional spaces, even. The opinion by Justice
Owen Roberts left a pinhole in the new doctrine, which would open more widely in rulings to
follow. 16 Bracketing the marketplace of ideas from the messiness of public spaces like the
agora, the Court signaled its support for limits on embodied civic engagement:
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good
order… 17

15

Ibid.
The seminal account in this regard is attributed to Harry Kalven, in “The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana,” The Supreme Court Review, Sup. Ct. Rev., 1965, 1, 13; see also Zick, op cit., (2009) pp. 6-8; Mitchell,
op cit., (2004) pg. 15, Gey, op cit., 1540.
17
Hague v. CIO, at 516.
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That caveat would become a foregone conclusion in short order. Two years after Hague
was decided, the Court reviewed a New Hampshire statute prohibiting parades, processions, and
open-air meetings on streets and sidewalks—without a special license obtained through local
selectmen or city licensing committees. When a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses violated the
statute, by organizing a parade of single-file marchers in Manchester without the required
license, the Court reaffirmed its reservations about unlimited access to public spaces. 18 This
time, moreover, a majority upheld a restriction on the use of streets and sidewalks characterized
in Hague as traditional public spaces, because it was neutral with respect to the content of public
expression. In Cox v. New Hampshire, the Court pursued a different course from Hague. It
argued that there might be occasions on which the broadest protection of freedom necessitates
regulation of space, in the interests of orderly association:
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an
organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be
lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to
impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in
the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil
liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which
they ultimately depend. 19

The formulation above hinted at an alternative doctrine, one that regulated the use of
public space, rather than excluding it: time, place, and manner. The time, place, and manner
doctrine specified when, where, and in what mode speech and assembly could be exercised under
the First Amendment. It applied to traditional public fora alone, however. When the Court
addressed civic activity in the new landscapes of the latter 20th century, a much more abstract

18

NB: As to the political messages involved in the contest, the petitioners carried signs reading, “Religion is a Snare
and a Racket,” “Serve God and Christ the King,” and “Fascism or Freedom. Hear Judge Rutherford and Face the
Facts.” They also distributed leaflets announcing a public meeting during which a talk on government would be
given, free of charge. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) at 572.
19
Ibid., at 574.
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public forum doctrine would control in cases where expression and association were considered
in terms of space. 20
In fact, Cox v. New Hampshire did not differ too much from Hague v. CIO where
physical setting was concerned. However, the exclusion in Hague was based on an arbitrary,
invidious distinction between tolerable and unwanted expression. Both cases involved permit
requirements, which were imposed on groups seeking to spread heterodox ideas.

Yet the

plurality in Hague concluded that Jersey City illegally excluded certain kinds of political speech
on public property. The majority in Cox surmised that the marchers in that case would have
received a permit had they requested one, and then observed its rules. 21 The activists in Cox,
unlike the CIO organizers in Hague, were never prohibited from distributing leaflets and other
written materials, nor were they unconstitutionally prevented from meeting in public or
communicating with larger audiences. The issue in Cox, the Court maintained, centered on
reasonable requirements for the exercise of publicity, enforced without any prior restraint by the
Manchester authorities: time, place, and manner rules that supported the free exchange of ideas
in most public places, while preserving their use for all of the city’s 75,000 residents.
Cox therefore held that regulated space protected speech for everyone in Manchester,
New Hampshire. Lawful limits in the city qualified when, where, and how citizens might
assemble and communicate with each other. Those limits expanded the scale of public space:
If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public streets for parades or
processions, as it undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give
consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place, and manner in
relation to the other proper uses of the streets. 22
20

The time, place, and manner doctrine has been inveighed by Zick and Mitchell. They view the doctrine as a
veiled attempt to suppress the efficacy of public expression by regulation, rather than outright exclusion under a
public forum analysis. See Zick (2009), op cit., pp. 54-61; Mitchell (2004), op cit., pp. 16-18. My intention here is
to distinguish time, place, and manner from the public forum doctrine—positioning the former as an alternative to
the latter, rather than joining criticism of either at this stage in my examination.
21
Ibid. at 572.
22
Ibid., at 576.
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The Manchester limitation merely ensured that public events would be policed properly;
that multiple parades did not conflict with one another, for example. 23 It provided order, without
prejudice, in the public spaces characterized in Hague as immemorially associated with civic
exchanges among citizens. Yet it did so from an alternative doctrine: time, place, and manner.
That doctrine applied in legal situations involving quintessential public spaces, such as streets,
sidewalks, and parks, at least until recently. When it came to new landscapes and unexpected
activities after 1950, the Supreme Court generally turned to the doctrine it issued in Hague: the
public forum. In its earliest iteration, the public forum doctrine seemed generous from the point
of view of constitutionally protected speech and legally defensible space. As the second half of
the 20th century unfolded, however, it would gradually be reformulated to safeguard what the
Court came to define as government-owned property. In turn, the doctrine tended to position
embodied association and expression against constructs of proprietorship. The impact of that
doctrinal transformation on practicable public space is evidenced in the cases below.

New landscapes, new contests
The traditional public forum remained stable throughout the 1940s and 1950s, while it
was regulated by time, place, and manner rules. Free association and exchanges of ideas on
older urban topographies seemed secure under the Court’s nascent doctrine.

In a rapidly

changing socio-economic landscape after 1960, however, coupled with growing scales of
political activism during a new era of civil rights movements, the Court began to introduce
wrinkles to its construction of the public forum doctrine. The first of those wrinkles imposed
constitutional hurdles to the dissemination of controversial ideas in places the Court had
23

Cox, at 577.
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previously characterized as traditional public fora. While pure speech might still find First
Amendment protection within such spaces, the Court turned its attention to what it deemed to be
a new medium of political activity worthy of scrutiny: expressive conduct.
In Cox v. Louisiana, a 1965 decision that inspired Kalven’s seminal analysis of the public
forum doctrine, The Negro and the First Amendment, 24 the Court essentially reiterated its
support for free expression in quintessentially public places. But now the Court distinguished
pure advocacy from political “behavior” that transcended plain speech. 25 The distinction was
hardly a minor one. Not only did it have a major impact on a watershed ruling during the civil
rights era, but it also reshaped the Court’s elaboration of the public forum doctrine.
Elton B. Cox, an ordained congregational minister and field secretary/advisor to the
Committee on Racial Equality (CORE), was arrested and subsequently convicted in Baton
Rouge for violating three Louisiana statutes. The first statute related to disturbances of the
peace. It read as follows:
Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances
such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby…crowds or
congregates with others…in or upon…a public street or highway, or upon a
public sidewalk, or any other public place or building…and who fails or refuses to
move on…when ordered so to do by any law enforcement officer of any
municipality, or parish, in which such act or acts are committed, or by any law
enforcement officer of the state of Louisiana, or other authorized person…shall be
guilty of disturbing the peace.

24

Harry Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). Two points are
worth mentioning: 1) Kalven’s book was an extension of an article he authored in the Supreme Court Review, “The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,” S. Ct. Rev. 1965; 2) Kalven’s work still stands as a unique
examination of the public forum doctrine in a full volume format.
25
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), at 555; 379 U.S. 559 (1965), at 566. NB: Cox v. Louisiana actually
consists of two individual, contiguous, rulings, as the two citations here should indicate. In effect, three charges
were leveled against Cox; two of them—breach of peace and obstruction of public passages—were addressed in the
first ruling, referred to as “Cox I.” A third charge—picketing a courthouse—was considered in a subsequent ruling,
called “Cox II.”
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Cox led a peaceful protest outside a Baton Rouge courthouse following the arrest of twenty-three
young men, who were all awaiting trial for their involvement in pickets urging a boycott of
racially segregated lunch counters. Cox’s demonstration drew some 2,000 protesters to the State
Capitol. Shortly thereafter, approximately 300 whites assembled near the protest, prompting a
threat of violence, according to the testimony of several police officers that collected at the
scene. As a result, the officers arrested Cox, who refused to leave after being ordered to do so by
the chief of police. The former was also charged with violating a Louisiana statute that made it
illegal to obstruct public passages and building entranceways. 26
In the case of each statute above, the Court overturned Cox’s conviction by the Louisiana
judiciary. It found the regulations on his speech to be too sweeping. Both laws raised the
possibility of arbitrariness and abuse by local authorities, not like the ones struck down in Hague
v. CIO. The prohibitions were overbroad, the Court argued, and local law officers might use
them to exclude speech from public places based on its content. Discrimination of that nature
was evidenced by a Baton Rouge police admission that it permitted demonstrations and even
obstruction by labor unions, which threatened to disturb the peace, while withholding that right
from individual and collective outcry for racial justice or equality. 27

Rather than creating

invidious distinctions, and then barring unwanted expression, the Court declared, civil authorities
were responsible for safeguarding free speech and assembly against open threats made by
onlookers or counter-publics.

Convicting Cox and circumventing conflict at the behest of

counter-demonstrators, who might or might not engage in violence, unconstitutionally infringed
on his First and Fourteenth Amendment liberties.

26

Cox v. Louisiana, op cit., at 538-41. NB: The facts of the case are somewhat more complicated than the account
summarized here. This summary is intended to establish a context for the Court’s decisions and opinions as they
relate to public space and forum.
27
Ibid. at 557.
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Having protected Cox’s rights in the first decision, the Court articulated a different line of
reasoning in its sequel, Cox II, which went against him. While the Court seemed to issue a
distinction without a difference in Cox I, between speech and expressive conduct, the distinction
turned out to prove important in Cox II. It became central in the immediate cases, and it would
be expanded in later rulings. The majority ordered that embodied speech be given a wide berth
within public places, in Cox I.

The Constitution required that much, it said.

However,

expressive conduct, in the form of protests, pickets, and public obstruction—in other words,
individual and collective action—engendered narrower constitutional protection. As the Court
pointed out in Cox I:
We…reject the notion urged by [Cox] that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by
conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as
these amendments afford those who communicate ideas by pure speech. We
reaffirm the statement that ‘it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom
of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed.’ 28

The qualification above set the tone for Cox II, where the Court reviewed a third
Louisiana statute, which outlawed picketing near a courthouse, aimed at obstructing the
administration of justice. The statute read:
Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the
administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror,
witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty pickets or parades in or near
a building housing a court of the State of Louisiana…shall be fined not more than
five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 29

Unlike the other statutes that pertained to obstruction of passageways and interference with
public order, the Court believed that the courthouse picketing law above was better tailored to
28
29

Ibid., at 556.
Ibid., at 560.
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proscribe “certain specific behavior” in places where it might normally be accommodated or
tolerated. 30 As such, it passed the famous, to some, infamous, constitutional test posed by
Justice Holmes in Schenck v. U.S., a decision that also prohibited expression otherwise protected
by the First Amendment when it presented a “clear and present danger.” 31 Yet, there was no
evidence of an imminent threat in the facts that precipitated Cox. The picketers’ hypothetical
interference with the administration of justice was neither direct, nor inherent in any actions they
actually took near the Baton Rouge courthouse.

Still, Justice Goldberg and the majority

imagined a number of scenarios in which public protests immediately outside that courthouse
might somehow sway legal decision-making inside. The danger was a plausible one, they
argued:
It is, of course, true that most judges will be influenced only by what they see and
hear in court. However, judges are human; and the legislature has the right to
recognize the danger that some judges, jurors, and other court officials, will be
consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstrations in or near their
courtrooms both prior to and at the time of the trial. 32

Thus, the Louisiana statute satisfied the majority’s requirement that regulations on conduct be
made pursuant to a “substantial state interest in protecting the judicial process.” 33
In the end, the Court rejected a racially motivated order of dispersal by the Baton Rouge
police against Cox and his fellow demonstrators, but upheld the state’s courthouse picketing ban
as a permissible restraint on expressive conduct, by dint of where that conduct took place. The
reference to place was subtle, but terrible important to the majority’s rationalization of its

30

Ibid., at 562.
Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919). NB: Schenck hinged on the fitness of expressive behavior, vis-à-vis its space
and context. While responsibly warning of a “fire” in a crowded theater where one burned would not constitute a
destructive act, Justice Holmes argued, doing so falsely in the same space might provoke unnecessary panic, chaos,
and harm among audiences in such a context. Mitchell relays Holmes’ spatial analogy and its contextualization of
free speech in his critical review of the public forum doctrine. See Mitchell (2004), op cit., pp. 6-11.
32
Cox v. Louisiana, op cit., at 563
33
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decision. All the ban did, said the Court, was regulate the space in which expressive conduct
transpired, not the expression or the conduct itself. Further, the state’s regulation of space was
defensible inasmuch the geography of civil rights protests might intimidate or unduly influence
judicial officers and thereby undermine impartial administration of justice. The ban never
destabilized the abstract value of a public forum, nor did it infringe on free speech and assembly
in and of themselves, according to the majority:
Nor does such a statute infringe upon the constitutionally protected rights of free
speech and free assembly. The conduct which is the subject of this statute—
picketing and parading—is subject to regulation even though intertwined with
expression and association. The examples are many of the application by this
Court of the principle that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be
regulated or prohibited…We are not concerned with such a pure form of
expression as newspaper comment or a telegram by a citizen to a public official.
We deal in this case not with free speech alone, but with expression mixed with
particular conduct. 34

There were other dimensions to the Cox decisions to be sure. For my purposes, however,
the cases may be said to hinge on a distinction between speech and conduct, on the one hand, and
their spatialization by the Court, on the other. The link between speech, conduct, and place
generated further variables for jurists to consider under the banner of the public forum doctrine.
And though Cox is sometimes cited as a judicial expansion of the public forum, I would argue
the reverse: the added connection of speech to conduct, based in large measure on where it took
place, widened the berth for constitutionally permissible exclusions against individual and
collective participation in open political discourses. Having tolerated restraints on political
conduct such as pickets in quintessentially public streets and sidewalks, adjacent to other public
spaces like courthouses, the Court began to restructure the public forum doctrine to admit more
restrictions on association and expression within the American landscape, as Kalven and others
34

Ibid., at 563-64.

121

concede. 35 The Court would continue to enforce greater limits on the public forum, particularly
as it applied the doctrine to new spatial types, not to mention ones it eventually deemed to be
non-public. As topography changed and began to reflect the demographic and commercial shifts
described in the second chapter, states and municipalities were increasingly obligated to compete
with the rapidly sprawling geography of marketplace migrations into suburbs.

In view of

government’s entry into that competition, the Court’s enforcement of limits on the public forum
might help explain why observers in the first chapter lament a decline in space and civic
engagement in the United States.

Non-public space
Prior to its delineation of the designated public forum, the Court did weigh exclusions
against free expression on suburban property. Its ruling in Central Hardware CO. v. NLRB helps
propels us forward, therefore, towards contests in which shopping centers are the spaces of
dispute. By the time the Court decided that case in 1972, it was well on its way to espousing a
model of what was public and what was not, as well as mediating between competing tenets of
free expression and private property under the law. 36 Central Hardware presented a couple of
thorny issues, which perennially complicate overlaps of civic and commercial space in the late20th century, especially. First, the case addressed exclusions against free speech that were
imposed by a property owner. Next, it hinged on the categorical differences between public
space and proprietary space. Decided on the same day as Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner—the
Court’s second major ruling on speech in shopping malls—the opinions in Central Hardware
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became a referendum on earlier rulings about speech and property: Marsh v. Alabama and
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza. Those two decisions focused on
public expression in company towns and shopping centers, respectively, where speech was
indeed required by the Court. 37 In response, the majority in Central Hardware rejected a public
forum designation on popularly accessible, privately owned property, despite the minority’s call
for allowable expression on matters pertaining to that property. The point I wish to emphasize is
that Central Hardware signaled post-civil rights movement recoil against multifunctional
definitions of places treated as property, as well as antipathy toward expressive practices therein.
The case helped establish a framework through which the Court narrowed its application of the
public forum, as I hope to show throughout the remainder of this chapter and the one to follow.
It also anticipated prevailing conditions under which deliberative functions would be legally
segregated from proprietary spaces.
Central Hardware was decided in the 1972 term, which turned out to be a significant one
for shopping center jurisprudence. I will revisit that term in the following chapter. For now, I
would like to fast forward two years, to 1974, when the Court decided another important public
forum case, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights. 38 Lehman is routinely cited as evidence of the
doctrinal maturation of the public forum. The brief opinion in that case continues to attract
comment in legal reviews involving the public forum and it surely raises a host of salient issues
for us here. Beyond its star power among contemporary First Amendment observers, Lehman
turned out to be rife with challenges for judicial decision-makers responsible for shaping the
public forum doctrine in relation to commercial property and publicly permissible political
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expression. Though it may not have been obvious at first, the ruling in Lehman promised to
clarify predominant attitudes among members of the Court as they turned toward free expression
in contemporary places. Moreover, Lehman should illustrate an argument that animates the end
of this examination: Any effort to reconstitute shopping centers as civic spaces ought to be vetted
through the High Court’s reassessment of both the First Amendment and the public forum
typologies it began to endorse in an era of suburbanization.
In 1970, Harry J. Lehman, a candidate for the office of State Representative to the Ohio
General Assembly, sought to purchase car card space on the Shaker Heights Rapid Transit
System. He hoped to do so for a three month period prior to a general election in November.
The proposed advertisement read:
HARRY J.

LEHMAN IS

OLD-FASHIONED!

ABOUT HONESTY,

INTEGRITY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT.
The management of the municipal transit system refused to sell him the car card space, however.
It based its decision on a local ordinance, which deemed that no political advertisements could be
placed on any bus in the municipality’s surface transportation system. While transit system
managers routinely sold advertising space to cigarette, liquor, retail and service establishments,
as well as banking, savings, and loan companies, they refused to do so when it came to political
campaigns and public issue ads. 39

Shaker Heights’ rationale for excluding political

advertisements was simple, yet it raises questions about the way in which free speech protections
may engender expressive discretion for those who own or manage publicly accessible space,
including private property developers: the city wished to avoid the appearance of political
favoritism, which might stem from its sale of public spaces to select candidates or civic
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organizations. 40 In the interest of ensuring a steady stream of revenue, moreover, local public
officials and transit system administrators declined to sell temporary advertising space during
election cycles, to avoid incurring the loss of more lucrative annual contracts with “innocuous
and less controversial” commercial advertisers. The Shaker Heights ban on political advertising
and issue advocacy was neutral and comprehensive. That is, it was not limited to any specific
candidates, interest groups, or viewpoints.
Lehman challenged Shaker Heights’ restriction on political advertising. Since the buses
belonging to the rapid transit system were municipally owned and operated, he contended, they
constituted First Amendment public fora in which all forms of expression, including political and
advocacy campaigns, were protected. Lehman continued, arguing that his freedom to publicly
promote his candidacy for office had been violated. 41 His cause fell on deaf ears, however, first
in Ohio’s lower courts and then in its highest court. Ignoring dissenting arguments that no valid
governmental interest was served by the ban on political advertising, a majority of the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that dissemination of political views merited full protection in spaces
categorized as public by the nation’s High Court, but Shaker Heights’ transit vehicles did not
qualify as such. 42
Lehman countered that car card spaces on buses were quintessentially public fora. They
therefore supported a guarantee of open access to political expression, too.

He fared

unsuccessfully when the case was reviewed in the federal Supreme Court. In its plurality
decision, the Court disputed Lehman’s claim that the municipal transit system and its car card
space functioned as a public forum for communication about politics. It conceded that public
access to the bus system did pose one kind of public space. However, that space did not
40
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transform any of the vehicles into public forums, by definition, nor did public access implicate
political speech or related forms of expression. In declaring this view, the Court focused on the
characteristics of the space in question. It relied on an opinion in a British case delivered long
ago, which found it necessary to define the intended purpose of a space before adopting or
adapting legal uses within it. As Justice Blackmun pointed out:
Although American constitutional jurisprudence, in the light of the First
Amendment, has been jealous to preserve access to public places for purposes of
free speech, the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved have
remained important in determining the degree of protection afforded by the
Amendment to the speech in question. 43

Thus, the Court’s characterization of place determined the outcome for speech in
Lehman. While municipal buses and car cards were publicly accessible spaces, any designation
as public fora meant they would also perform as places of uninhibited expression. In order to
trigger the protection of the First Amendment, Lehman would need to prove not only that the
buses were characteristically public spaces, but that they also operated as public fora in the spirit
of traditional places described above. Barring that evidence, the Court maintained, a city-owned
bus and its car cards might well exhibit forms of open and accessible public space, but their
functional value as legally protected public fora were other matters entirely.
In the opinion of the plurality, municipally-owned public spaces in Shaker Heights did
not function like the traditional public forums considered in Hague v. CIO. As Blackmun
pointed out, “[h]ere, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street corner, or other public
thoroughfare.”

On the other hand, the Court conceived city buses and their car cards as

exclusive in purpose—a view that will be echoed when we turn to space and property in the next
chapter. This characterization became important in Lehman. It afforded the city and its transit
43
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managers a “legitimate governmental interest” in reserving public transportation facilities and
spaces for revenue generation. The city acted in a “proprietary capacity,” the Court concluded,
and it therefore retained the right to advance its commercial objectives, even though that meant
rejecting political speech on its buses. If the city had deployed its spatial advertising regulations
to favor or disfavor any political candidates, or silence unwanted viewpoints, then its policies
could have been invalidated. But its rules for use of public space pertained to revenue generation
and they therefore functioned outside the scope of the First Amendment. The exclusion policy
did not impact what Lehman wished to express, but rather where he could and could not do so.
Owing to the commercial function of the municipal buses, over and above their public
accessibility, argued Blackmun, no constitutional violation occurred, since “no First Amendment
forum is here to be found.” 44
Lehman was decided in 1974, two years after the Court significantly conditioned free
speech in shopping centers, and two years before it excluded all First Amendment protections
therein. 45 In retrospect, the chronology is significant. The likelihood of expressive protection in
privately owned shopping malls seems to narrow considerably in this era, given the Court’s
interpretation of a municipally-operated transit system in proprietary terms; revenue values
trumped political discourses. The distinction in Lehman, between a commercial and public
forum, suggested that civic participation and representation in public spaces had dipped in value,
well below the watermark set in the first half of the 20th century. As Supreme Court decisionmaking progressed further into the 1970s, the proprietary functions of public spaces began to
uniquely define their perceived compatibility with free expression. Increasingly, those functions
44
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would redefine characterizations of public fora more generally. Notwithstanding the differences
between city buses and shopping malls, then, Lehman shines a revealing light on the Court’s
shifting definitions of space in the post-civil rights era. 46
Ever since Hague v. C.I.O., a crucial element of free speech jurisprudence has consisted
in the Court’s effort to order the geography of civic engagement in America, as it did in Lehman.
Repeatedly, the Court has asked, how public are public spaces when embodied by people who
want to use them for open discourse?

The salience of this question grew in Heffron v.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness (hereafter, this group will be referred to as
ISKCON). In Heffron, the Court distinguished its doctrine further to include something it called
the “limited public forum.” 47 It also modified the rules of use in public spaces, narrowing them
more than it had previously. That has prompted observers such as Buchanan to argue that
Heffron ushered a “transformation principle,” in which the Court became the principal arbiter of
what was or was not publicly accessible space, preempting legislators and administrators. It
likewise transformed an open space into a limited forum, where fewer First Amendment
protections pertained, and free speech advocacy was impugned more generally. 48
Heffron involved an annual state fair organized by the Minnesota Agricultural Society, a
public corporation empowered to make all rules and bylaws for the event, consistent with state
and federal law. The Society issued a regulation that limited the distribution and sale of any
printed materials on the fairgrounds to fixed locations, establishing that those activities had to be
conducted exclusively from licensed booths. The same applied to any solicitation by individuals
46
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or groups wishing to do so verbally or in print. The booths were leased on a first-come, firstserved basis; failure to use a secured booth for the activities above was considered a
misdemeanor. The requirement was categorical and content-neutral. Any organization that
rented a booth was also free to openly communicate its views to visitors on the fairgrounds.
The fair grew to become a major public event in Minnesota. It attracted people from all
over Minnesota and other parts of the country. Set on 125 acres, it averaged 115,000 fairgoers
on weekdays, 160,000 on Saturdays and Sundays.

Organizers agreed that the attendance

numbers generated a high density of visitors on the grounds, given that acreage. 49
A controversy loomed on the eve of the fair, when ISKCON filed suit against Minnesota
state officials. The group sought an injunction against the Agricultural Society’s booth policy. It
wanted the rule to be declared invalid on its face and also as applied under the First Amendment.
ISKCON espoused the Krishna religion and therefore claimed that the regulation violated its
rights to both free religious exercise and expression, since it excluded the group’s primary means
of publicizing its faith: Sankirtan. A religious ritual, Sankirtan instructs followers to access and
roam public spaces to distribute or sell Krishna literature, as well as solicit donations. The
practice was inherently peripatetic, argued the Krishnas. Therefore, the booth lease guideline
established on the fairgrounds unduly interfered with ISKCON’s liberty to express its beliefs and
proselytize among the public on behalf of its faith. The Court faced the following question,
which was framed by Justice White, who will figure prominently in the next chapter:
The question presented for review is whether a State, consistent with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, may require a religious organization desiring to
distribute and sell religious literature and to solicit donations at a state fair to
conduct those activities only at an assigned location within the fairgrounds even
though application of the rule limits the religious practices of the organization. 50
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The answer to that question was a resounding yes. Moreover, the Court used its opinion
in Heffron to expand its public forum doctrine to new spaces, adding another wrinkle to the
topography of embodied association in a post-civil rights era.

The Agricultural Society’s

requirement of fixed locations for distributions, sales, and solicitations on the fairgrounds
satisfied three conditions established by the Court to rationalize restrictions on expressive
activity. First, restrictions on speech had to be neutral with respect to its content. Next, they had
to be made pursuant to a “legitimate government interest.” Finally, they could not exclude
alternative channels for communicating ideas circumscribed within spaces affected by the rule. 51
Treating the fairgrounds as a limited public forum, despite the traditional nature of the Minnesota
event, the Court found the regulations consonant with its new spatial typology, along with others
like it. It rejected ISKCON’s claim that a large, well-attended state fair functioned in the way
that city streets did; likewise, that organizers were required to provide unlimited access for
speech and related forms of expression. Having differentiated the fairground space from the
public forum it once delineated in Hague, the Court entertained tighter controls on diverse
practices therein. After all, those controls on space did not preclude expression in-itself.
In Justice White’s opinion, the Agricultural Society requirement applied impartially to
any individual or group wishing to advocate its beliefs on the fairgrounds, no matter their
religious or political affiliation. Therefore, ISKCON could not claim that the rule was drafted to
quell its expression, nor that it was aimed to suppress its religious views. Rather, booth rentals
were conducted on a first-come, first-served basis, with no other restrictions on what individuals
or groups were eligible to lease them. 52 Provided they leased a booth on the grounds, the
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requirement did not affect the Krishnas’ distribution or sale of written materials. Similarly,
ISKCON’s solicitation activities were never targeted in any way.
The Court saw no offense by fair administrators against the content of the group’s
speech.

In fact, White countered, the Krishnas had advanced suspicious claims about the

Establishment Clause and protections afforded them under the First Amendment. ISKCON’s
peripatetic communication of its religious beliefs could not be used to justify any guarantee of
First Amendment easements left unavailable to groups or causes that engaged in other forms of
speech and assembly. Religious demonstration meant equal rights to spaces of advocacy, not
greater room for association than ideological or political representation. 53 Allowing ISKCON
the unique liberty it sought, to distribute and sell literature, and spread its beliefs by roaming the
fairgrounds effectively discriminated against others who might likewise wish to do so, but were
prevented under the regulations issued by the Agricultural Society.
In view of its arguments pertaining to content considerations and special exemptions
sought by ISKCON, I would like to look at the Court’s view of alternative channels for
expression on the fairgrounds, en route to its legitimation of government interest in Heffron.
Denying any biases against the content of restricted speech and assembly on the grounds, the
Court held that the Agricultural Society rule left ample spatial alternatives available to
individuals and groups wishing to communicate their views or circulate printed materials.
Justice White was indifferent to arguments made by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and the other
dissenters, who complained that fair officials could meet their goals by deploying narrower, less
speech-restrictive regulations. For example, organizers might have excluded distribution, sales,
and solicitation from entrances and exits only. That would have reduced congestion at key
chokepoints, while opening fairground space for ISKCON’s expressive practices. The majority
53
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disagreed, concluding that the Krishnas enjoyed sufficient alternatives for their speech. First,
any organization that leased a booth was also allowed to move about the grounds and air its
views. Second, ISKCON was free to engage in Sankirtan outside the fairgrounds if it did not
wish to rent a booth for its expressive activities. This was a special event, after all:
The Minnesota State Fair is a limited public forum in that it exists to provide a
means for a great number of exhibitors temporarily to present their products or
views, be they commercial, religious, or political, to a large number of people in
an efficient fashion. Considering the limited functions of the Fair and the
combined area within which it operates, we are unwilling to say that [the rule]
does not provide ISKCON and other organizations with an adequate means to sell
and solicit on the fairgrounds. 54

Owing to the large expanse and short duration of the State Fair, the Court saw fit to
legitimate Minnesota’s interest in regulating public space on the grounds. The Court’s limited
public forum rationale was closely connected with its notion of proprietorship. The same was
true in Lehman, where rights to public space conflicted with the commercial prerogatives of a
city.

Where the state fair was concerned, the scale of the event, combined with its brief

commercial operation, meant that authorities had a compelling interest in ensuring orderly
movement among people who attended. Recall, though, that the Court dismissed ISKCON’s
analogy between the fairgrounds and city streets, which are spatially fixed and linked with free
expression. On the contrary, the Minnesota fair was temporary in could not support the public
infrastructure or functions associated with downtowns. If ISKCON and other groups were all
permitted to practice their activities willy-nilly, argued the Court, chaos might ensue. In Justice
White’s opinion, the lower courts erred by failing to hypothesize the dangers that could result
from unregulated flows of public space within the fairgrounds, where audiences would
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imaginably assemble around speakers and solicitors. 55 The state’s interest in order succeeded
ISKCON’s interest in space:
Given these considerations, we hold that the State’s interest in confining
distribution, selling, and fund solicitation activities to fixed locations is sufficient
to satisfy the requirement that a place or manner restriction must serve a
substantial state interest…In our view, the Society may apply its rule and confine
the type of transactions at issue to designated locations without violating the First
Amendment. 56

The restrictions above might not have been acceptable on city streets, White added. On
the other hand, the judicial typology being animated by non-urban topographies shared by
greater numbers of people fueled the Court’s readiness to condition public space through its
public forum doctrine. It was the disputation of place in Heffron that led the majority to rely on
perceptions of state interest and legitimacy in limiting expressive activity at the fair. Given the
differences between conventional city streets and improvised state fairgrounds, Minnesota had an
interest in ensuring comfort and convenience among fairgoers. This was an important doctrinal
shift. The Court’s distinction of streets and newer spaces supported its alterations of the public
forum catalogue. Where the Court once scrutinized government agendas aimed at suppressing
heterodoxy or excluding it from the public sphere, comfort and convenience become valid
justifications for tighter regulations on it. While it was always there, lurking in the background
of the Court’s reservations about unlimited public space, previous decisions such as Hague had
never prioritized comfort and convenience. By the time the Court ruled in Heffron, however, it
seemed to parlay the topographical changes in metropolitan landscapes to sustain proprietary
interests expressed by the state, such as comfort and convenience, as it did in deferring to the
55
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Minnesota Agricultural Society. In an era of suburbanization, public interest and publicity were
further segregated in government policies and, increasingly, High Court opinions.
Public interests assigned to the comfort and convenience of space, not to mention its
orderliness and fungibility, appeared to swell in relation to the Court’s endorsements of state
property assets, as well as its hypothesis that they were endangered by expressive practices. This
anxiety applied in Lehman, continued in Heffron, and expanded in later cases, such as Los
Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent and U.S. v. Kokinda. 57 Public safety for fairgoers
was an issue in Heffron. Yet, Justice White’s repeated admonitions regarding Minnesota’s
legitimate state interest in orderly foot traffic on the fairgrounds seemed to turn on maximum
marketability for the “variety of goods, services, entertainments, and other matters of interest”
sold at the state-sponsored event. The purpose here is not to second-guess White’s opinion in
Heffron, nor disparage the Court’s regard for government as a proprietary agent. Rather, it is to
indicate one way in which the public forum doctrine has evolved in non-traditional public places,
as well as to demonstrate the terms on which the doctrine has been modified to encompass the
perceived needs of state proprietorship.
As the public forum doctrine matured, the Court was required to reason through more
unexpected activities by individuals and group, in more embodied places. Public spaces that
looked substantially different from the ones recapitulated at the outset of this chapter obliged the
Court to update the continuum on which it judged speech in physical landscapes. It had to
examine the quintessentially public, the private, and the in-between.

And our post-War

experience with constitutionally-adjudged civic space reflects some of the fluidity evidenced in
the first half of the 20th century, to be fair. In Widmar v. Vincent, for example, decided during
the same judicial term as Heffron, the Court appeared receptive to the idea that state-owned
57
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property might be designated as a public forum in the interests of expression. 58 Widmar dealt
with a state-run university, which prohibited the use of its campus for non-secular association,
though it had opened its facilities to free speech in general. The Court required the university to
accommodate unwanted religious assembly. It advanced an idea of accessible public space
different from its prevailing public forum jurisprudence in 1981. It also constructed an argument
that might even apply to a privately owned space: once the university opened its campus to a
segment of the public (in this case, its students), it could not deny them the benefit of practicable
space, nor could administrators include or exclude members of that public as they saw fit. The
institution’s commitment of common space to some forms of expression delineated a public
forum, one that could not be retrenched under the First Amendment.
It would be before too long, however. If Widmar signaled a flow in publicity and
practicable space, then the Court’s decision two years later, Perry Education Association v.
Perry Local Educators’ Association, reasserted primacy for proprietary exclusions. 59 Perry
resulted from a jealous battle between two rival unions that represented teachers in a local school
system: Perry Education Association (PEA) and Perry Local Educators’ Association (PLEA).
For many years, both unions were charged with safeguarding collective bargaining rights for
teachers and others employed by the Board of Education of Perry Township. Given their joint
responsibility, PEA and PLEA enjoyed equal access to an inter-school mail system, the chief
medium of communication between the unions and school employees. The system included
teachers’ mailboxes located in school buildings. Following disagreements over union policies,
PLEA filed an election petition with the statewide Education Employment Relations Board in
1977. It challenged PEA for the lone mantle of principal bargaining representative among the
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schoolteachers. The challenge failed unambiguously, so much so that PEA was awarded a de
facto right to negotiate for all teachers throughout the school system.
After a pursuant agreement between the PEA and system administrators, sanctioned by
the statewide board, the union—now recognized as the voice of Perry schoolteachers—was
earmarked to use the inter-school mail system and its teacher mailboxes. 60 PEA access to the
mail system was deemed exclusive, moreover. No other “school employee organization,” code
for the outcast PLEA, could use the system or its mailboxes. The mail system was similarly off
limits to the general public, although a small number of outside organizations, such as the
YMCA and Cub Scouts, were allowed access in order to communicate with teachers.
The agreement was initially ratified in 1978, and then renewed in 1980. 61 PLEA reacted
by filing suit against its rival and members of the Perry Township School Board.

PLEA

contended that PEA’s exclusive access to the school mail system and its teacher mailboxes
violated the First Amendment’s free speech clause, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause. A federal district court ruled in favor of PEA. However, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court decision. The Court of Appeals held that once
the school district opened its mail system and mailboxes to the incumbent PEA, it could not
legally deny access to its rival, which still represented other schoolteachers within the Perry
community.
Citing the internecine battles and its belief that the school board’s policy was drafted to
unfairly advantage PEA, PLEA argued that the Perry inter-school mail system and system-wide
teacher mailboxes functioned as a public forum. The exclusion of most outside users, coupled
with selective inclusion of others, unconstitutionally suppressed the expression of speakers
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wishing access to that forum. Responding to the quarrel and its implications for the First
Amendment, the Court began where it did in the cases above. That is, the Court introduced its
opinion by indicating that the characteristics of space determined its publicness, the degree to
which it was legally accessible, and the standards by which speech and other forms of expression
enjoyed protection or would be subject to exclusion. Justice White wrote for the Court again:
The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which
limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character
of the property at issue. 62

Positioning the character of the “property at issue” as the key variable in Perry, White
developed a three-tier typology of the public forum. It was the Court’s most elaborate thus far,
and it still serves today in most instances. First, he noted, there were “places which by long
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,” where expression
would be given the widest protection against exclusion. 63 White was referring, of course, to the
traditional public forum outlined in Hague v. CIO, which comprised “one end of the spectrum,”
according to him. Second, there was publicly accessible property designated by government for
expressive activity—the limited public forum. This forum was not traditionally associated with
speech, but it was still civic space. Rights of free expression still pertained, therefore, and they
warranted constitutional protection, even when the forum was created for other purposes by the
state. 64

For example, the fairgrounds in Heffron served as a limited public forum in this

typology. Thus, the Court was keen to ensure that the Krishnas still could share their views
outside those grounds in that case, along with spaces inside, subject to time, place, and manner
regulations.

Finally, said White, there was “public property which is not by tradition or
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designation a forum for public communication,” and that space had to be “governed by different
standards.” 65

Here was the Court’s invention of the non-public forum, the newest in its

typological catalogue, and the clearest indication of its intention to use judicial doctrine to assign
order to a landscape in which political association bordered proprietary interests in ways that
seemed to privilege the latter over free expression.
Eschewing PLEA’s demand for open access, the Court ruled that the inter-school mail
system and its teacher mailboxes constituted a non-public forum. The system was a recent
innovation, White argued. It lacked historical connotations with traditional public spaces, such
as the streets, sidewalks, and parks implicated in Hague. Further, although the mail system
property in Perry was owned publicly, it had a unique purpose. It was created to facilitate
communications among selected speakers who were invited to use the system, not anyone with
something to say. Neither a tradition of open discourse applied to the mailboxes, nor did public
designation by the school board or state reconfigure them for unrestricted use by the larger
community. Simply stated, the system was intended for one use: transmission of information
related to collective bargaining; and one user: the PEA, recognized as the representative union
agency of teachers and employees in the school district. Disputing PLEA’s claim that the mail
system was a limited public forum, at least, since groups like the YMCA and Cub Scouts were
permitted to use it for communication, White countered that administrators’ invitations to certain
segments of the community to use the space did not reconstitute it as public.
Once it reasoned that the forum inside the township’s schools was non-public, the Court
met each of PLEA’s remaining claims with intensified scrutiny. For example, PLEA relied on
its shared responsibility for collective bargaining over the course of a long history during which
it enjoyed equal access to school facilities. The rival union therefore pressed for continued rights
65
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to communicate through the system, arguing that the history of open access had transformed its
mailboxes into a traditional public forum. That claim fell flat, according to White. It overlooked
the fact that nothing about the forum itself had changed following the contest between the two
unions. Rather, the infrastructure of workplace relationships within the Perry school system had
changed, and those were no more public than any other private relationship. The mail system
existed to ease communication between teachers and their union, no more. Thus, the forum
would continue to function as it always did:
PLEA’s previous access was consistent with the School District’s preservation of
the facilities for school-related business, and did not constitute creation of a
public forum in any broader sense. 66

The majority was equally unimpressed by a PLEA argument echoed by Justice Brennan
in his dissent: the mail system exclusion was aimed at suppression of rival viewpoints. A
cornerstone of its approach to the public forum, the Court has held that content-based
discrimination against speech will meet with strict scrutiny in both traditional and limited public
fora. Given the Court’s fidelity to its typology above, however, content considerations did not
pertain in the contest, notwithstanding the effects of the mailbox prohibitions. White offered two
thoughts. First, the mail system did not function as a public forum, traditionally or limitedly; so
content was not an issue in the mailboxes.67 Second, the majority saw no evidence of bias
against PLEA’s views on collective bargaining. The Perry school system established a contentneutral access policy, following an arrangement under which the PEA assumed unique
responsibility for the collective bargaining among union members.

The latter argument cast a

cloud over PLEA’s position in the case. The former argument, however, expanded rights to
exclude speech and related forms of expression in non-public fora:
66
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Because the school mail system is not a public forum, the School District had no
‘constitutional obligation per se to let any organization use the school mail
boxes…There is…no indication that the School Board intended to discourage one
viewpoint and advance another. We believe it is more accurate to characterize the
access policy as based on the status of the respective unions rather than their
views. Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make
distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These
distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and
inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible
with the intended purpose of the property. 68

In essence, PLEA’s appeal for viewpoint protection was rejected within the syntax of its
unsuccessful bid to convince the Court that Perry’s inter-school mail system was a limited public
forum. Absent the categorical outcome sought by PLEA, school administrators were free to
reserve access to PEA, as well as privilege its lead in collective bargaining arrangements with
teachers and other employees. PEA’s exclusive right to communicate through the system also
fulfilled a legitimate governmental interest, “insuring labor peace within the schools.” The
administration had legitimately deployed the mailboxes for their intended purpose. White’s coda
on the contest addressed the singularity of the space in question:
[T]he internal mail system is not a public forum. As we have already stressed,
when government property is not dedicated to open communication the
government may—without further justification—restrict use to those who
participate in the forum’s official business…On government property that has not
been made a public forum, not all speech is equally situated, and the State may
draw distinctions which relate to the special purpose for which the property is
used. 69

The Perry ruling rested on the following argument: rights of expression could be legally
barred from places not conceived specifically for purposes of public communication. Unless a
shared space was built or designated for discourse, there were always circumstances in which
speech and other forms of expression could be excluded by the authorities that controlled it.
68
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This argument raises some obvious complications, which will surely be exacerbated in the years
to come by the growing commercialization of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Tumblr. With respect to embodied spaces besides state capitols and government institutions, we
are reminded that it is impossible today to identify any contemporary public place strictly built
for the purpose of communicating ideas. 70 The Court has acknowledged that there are traditional
spaces historically associated with speech and assembly. But even the streets, sidewalks, and
parks cited in Hague were originally devised for other ends. Insofar as Perry hinges on an
argument from original designation, then, the Court’s opinion elevated the bar on what
constituted a public forum according to its doctrine, while concurrently lowering it on lawful
exclusions against expression in public spaces.
Thus, the Court contracted the ecology of association in Perry, by withholding space not
categorically conceived as public fora from it. The typology laid out in that case imposed a new
threshold for spaces in which expressive practices might be necessary for fair political
competition among diverse interests. If discursive spaces are only indicated by design, then few,
if any, can be found in our physical landscape. Dissenting opinions shared this concern, arguing
that the First Amendment protected speech and assembly in public places besides government
buildings and others traditionally reserved for expression by representatives of the state. Justice
White defended the majority’s decision, noting that alternative channels of communication were
available to PLEA. For example, there were no restrictions on the use of bulletin boards or
meeting facilities on the school grounds. PLEA could also communicate its messages through
the United States Post Office. Finally, both unions enjoyed temporary access to the inter-school
mail system when they contested each other in periodic elections.
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The alternative channels rationale proved important in Perry, as it did in Heffron and
other cases in which the Court has weighed access to public fora against their proprietary control.
Still, the Perry principle, that a public forum exists where space is designed for communicative
purposes, affected free speech jurisprudence profoundly, while undermining legally protected
association in diverse spaces used by individuals and groups outside the mainstream of given
communities. Much the same happened a year later, in Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent. 71 That ruling dealt with political expression (campaign poster “sniping”) during an
election. It involved government owned property (utility poles) atop the streets and sidewalks
proclaimed traditional public fora in Hague. Yet, the Court stuck to its Perry principle. It
concluded that space is public when it was uniquely dedicated to deliberation by the city, though
municipal officials potentially stood to lose as a result of political expression that was critical
and competitive. A public forum could be excluded as long as government demonstrated an
interest in combating substantive evils—in this case, aesthetic blight and incidentals incurred in
the removal of campaign ads. 72

Retrenching another expressive easement through its

narrowing public forum doctrine, the Court held that Los Angeles’ urban beautification program
outweighed the low cost campaign needs of a third party political candidate, who could not
afford newspaper ads or electronic media buys obtainable to his competitors from the two major
parties. Unfortunately for him, the Court’s interpretation of the free speech clause determined
that the utility poles on which he sought to disseminate his views were not traditional enough to
serve as designated public fora under its typology of contemporary spaces. 73
In Vincent, White and the majority treated Los Angeles as a property owner, explicitly.
The characterization was more than a rhetorical one. It was substantive, in my view, and it
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represented further emplacement of proprietorship above free expression in the new geography
of First Amendment jurisprudence. Putting aside criticism that the Vincent opinion overlooked
hurdles faced by minor party candidates seeking office, the Court’s ruling legally excluded
political expression in a major metropolitan city where traditional public spaces were routinely
flooded with product advertisements and other forms of commercial speech. True, an argument
might be made about the projected expense of poster removal. As Justice Brennan pointed out in
his dissent, however, evidence to support that claim never appeared in the case record. 74
After doubling down on its typology in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund, 75 decided one year after Vincent, the Court clarified its jurisprudence from the point of
view of legal scrutiny exercised over speech exclusions in public spaces. Expressive restrictions
in spaces defined as traditional public fora would be scrutinized most closely, meaning that a
strict burden of proof fell on contestants seeking to suppress speech. The same level of scrutiny
would apply in spaces construed by the Court as designated public fora.

Posing some

complications, the concept of a designated public forum remained amorphous.

The Court

scarcely clarified matters by proffering a subset of designated fora: the limited public forum.
The only defining thread here seemed to be that the Court would require case-by-case evidence
that government or a controlling authority created an expressive space, reconfiguring the burden
of proof above and placing it on speakers to establish that evidence. 76 In each instance above,
First Amendment access to the public forum could be legally regulated through time, place, and
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manner guidelines. That part of the doctrine persisted following the Court’s establishment of
such guidelines in its Cox and Heffron precedents.
Turning to publicly accessible spaces defined as non-public fora, the role of the state as
property owner would grow and eventually encompass the federal government in United States
v. Kokinda. 77 In fact, the Court expanded its conclusions in Vincent. Now, the “immemorially”
public space held open to individuals and groups in Hague was characterized as property and
suspended for expressive activity, in order to safeguard its capitalization by government entities.
In defending this transformation, the Court had charted a jurisprudential course more than fifty
years in the making. In a new milieu, it declared “reasonableness” to be a constitutionally
applicable justification for proprietary curbs on speech and political association. 78
Kokinda dealt with expression in the kind of space that will be revisited at the start of the
next chapter: a sidewalk near the entrance of a United States Post Office. Several members of an
advocacy group, the National Democratic Policy Committee, including a volunteer, Marsha
Kokinda, set up a table immediately outside the Bowie post office in suburban Maryland. They
hoped to distribute literature, sell books and subscriptions to the group’s newsletter, and solicit
contributions. The sidewalk where they placed their table was the only pathway from the post
office entrance to an adjacent parking lot. Both the walkway and the lot rested on Post Office
property. Following a 1970 federal restructuring, the U.S. Postal Service replaced the old Post
Office Department. The new service operated pursuant to a congressional mandate that required
it to function “more like a business than had its predecessor…” 79
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National Democratic Policy Committee members manned the sidewalk table for several
hours during the day. When roughly fifty complaints about the table were addressed to various
postal employees, the Bowie postmaster asked them to leave. They refused. 80 Postal inspectors
eventually arrested Kokinda and other members of the advocacy group. Their table was seized,
along with several pieces of literature and other belongings. They were tried and convicted by a
United States Magistrate in the District of Maryland for violating a 1989 law against soliciting
contributions and campaigning for public office on postal premises. 81 Kokinda was fined $50
individually and sentenced to ten days’ imprisonment. She appealed her conviction in a district
court. The court affirmed, on the grounds that the sidewalk was not a public forum and the
Postal Service ban was reasonable. Her conviction was reversed by the United States Court of
Appeals, which held that the sidewalk was a traditional public forum. The appeals court also
held that the Postal Service had no significant interest in excluding expression. Time, place, and
manner regulations were available to achieve the purpose of ensuring ingress and egress from the
post office to its parking lot. The Supreme Court granted review.
Authoring the Court’s opinion, Justice O’Connor began by addressing levels of scrutiny
that might pertain to the Postal Service prohibition under a First Amendment analysis.
O’Connor’s ordering of the issues in the case was important. It telegraphed her intention to
review the exclusion in Bowie through the physical space involved, as in previous rulings, and
then through the prism of the Court’s more mature public forum typology. In both instances, a
topographical determination would be used to assess the reasonableness of Kokinda’s eviction
from the post office property. The question, then, was whether the space where she and the rest
of the political advocates expressed their ideas also served as a public forum under legal
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standards established in the cases above? O’Connor indicated as much in the preamble of her
opinion, where she noted that the contest would be judged “to an extent determined by the nature
of the relevant forum.” 82 Things would grow more interesting from here, particularly from the
point of view of reconciling expressive rights with proprietary ones.
First, the Court decided that the post office sidewalk resembled, but did not function like
a traditional sidewalk. As Justice O’Connor argued:
The postal sidewalk was constructed solely to assist postal patrons to negotiate the
space between the parking lot and the front door of the post office, not to facilitate
the daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or city. 83

Owing to its restricted purpose, O’Connor considered the postal sidewalk a non-public forum. It
neither functioned like a traditional public forum, as did the bulletin boards inside the post office
building, nor a designated one, in spite of numerous examples of public access accommodated or
at least tolerated near government owned property. 84 In the Court’s new jurisprudence, a public
forum was never engendered by government passivity. The state designated one “only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse,” according to O’Connor.
Having settled on a non-public typology where the contested space was concerned, the
Court turned to the level of judicial scrutiny under which the Postal Service exclusion would be
examined. First Amendment scrutiny depended on public forum typology, confirmed O’Connor.
As a result, the level of scrutiny in the case had diminished in direct proportion to the Court’s
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definition of the post office sidewalk as non-public, as well as its identification of the
government as a property owner in the contest with Kokinda and her fellow advocates:
The Government’s ownership of property does not automatically open that
property to the public. It is a long-settled principle that governmental actions are
subject to a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny when the governmental
function operating…[is] not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker…but,
rather, as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operations. 85
O’Connor cited Lehman, Heffron, Perry, and other late 20th century decisions handed
down by the Court to validate her argument that the primacy of First Amendment speech and
assembly had become suspect on public property when government “engaged in commerce.”
Given that reevaluation, it was the Court’s responsibility to appreciate the history of the new
Postal Service mandate, in other words, that it “’be run more like a business than had its
predecessor, the Post Office Department.’” This new commercial agenda implicated revised
rules of use for expressive practices on postal property. It also triggered a lower threshold for
reasonable restriction of association when those rules came under any legal scrutiny as part of
the Court’s free speech jurisprudence. 86
The postal sidewalk provided ingress to and egress from the facility.

The Service

intended the sidewalk to facilitate easy foot traffic between the parking lot and the building
entrance. The space was therefore created to support business practices, not expressive practices.
Indeed, opined the Court, Kokinda’s table, from which her group solicited funds had produced
interference with foot traffic flows and might likewise generate disincentives to use the Bowie
branch. After all, there were patron complaints. Moreover, an analysis submitted to the Court
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suggested that solicitation could result in functional obstructions on publicly accessible property.
The exclusion against that activity was a reasonable exercise of proprietary decision-making,
therefore. It had less to do with what Kokinda said, and more to do with where she and her
associates were saying it. The postal service had met its exclusive obligations under an order of
Congress, O’Connor concluded. It addressed the public interest, relying on a rational calculation
that pertained to the effects of civic activity on its property. Its formulation of a solution was
sufficiently reasonable, whether or not there were less speech-restrictive options available.
This fidelity to a new and more facile test of reasonableness provoked a spirited dissent
from Justice Brennan. In his objections, Brennan essentially encapsulated the gamut of problems
with public forum jurisprudence where spaces like Bowie’s postal sidewalk were contested on
behalf of open political discourses. Brennan took on the Court point by point. He challenged all
three arguments it relied upon to uphold the exclusion against Kokinda. In the first place, he
criticized O’Connor’s delineation of the postal sidewalk as a non-public forum. That delineation
raised a broader issue, thought Brennan, joined not only by judicial restraint proponents, namely,
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, but also by Thurgood Marshall, who will figure prominently on
questions of space and property in the next chapter. Citing Kalven’s study of the public forum,
Brennan indicted the Court’s doctrine generally. In his view, the typology upon which that
doctrine was ultimately constructed—quite apart from its intended purpose: protecting free
expression—had been transformed in most of the cases above to deprive citizens of their rights
to free speech and assembly under the First Amendment. The doctrine’s arc had closed space
where it was supposed to open it, Brennan argued:
Ironically, these public forum categories—originally conceived of as a way of
preserving First Amendment rights…have been used in some of our recent
decisions as a means of upholding restrictions on speech… I have questioned
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whether public forum analysis, as the Court has employed it in recent cases,
serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at hand…
Today’s decision confirms my doubts about the manner in which we have been
using public forum analysis. 87

Transitioning to the case at hand and the Court’s misguided application of its morphing
typology to the public space in Bowie, Brennan protested that the evolution of the doctrine had
finally gone too far. The postal sidewalk used by Kokinda and the others was surely a public
forum under any traditional analysis. Spatially, the sidewalk was identical to fora previously
determined to be “immemorially” open to expressive activity.

To decide otherwise now,

Brennan contended, the Court had to depend on a “strained and formalistic” logic of space:
It is only common sense that a public sidewalk adjacent to a public building to
which citizens are freely admitted is a natural location for speech to occur,
whether that speech is critical of government generally, aimed at the particular
governmental agency housed in the building, or focused upon issues unrelated to
the government. No doctrinal pigeonholing, complex formula, or multipart test
can obscure this evident conclusion…
Public access is not a matter of grace by government officials, but rather is
inherent in the open nature of the locations. 88

Brennan turned to the public functionality of the postal sidewalk, scoffing at O’Connor’s claim
that was constructed for a singular purpose. However, the real liability here rested with the
Court’s awkward formulation of the designated public forum. It was a tenuous formulation, at
best. There was little doubt that the postal sidewalk was built to ease foot traffic between the
entrance to the Bowie post office building and the outside parking lot. But its original design no
more prevented it from functioning politically for speech and assembly than any public space
shared by people carrying out complex functions:
87
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It is irrelevant that the sidewalk at issue may have been constructed only to
provide access to the Bowie Post Office. Public sidewalks, parks, and streets
have been reserved for public use as forums for speech even though government
has not constructed them for expressive purposes. Parks are usually constructed
to beautify a city and to provide opportunities for recreation, rather than to afford
a forum for soapbox orators or leafleteers; streets are built to facilitate
transportation, not to enable protesters to conduct marches; and sidewalks are
created with pedestrians in mind, not solicitors. Hence why the sidewalk was built
is not salient. 89

Brennan closed his dissent by admonishing the Court’s citation of more recent
precedents, adding that early public forum analysis never engaged in aggressive fact-finding
missions as O’Connor and the plurality had with respect to foot traffic interferences and the like.
Nor did it give in so uncritically when reviewing rationales for exclusions against citizens by
government in its guise as proprietor. In doing so this time, the Court had “collapsed the
distinction between exclusions that help define the contours of the forum and those that are
imposed after the forum is defined.” Brennan was vexed about the Court’s reliance on a vague
idea of “reasonableness” to sustain Kokinda’s exclusion, as well as its contention that her
removal had nothing to do with the content of the advocates’ expression. The exclusion had
everything to do with the content of her expression. In Brennan’s view, the group’s solicitation
was the content of its speech and assembly. Thus, any government interest in its removal was
tantamount to suppression of expressive content.

Moreover, the Court’s reliance on a

congressional mandate that the Postal Service operate “more like a business” was a suspicious
element in First Amendment jurisprudence. Barring any evidence that Kokinda’s expression was
unusually disruptive, O’Connor and the Court had engaged in pure speculation and thereby
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constructed judicial policy that swept “an entire category of expressive activity off a public
forum solely in the interest of administrative convenience.” 90
Certainly, there were indications in the earliest public forum decisions that comfort and
convenience might one day trump political association, a point that Brennan seems to have
overlooked. Nevertheless, his dissenting opinion in Kokinda plainly voices some of the key
contradictions of a relatively young, still opaque doctrine, one that curves towards ownership and
regulation of space, rather than open access and civic practices there. More controversies
followed Kokinda, including a very recent case that further contracts the public forum on
municipal sidewalks on the outside perimeter of post office property, past the dedicated
walkways designed to ease pedestrian flow between the entrances and parking lots above. The
Court denied the case a place on its docket this year. The upshot of that denial is more farreaching exclusions of speech and assembly at an almost fiscally insolvent Postal Service. 91
More contemporary spaces would fall to the Court’s doctrine. For example, its arc would
reach publicly accessible airport terminals two years later. More than any space above, they
project the look and feel of privately owned commercial property, specifically, shopping malls.
The airport terminal cases of 1992, Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness and
its companion case, International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, have therefore
garnered considerable attention in scholarly and popular circles, I think. I am electing not to
detail them for two reasons, however. One, innumerable observers in and outside legal circles
have addressed them previously, ad nauseum, in fact. Two, not unlike Heffron above, a key
point of contention in Lee was Sankirtan inside an airport terminal operated by the Port
Authority of New York/New Jersey.
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Without attempting to disparage that activity, I would argue that solicitation as civic
practice in that particular case may concern us less than Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
the decision, which excluded it from the airport terminal. In his opinion, Kennedy urged his
colleagues that no modern public space, not an airport terminal, nor a shopping mall, is ever
designed for free expression. Echoing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Kokinda, Kennedy believed
the Court’s excessive reliance on the purported function of non-traditional public fora would
narrow the legal exercise of free speech and assembly, notwithstanding their compatibility with
contemporary environments. Decisions like those above would make speech-compatible spaces
increasingly unlikely in an era of suburbanization, when Americans spent more of their time in
airports, cars, and privately owned places where the First Amendment did not pertain, owing to
the Court’s property doctrines. 92

In general, property both has and is a legal effect, which contours spatial relationships
and sets boundaries between people, as Blomley notes. 93 The legal effect of Kokinda, Lee, and
others that fell inside the arc of the public forum doctrine was a transformation of practicable
public space into some-thing privileged as public property. This is what Zick means when he
argues that the Court helped transform publicly accessible place into res. 94 The change also
marked a shift in the political relationship between American government and people who
wished to petition it for redress of grievances. Mitchell, who was cited at the top of this chapter,
92

Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), at 698. The companion case,
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 830 (1992), involved leafleting, which was legally
permitted in an airport terminal operated by the Port Authority, subject to time, place, and manner restrictions.
Ironically, it was the author of the Kokinda decision, Justice O’Connor, who contrasted airport terminals with
shopping malls, hinting in her concurring opinion that malls were more functional as public spaces. NB: Both
companion cases were decided in the same year as Lechmere v. N.L.R.B, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), where the Court
overturned labor law protections for speech and assembly in privately owned shopping centers, its last statement to
date on such properties.
93
Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property (New York: Routledge, 2004).
94
Zick, Speech Out of Doors, 2009, op cit., pg. 8.

152

joins Staeheli to point to the conceptual and geographical conversion of civic spaces into
territories of the state. In their view, the kinds of spatial contests I have attempted to outline
here—combined with countless others—have largely repositioned government in relation to the
public sphere outside the state. The former has transformed from “a sovereign to a landlord,
from the embodiment of ‘the people’ to the owner of land, from the protector of the rights of the
public to the enforcer of the rights of (its own) property.” 95 This change becomes particularly
salient in the context of the First Amendment and Ely’s view on government’s recalcitrance in
the face of democratic association that might challenge its power, an idea I will come back to
later in this examination. 96
Private property is yet to be discussed in this examination of legally conditioned space.
Yet, the typology outlined in this chapter will offer a hint about how the Court will define First
Amendment speech and assembly there. It is true that a typology of space does not amount to a
theory of space, de facto or de jure. And that may confirm the delicacy of the Court’s public
forum doctrine as we move forward. Moreover, it might recommend hopes for a judicially
constructed notion of public space that is transparent and inclusive of indications described in the
first chapter, as well as the practices historicized in the second. In the short run, however, the
conditions that underlie the Court’s typology of public space will be explored in the chapter that
follows, which looks at private property, specifically. To be sure, those conditions shape the
Court’s valuation of political expression in suburban era places where commerce is very much a
part of the public experience.
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Chapter Four
Occupied Mall Street?
Case Histories of Property and Space
In American Shopping Centers
“[S]hopping is arguably the last remaining form of public activity”
- Rem Koolhaas, et al. 1

While the diminution of public space at times lamented in the first two chapters is surely multidetermined, the rulings traced in the third chapter also explain how the nation’s highest court has
helped to underwrite that decline. As the Supreme Court advanced its public forum doctrine
further, support for practicable space weakened, particularly in contests over free speech in
contemporary environments. Seemingly convinced that expressive activity would have a zerosum effect on the value of public property, the Court constructed an increasingly formalistic
typology that included the non-public forum, where open political discourse and association
could be excluded in spite of the First Amendment. The new doctrine represented a departure
from the view espoused in Hague v. CIO, that the state held public places in trust for speakers
and listeners. By the time the Court handed down decisions in Kokinda (1990) and Lee (1992),
the government was construed in an entirely different way: as a proprietor of public space.
The arc of the public forum doctrine has led Zick and other observers to grumble that
First Amendment jurisprudence now precludes a theory of place; that the trajectory of judicial
decision-making has chipped away at what the Court itself dubs “breathing space,” required by
citizens in order to express their views freely, and educate themselves about matters of import.2
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Shying away from a more robust concept of civic space in its decisions, the Court reified public
property. It transformed practicable space into something static—what Zick calls “place-as-res.”
Further, the Court inscribed publicly owned property with a government brand, privileging its
management prerogatives over the people’s rights to practice citizenship. 3 This criticism, also
reflected in work by Staeheli and Mitchell, among others, centers on publicly controlled spaces,
where we tend to expect greater First Amendment protection for speakers and listeners, but
which appear to have diminished since the mid- to late 20th century. 4
What happens, then, when we broach that fourth category mentioned in the opening of
the last chapter: private property? Challenges over expression become more complex, owing to
an American constitutional tradition that must delicately balance political association, on the one
hand, and legally protected rights of ownership, on the other. If the city of Shaker Heights, the
state of Minnesota, or the U.S. Postal Service can deploy publicly accessible space to maximize
revenue, as well as restrict activity that might interfere with that revenue, do property owners
enjoy less liberty to control their space, even when expressive freedoms are compromised? This
question merits consideration of privately owned, publicly accessible property following World
War II, when the First Amendment variously brushed against statutory trespass codes, the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, all before the Court.
The tension between public expression and private property rights is evidenced in
American shopping centers. The purpose of this chapter is to explore that tension, in the context
of the judicial doctrine outlined in the last chapter, as well as others. My focus, again, is on

Places (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). NB: The term “breathing space” was first used by Justice
Brennan in N.A.A.C.P v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
3
Timothy Zick, “Speech and Spatial Tactics,” Texas Law Review, 84 TX. L. Rev. 2006, 587; “Space, Place, and
Speech: The Expressive Topography,” George Washington Law Review, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev, 2006, 439.
4
Lynn A. Staeheli and Don Mitchell, The People’s Property? Power, Politics, and the Public (New York:
Routledge, 2008), pp. 5-21; Margaret Kohn, Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public Space (New
York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 49-55.
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Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court initially championed free speech and public space in
shopping centers, in 1968. In 1972, however, it significantly limited its support for public
expression in malls. By 1976, it withdrew the First Amendment from malls entirely. In 1980,
the Court decentralized the contest between speech and property in malls, holding that individual
states could extend expressive protections under their own constitutions.
Many applauded that last decision, including Justice Thurgood Marshall, who wrote the
Court’s first full opinion on space and expression in modern commercial shopping centers. It
seemed fitting to restructure free speech jurisprudence related to malls, that is, to let states
balance competing property rights according to their own civic ecologies. The author of this
chapter’s last opinion, Justice William Rehnquist, frequently remarked that the states were the
best laboratories of public policy. 5 Yet an absence of federal free speech protection in shopping
centers has led to legal fragmentation, while adding very little “breathing space” where the
American people can either advocate or confront their politics. In the next chapter, I turn to
more recent decisions from the benches of New Jersey and New York, bordering states where the
High Court’s rulings have been interpreted in opposing ways. In view of the inconsistency, I
will conclude by recommending revitalized First Amendment protection for practices of public
space within malls and their newest incarnations. These new urban iterations demonstrate a
thirst for architectures of public space among contemporary designers and developers. They also
point to growing suspicion about the virtues of exclusion inside older shopping centers, which
are similarly reflected in their current underperformance as financial assets in suburbs. To the
extent that today’s malls are struggling commercially, it may be time to revisit the ways in which
civic engagement, inclusion, and design are valuated therein—particularly at a time when

5

See, for example, Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), pp. 95-100.
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metropolitan geography is transforming, and needs for diverse and visible space continue to
grow among residents and would be shoppers throughout our suburbs.

Prologue: Marsh, public function, and the preferred position of speech
The contest between free expression and publicly accessible private property was first
adjudicated in Marsh v. Alabama, alluded to briefly in the previous chapter. Marsh represents
the opening salvo in an ongoing debate over speech and assembly on private property—a debate
continually reshaped by changing physical topography and commercial patterns in the United
States. The case also set the tone for subsequent arguments in this area of First Amendment
jurisprudence. This is especially true in the context of shopping malls, which revolutionized late
20th century American commerce and continue to influence consumer behavior to this day.
Indeed, observers who still squabble over inclusion and exclusion of non-commercial expression
in shopping centers tend to speak in unison about the salience of the Marsh decision. 6
A brief analytical pause is in order, which will help us understand the outcome in Marsh,
and its relationship to mall jurisprudence, generally. In their analysis of legal reasoning and
Supreme Court decision-making, Carter and Burke argue that final rulings are often staked on a
consensus formed by the justices about “social background facts.” 7 Social background facts are
defined as the cultural phenomena—demographic shifts or technological innovations, for
instance—that color most disputes faced by the Court. In order for it to decide a controversy, the
justices must not only develop a consensus about the immediate facts in front of them, but also
the surrounding circumstances that precipitate those facts.

6

See note 7, below.
Lief H. Carter and Thomas F. Burke, Reason in Law, 6th Edition (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2002),
pg. 10.
7
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A consensus on social background facts was critical to the jurisprudence in Marsh v.
Alabama, not to mention subsequent contests involving shopping centers. In fact, Marsh is
widely regarded as the prologue to the Court’s mall rulings. 8 In Marsh, the Court weighed the
constitutionality of criminal trespass sanctions imposed against an individual who distributed
religious literature on the private property of a company-owned town. 9 Company-owned towns
featured multipurpose plants built and run by commercial firms in need of labor for industrial
operations, such as mills and mines. They also included self-contained residential facilities for
employees and their families. Largely defunct in the wake of shifts toward the service sector
over the last several decades, company-owned towns became widespread during the post-War
boom of the late 1940s and 1950s. 10 They were the industrial parks and corporate campuses of
their day. In view of their sheer number, as the Court noted in Marsh, many American citizens
called them home. 11 Some company-owned towns delivered a complete array of services to
residents, including public amenities and conveniences, such as federal post offices and waste
treatment facilities. That consideration, and the social background facts involved in Marsh,
would help determine its legal outcome.
Chickasaw, a town suburb outside Mobile, Alabama, was owned and operated by the
Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. The town consisted of several residential properties, a street
8

A preponderance of law review articles advocating different positions nevertheless treat Marsh as the key
precedent behind later shopping mall rulings. See, among others, Wayne Batchis, “Free Speech in the Suburban and
Exurban Frontier: Shopping Malls, Subdivisions, New Urbanism, and the First Amendment,” Southern California
Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 301, 2012, 351-57; Samantha Barbas, “Creating the Public Forum,”
Akron Law Review, 44 Akron L. Rev. 2011, 862; Paul J. Weinberg, “The Shopping Center as Hyde Park Corner:
Free Speech or Invasion of Property Rights?” in Zoning and Planning Law Report, Vol. 32, No. 11, December,
2009, pp. 2-3; Gregory C. Sisk, “Uprooting the Pruneyard,” Rutgers Law Journal, 38 Rutgers L. J., Summer 2007,
1145; Mark C. Alexander, “Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping Mall,” Arizona
Law Review, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. Spring 1999, 18. The foregoing citations reflect a small sample of law review essays
considered in this section.
9
Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
10
For a more detailed analysis and history of company towns, see, Hardy Green, The Company Town: The
Industrial Edens and Satanic Mills That Shaped the American Economy (New York: Basic Books, 2010)
11
At their peak, there were roughly 2,500 company-owned towns throughout the U.S., and 3% of the American
population lived in these settlements. See Green, op cit., note 9, pg. 145.
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grid, sewer system and sewage disposal plant, and a business block that fairly resembled a
traditional downtown shopping center. A full range of goods and services could be purchased
there. A deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff policed Chickasaw. A branch of the U.S. Post
Office housed there delivered mail inside and outside the town. Interestingly, and significantly
as it turned out, the property lines of the company-owned town were largely indistinguishable
from those of its surrounding neighborhood. Nearby residents shopped and satisfied a host of
commercial needs on Chickasaw’s business block. 12
The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation posted numerous signs on storefronts in the town’s
shopping center. They read, “This is Private Property, and Without Written Permission, No
Street, or House Vendor, Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted.” Disobeying the
signs, a Jehovah’s Witness named Grace Marsh stood on the business block sidewalk, outside the
U.S. Post Office branch, and distributed religious literature to passersby. 13 Marsh was told that
she was not allowed to distribute literature without a permit, that no permit would be issued, and
that she must leave. When she refused to do so, she was arrested and convicted under an
Alabama statute that made it illegal to enter or remain on private premises without permission.
Marsh claimed her guarantees of free speech and religion under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments had been violated by the state. The Alabama Court of Appeals upheld Marsh’s
conviction, however, maintaining that the Gulf Corporation owned the sidewalk on which she
passed out literature. It could therefore exclude her under state law. 14

12

Marsh, at 502-03.
While members today rely on more limited, door-to-door interfaces with private citizens, there is a rich history of
public space practices by the Jehovah’s Witness sect, which were intended to assert identity claims and establish
visibility for its religious beliefs. See Zick, Speech Out of Doors, op cit., pp. 75-78. See also, Margaret Kohn,
Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public Space (New York: Routledge, 2004), pg. 13.
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The Supreme Court declared Marsh’s conviction unconstitutional and reversed it. Before
doing so, a majority conceded at the outset of its opinion that the Corporation’s ownership of the
business block complicated Marsh’s claims to uninhibited expression there. The protection
afforded free speech and assembly under the First Amendment would surely have been greater
on publicly owned sidewalks than on privately owned ones, it said. 15 Yet, the Court could not
“agree that the corporation’s property interests settle the question” raised in the case. 16 Rather,
by making its business block accessible to public use—by employees, residents, and neighbors
alike—the Gulf Shipbuilding Company surrendered some of its property rights. Justice Black
the majority’s opinion:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it. 17

Chickasaw, Black wrote, was not functionally distinct from any other city or town with
publicly owned streets. Its business block served as a community hub, frequented by Gulf’s
workers, residents, and visitors from a nearby neighborhood, who used it as a shopping center.
The community characteristics of the company town were linchpins to Justice Frankfurter, an
advocate of judicial restraint, who nevertheless saw fit to describe them in detail in his
concurring opinion. Frankfurter treated the cornucopia of public amenities inside Chickasaw as
its main social background fact, noting, “a company-owned town is a town. In its community
aspects it does not differ from other towns. These community aspects are decisive…” 18 And in a
remarkable echo of the viewpoint defended by Jackson in the first chapter, which argued that the

15

Ibid.
Ibid., at 505.
17
Ibid., at 506.
18
Ibid., at 510.
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functions of public space transcend their designated purpose, Frankfurter believed that civil
rights on Chickasaw’s business block derived from the fact of how people used the shopping
center, rather then who held its legal deed:
Title to property as defined by State law controls property relations; it cannot
control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a company town is a
town as well as a congeries of property relations. 19

Aware that a private owner had excluded Marsh, not the state, Black nevertheless
concluded that her freedom to use the business block grew in proportion to the public function
served by Chickasaw property. Given the publicity of that space, the Court broached democratic
theory and its view that Marsh’s expression conduced to greater civic capacity. Beyond her
individual liberty under the First Amendment, other users of the company-owned town at once
had a right to be informed by Marsh’s speech, which they needed in order to exercise their
collective claims on citizenship—not unlike municipal inhabitants anywhere in the nation. The
majority coupled Marsh’s personal sovereignty within a functionally public space to civic
demands for association. It envisaged a preferred position for the First Amendment, therefore,
one that preempted the unfettered right of owners to exclude speakers from their property. 20
The Court’s interpretation of practicable public space in Chickasaw ran afoul of Justice
Reed’s view. Reed dissented from the majority and its “novel Constitutional doctrine.” 21 He
saw the decision as a violation of the company’s rights, noting that it was the first time the Court
had permitted expression on private property, against an owner’s wishes. Marsh, he thought,
could have passed out her literature anywhere near the company town, outside its legal property
19

Ibid., at 511.
Ibid., at 509. NB: The doctrine of “preferred position” maintains that First Amendment freedoms of press, speech
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lines. Requiring that she be allowed to do so in the middle of Chickasaw’s business block
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its owner’s property without just compensation. 22
Reed did not dispute the right to free speech, but rather its preferred position:
A state does have the moral duty of furnishing the opportunity for information,
education and religious enlightenment to its inhabitants…but it has not heretofore
been adjudged that it must commandeer, without compensation, the private
property of other citizens to carry out that obligation.
The rights of the owner, which the Constitution protects as well as the right of
free speech, are not outweighed by the interests of the trespasser, even though he
trespasses in behalf of religion or free speech. 23

Reed’s argument for mutual protection for property rights did not carry the day in Marsh.
In the end, and notwithstanding the absence of direct state action in Marsh’s exclusion, the
protections of the First Amendment were still triggered in Chickasaw’s shopping center. 24 Since
the privately owned town catered to “all” basic municipal needs, it assumed another important
public function: to provide space where residents and visitors might acquire information and
cultivate their citizenship tools:
Just as all other citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of
community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order
to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored.
There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms
with respect to any other citizen. 25
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The Marsh ruling emplaced freedom of expression within a new variety of space, on
behalf of a well-informed citizenry and participatory democracy. It set a high bar for judicial
review of exclusions from publicly functional private property, in this case, accessible property
owned by an industrial corporation, rather than governments we saw in the previous chapter. As
the United States continued to disengage from military commitments following World War II—
and significant financial support flowed from the federal government, in the form of highway
funding and new housing policies—thousands of families settled in America’s burgeoning
suburbs, while others migrated there from central cities during the next few decades. 26 Given the
massive geographic shifts that took place after Marsh was decided in 1946, the spatialization of
American commerce was bound to change, too. One of the most pronounced topographical
manifestations of that change, the contemporary shopping center, exploded on the landscape
after 1950, facilitated by a host of tax policies and eminent domain decisions. 27 Its ubiquity, its
impact on economy, community, and publicity in the suburbs, especially, would combine to form
a whole new set of social background facts after Marsh. The Court first confronted them in
1968, in the case of Logan Valley Plaza.

Public space flows in the plaza: Logan Valley Plaza
When we envision them today, it is worth remarking that the seminal Supreme Court
decision over public space and the First Amendment in shopping centers involved expression
that never reached into an enclosed mall. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590, et al.
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., et al. involved a mall development still in its nascent stages, when a
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battle transpired over free speech outside the facility. 28 When the contest first ignited in 1965,
the Logan Valley Mall, built in a suburb outside of Altoona, Pennsylvania, Logan Township,
consisted of only two anchor stores: Weis Markets, Inc., a supermarket chain, and Sears,
Roebuck and Co. Fifteen more businesses opened by the time the Court handed down its ruling
in 1968. 29 By today’s standards, and those in the immediate wake of a shopping center boom
during the years that followed, Logan Valley was a modest example.
There was indeed a pedestrian mall, covered by a porch that reached around the entire
facility, right up to the Sears store and its garage, where patrons could bring in their automobiles
for repair while they shopped. At the other end of the mall was the Weis Market, fronted by the
overhead porch and two entrances, one for employees and one for customers. 30 Just off the
customer entrance, and between the supermarket and the center’s huge parking lot, was a thirtyfoot long, five-foot wide parcel pickup area.

This is where patrons deposited goods they

purchased into cars, with the help of employees stationed to expedite the transfers. Beyond the
parking lot, five approaches provided ingress and egress from two intersecting roads: Good’s
Lane and Plank Road (also known as U.S. Route 220, a highway). Good’s Lane and Plank Road
were separated from the parking lot by earthen berms, which were twelve and fifteen feet wide.
The distance between Good’s Lane and the Weis Market was 350 feet, while the distance
between Plank Road and the supermarket doors was roughly 500 feet.
28

Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590, et al. v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., et al., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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Weis Market opened in 1965. Its employees were all non-union. Owners posted a sign at
its entrance, prohibiting trespass and solicitation by non-employees on its front porch and
adjacent parking lot. A few days into its opening, members of the Amalgamated Meat Cutter’s,
Local 590, who worked for Weis’ competitors, launched pickets against the market. They
donned signs that read, “THIS STORE IS NONUNION, EMPLOYEES ARE NOT RECEIVING
UNION WAGES OR OTHER BENEFITS.” The pickets were stationed at the entrances, in the
parcel pickup zone, and on a nearby section of the parking lot. The union members behaved
peacefully. Their numbers ranged between four and 13, averaging six. They made no threats of
violence, though they produced periodic congestion in the parcel pickup area.
Ten days after the first union picket, the owners of both Weis Market and the Logan
Valley Mall sought and obtained an injunction from the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County.
The order enjoined the picketers from trespassing on shopping center property, specifically, the
supermarket’s parcel pickup zone, its pedestrian mall, the adjacent parking lot, and the entrances
and exits to and from that parking lot. The intent of the injunction was to exclude the picketers
from the private property entirely, move them away from the shopping center and onto the
publicly owned berms past the parking lots, which bordered each highway road. 31 The union
members peacefully transitioned to the berms, where they continued to picket. They also tried to
distribute handbills, urging prospective customers to boycott the supermarket, in objection to its
labor practices.
While the protest continued off the property, Local 590 challenged the injunction in
court, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court of Common Pleas decided for the
owners. It rejected the union’s constitutional claims, and concluded that the injunction had been
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issued pursuant to a valid statutory protection of Weis and Logan Valley’s ownership rights. 32 In
a 4-3 decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against Local 590. It
concluded that conduct by the labor union—in other words, its picket—constituted illegal
trespass on private property. Hence, one of the wrinkles added to the public forum doctrine,
“speech-plus,” described in the last chapter and announced just two years earlier, in Cox v.
Louisiana (1965), became a definitive part of Pennsylvania’s jurisprudence in the case. There
was more than speech on the mall, according to Pennsylvania’s highest court.
The union appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where a majority of six
members reversed the state court ruling. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for the
Court. Marshall defended the picket on three grounds. He argued that the First Amendment
protected speech and expressive conduct in publicly accessible spaces, provided they did not
interfere with other rights; that public expression could be legally regulated where privately
owned property was accessible to the community, but could not be banned entirely; that Logan
Valley Plaza functioned as the equivalent of a downtown commercial district—just like the
business block in Marsh v. Alabama. The state’s trespass laws could not be used to exclude
members of the public, therefore; not when they wished to express themselves “in a manner and
for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.” 33 The
phrasing of that last argument would become significant in subsequent cases.
Marshall wasted little time before emplacing the free speech provisions of the
Constitution’s First Amendment:

32

In fact, there was a further consideration in the lower court ruling, involving the National Labor Relations Act and
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We start from the premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open
generally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of
the picketing, protected by the First Amendment. 34

At a quick glance, Marshall’s statement appeared to concentrate on the mode by which Local
590 expressed its cause at the Weis Market. Similarly, he distinguished pure speech from
picketing, noting that the latter connoted action that could “be subjected to controls that would
not be constitutionally permissible in the case of pure speech.” This seemed to be a nod to the
two property owners, who both urged the Court to agree that the union’s expressive practices
were certain to become violent, had they continued their protest. 35 Yet the case law cited by the
owners was intended to rationalize a complete ban against the pickets. This “speech-plus”
strategy did not withstand First Amendment scrutiny, said Marshall, for two reasons. First, the
Court had upheld previous prohibitions against picketing on commercial property, but only after
hearing evidence that its aim was unlawful—a secondary boycott against employers not
implicated in the contest, for example. 36 Second, and more importantly for Marshall, the
precedents cited by the property owners never addressed the nature of the location on which
proscribed speech and expressive conduct took place. That consideration was critical, Marshall
thought. And it is at this stage in his opinion that Logan Valley Plaza flows from considerations
of both human geography and physical topography in booming post-War suburbs, a new social
background fact analyzed by the Court.
It is also where Marshall takes up his second and third arguments, where his construction
of public space in Logan Valley Plaza is shaped, and where the battle lines become more evident

34

Ibid., at 313. My emphasis.
Oral Arguments for Appellees, pp. 33-35. .
36
Logan Valley Plaza, at 314. In fact, the union argued that the effect of the injunction in contest was to force them
to areas outside the shopping center, where they might have been perceived to be advocating a secondary boycott of
other businesses that were starting to lease space on the property. Oral Arguments for Appellants, pg. 24.
35

167

in relation to the First Amendment inside shopping malls. Marshall turned to the effect of the
legal injunction on the pickets’ location, vis-à-vis the Weis Market. In his view, the injunction
stymied the union’s capacity to advocate its cause in an effective manner. It forced the picketers
to the far reach of the complex, indeed off the property, where they were unable to communicate
with their target audiences: supermarket employees and customers.

The situation was

inconsistent with the center’s general invitation to the public, said Marshall. Its openness and
accessibility produced constitutional rights, not unlike those found in cities:
It is clear that if the shopping center premises were not privately owned but
instead constituted the business area of a municipality, which they to a large
extent resemble, petitioners could not be barred from exercising their First
Amendment rights there on the sole ground that title to the property was in the
municipality. 37

Marshall cited Hague v. CIO now, and he found a parallel with the traditional public
forum outlined in that earlier case. In view of a perceived overlap, he welcomed a regulatory
approach to expression in the mall, such as the time, place, and manner scheme endorsed in Cox
v. New Hampshire. 38 His colleagues in the majority seemed to agree. During oral arguments, a
number of the Justices probed the counsel for Logan Valley. They questioned whether the
shopping center’s position would have been stronger had its owners instituted more narrow
guidelines for the union’s expression and association in the parcel pickup area.

Neither

proprietor would countenance a regulatory approach, however, so a blanket injunction was
obtained, and the pickets were relegated to public berms, some 500 feet away from the
supermarket porch. There the pickets were free to roam the berms, don their signs, and offer
handbills about labor conditions in the Weis Market. Of course, the considerable distance
between the berms and the Market meant that neither its employees nor its patrons could see the
37
38
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union’s message, as Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurring opinion. 39 Moreover, there
was little opportunity for union members to handbill publics, who traveled in automobiles at high
speeds between the feeder roads off the highway and the shopping center’s parking lots. In fact,
Marshall added, it was quite dangerous for them to do so. 40
While the injunction sought by the mall owners never impinged on what the picketers
could say, it effectively excluded their ability to say it where and to whom they intended. By
enjoining the union, Marshall continued, the state courts defended outdated constructs of private
property and trespass, even though modern shopping centers were unlike other public places
where people go. Both the owners and the lower courts went too far. They failed to recognize
that open invitations to shoppers and the general public introduced expanded constitutional
freedoms within those centers:
That the manner in which handbilling, or picketing, is carried out may be
regulated does not mean that either can be barred under all
circumstances…simply by recourse to traditional concepts of property law
concerning the incidents of ownership of real property. 41

Marshall’s opinion assumed a more rhetorical tone now. His argument expanded beyond
Pennsylvania to civil liberty within the American shopping center. In order to universalize the
matter, he turned to Marsh v. Alabama, the case that established a preferred position for the First
Amendment on private property, that is, when it served a public function. Marshall, who began
by asking, “whether peaceful picketing” could be prohibited in the Logan Valley Mall, as well as
whether unexpected activity inside the shopping center constituted an “invasion of the property
rights of the owners,” seemed intent on re-testing the Marsh analogy between private property
and public space. After reflecting on social background facts and jurisprudence in Marsh, he
39
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looked at the shopping center as a model of public functionality. He found that the companyowned town of Chickasaw was a proper case study through which to define the publicness of
contested space in Logan Township. As far as Marshall was concerned:
The similarities between the business block in Marsh and the shopping center in
the present case are striking… The general public has unrestricted access to the
mall property. The shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent of the
business district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh. 42
Marshall conceded that the company town included its own private residential enclave,
where expressive conduct practiced at the Logan Valley Mall would have stretched the
Constitution farther than property rights could fairly tolerate. However, open public access to
the commercial spaces of both sites, specifically, meant that the First Amendment could be
legally emplaced within their property lines:
While it is probable that the power to prevent trespass broadly claimed in Marsh
would have encompassed such an incursion into the residential areas, the specific
facts in the case involved access to property used for commercial purposes. 43

If Grace Marsh was at liberty to share her views with passersby in Chickasaw’s publicly
accessible shopping center, then Local 590 was likewise free to engage in expression and
association in a forum that delivered the functions of most urban spaces:

We see no reason why access to a business district in a company town for the
purpose of exercising First Amendment rights should be constitutionally required,
while access for the same purpose to property functioning as a business district
should be limited… Here the roadways…within the mall and the sidewalks
leading from building to building are the functional equivalents of the streets and
sidewalks of a normal business district. 44
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Ibid., at 318.
Ibid.
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Long before “new town centers” or “lifestyle centers” became part and parcel of the commercial
design vernacular in metropolitan America:

The shopping center premises are open to the public to the same extent as the
commercial center of a normal town. So far as can be determined, the main
distinction in practice between use by the public of the Logan Valley Mall and of
any other business district, were the decisions of the state courts to stand, would
be that those members of the general public who sought to use the mall premises
in a manner contrary to the wishes of the respondents could be prevented from so
doing. 45

Borrowing on the company town analogy in Marsh, Marshall claimed a preferred
position for the First Amendment in malls, too.

Free expression flowed from analogous

environments that presented downtown characteristics, even though neither was part of an urban
mix. Marshall’s opinion seems more remarkable now, given the ongoing contests for public
space throughout today’s cityscapes, not to mention the great lengths to which the property
owners were willing to go to prevent on-site protest in the Logan Valley Mall. Marshall
acknowledged the pitch in the contest.

He also reiterated the theoretical acceptability of

regulation in shopping centers, to prevent an anything goes atmosphere there. In a major
concession to property owners, moreover, he added that public place and expression needed to
bear a practical relationship to one another. That is, the objects of speech and assembly in malls
had to relate to commercial activities that took place there. Marshall’s defense of speech,
therefore, only prohibited the use of “trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the
public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a
purpose generally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.” 46
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Ibid. My emphasis.
Ibid., at 319-20. NB: In his own footnote on this point, Marshall indicated that the Court was never asked to
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In this case, the mall owners relied on a state trespass law to exclude the union outright,
though its members sought to publicize their cause in the very spaces where they might claim
identity with the interests of other supermarket employees with no collective representation.
According to Marshall, the ban therefore caused a “substantial” interference with Local 590’s
advocacy. Conversely, there was little evidence that the pickets obstructed business operations
at the Weis Markets, or that they adversely impacted the commercial bottom line for the new
center. Absent that evidence, Marshall denied “any significant claim to protection of the normal
business operation of the property…” In essence, the property owners staked their position on
total discretion to include and exclude the public. Marshall returned that “unlike a situation
involving a person’s home, no meaningful claim to protection of a right of privacy” could be
sustained in a shopping mall. “Naked title is essentially all that is at issue.” 47
Marshall closed with what many observers call obiter dicta. And yet his broader analysis
at the conclusion of Logan Valley Plaza sheds light on the social background facts behind the
case, as well as the impact of suburban development on commerce and publicity in contemporary
spaces. Marshall couched his opinion in terms of the massive suburban exodus mentioned in
Chapter Two. He recognized the commercialization of common space as an inevitable result of
the trends that had accelerated after World War II. The mall had now become a fixture in
America’s rapidly suburbanizing landscape:
The economic development of the United States in the last 20 years reinforces our
opinion of the correctness of the approach taken… The large-scale movement of
this country’s population from the cities to the suburbs has been accompanied by
the advent of the suburban shopping center, typically a cluster of individual retail
units on a single large privately owned tract. 48

major caveat in his argument, one that he would have to reckon with throughout the arc of shopping mall
jurisprudence. I will analyze it more fully when we turn to the penultimate ruling in this chapter.
47
Ibid., at 324.
48
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Marshall thought that the First Amendment had to flow where the American public did;
that it needed to go where the people were, if they were to engage civically. At the same time,
the Constitution and free expression could hybridize malls. They could level the playing field in
such a way that cities would not be disadvantaged by prophylactic variations on publicness in the
suburban commercial sphere that was fast evolving.

There was nothing neutral about the

architecture of suburban economic development, not if the Logan Valley Mall could legally
exclude any public criticism that might arise from business practices on the property. The
shopping center boom in the years and decades following Logan Valley Plaza largely outmoded
Marshall’s data. 49 Still, his argument illuminated the idea of public space, as well as the capacity
of the Court to support its practice, or stifle it on behalf of unfettered property rights in the
suburbs. Marshall alluded to the difference at the end of his opinion:
These figures [see note 48, below] illustrate the substantial consequences for
workers seeking to challenge substandard working conditions, consumers
protesting shoddy or overpriced merchandise, and minority groups seeking
nondiscriminatory hiring policies that a contrary decision here would have.
Business enterprises located in downtown areas would be subject to on-the-spot
public criticism for their practices, but businesses situated in the suburbs could
largely immunize themselves from similar criticism by creating a cordon sanitaire
of parking lots around their stores. Neither precedent nor policy compels a result
so at variance with the goal of free expression and communication that is at the
heart of the First Amendment. 50

In Marshall’s view, suburbanites enjoyed a right to the city, a right to practice public space,
which I will discuss further following my legal analysis in the next chapter. Moreover, the state
could not exclude that right entirely under the First Amendment, not in publicly functional
shopping centers where people naturally associated in an era of suburbanization.

49

Marshall and the Court included statistics on the growth of suburbs and shopping centers around the United
States, at 324-25. The data are outdated now, and are therefore not reflected here.
50
Ibid., at 325.
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Black and White and Reed all over: the dissents
Marshall and the majority may have enjoyed the final word against Weis Market and the
Logan Valley Mall, but they certainly did not have the last one in Logan Valley Plaza. Two
dissents would weigh heavily against the Court’s opinion, specifically, its notions of public
function and the preferred position of the First Amendment over mall owners’ rights to dispose
of their private property as they wished. The first dissent was drafted by none other than Justice
Hugo Black, who authored Marsh v. Alabama—the decision on which Marshall relied to buttress
his arguments above. To put it mildly, Black had become impatient with protest by this point in
American history. He also took exception to what he considered a misinterpretation of the legal
argument he made in 1946. Black objected to Marshall’s generous parallel between shopping
centers and company towns, as well as the latter’s analysis of the social background facts in
Logan Township.

He therefore joined Justice White in dissent, where both members

recapitulated Justice Reed’s disagreement with the Marsh ruling twenty-two years earlier. 51
Like Marshall and the majority, Black began his opinion by focusing on the space
contested in the shopping center: the parcel pickup area and porch outside the Weis Market,
adjacent to the parking lot in the Logan Valley Mall. However, the important social background
fact was not the rise of suburbs in America, as Marshall had concluded. Rather, the key
circumstance surrounding the case was what Black called a “phenomenon” of supermarkets and
the widespread use of automobiles. The combination generated consumer demand for bulk
purchases at places like Logan Valley Mall. In particular, the Weis Market and its parcel pickup
area functioned to speed egress from a relatively narrow corridor in which shoppers now used

51

There are many accounts of Justice Black’s shifting positions on free speech. They changed radically following
civil rights contests in the 1950s and 1960s. The prevailing view is that his First Amendment absolutism took a
conservative turn later in his career. See, for example, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 109.
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cars for commerce. It seemed strained, he thought, to suggest that kind of space was suited to
free speech in any way; likewise, that expression was generally compatible with the rapid motion
typified in shopping centers. The facts in Marsh were unlike the ones here:
It seems clear to me, in light of the customary way that supermarkets now must
operate, that pickup zones are as much a part of these stores as the inside
counters… I cannot conceive how such a pickup zone, even by the wildest stretch
of Marsh v. Alabama, [citation] could ever be considered dedicated to the public
or to pickets…
It would be just as sensible for this Court to allow the pickets to stand on the
check-out counters, thus interfering with customers who wish to pay for their
goods, as it is to approve picketing in the pickup zone which interferes with
customers loading of their cars. 52

Black seemed to accept single-use patterns on suburban property—the kind described in
Chapter Two—at least in commercial environments like the Logan Valley Mall. To that extent,
he considered the injunction against the union to be good law. The state courts addressed the
basic facts in the case, submitted Black, not ones they thought desirable. And the central fact
was that Logan Valley Mall was private property, unfit for public expression that aimed to
undermine its profitability. Therefore, the Court’s denial of ownership protections irked Black,
who sensed an activist social agenda in Marshall’s opinion, one that could neither be reconciled
with the space in question nor with the Constitution:
[W]hether this Court likes it or not, the Constitution recognizes and supports the
concept of private ownership of property. The Fifth Amendment provides that
‘no person shall…[sic] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.’ This means to me that there is no right to picket on the private
premises of another to try to convert the owner or others to the views of the
pickets. It also means, I think, that if this Court is going to arrogate to itself the
power to act as the Government’s agent to take a part of Weis’ property to give to
the pickets for their use, the Court should also award Weis just compensation for
the property taken. 53
52
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Given the uniqueness of the shopping mall and the newness of its relationship to the
Constitution, thought Black, the only course through which the majority could have “arrogated”
it away from its owners, and then supplied it to the union for a picket, was to invoke his opinion
in Marsh.

“But Marsh was never intended to apply to this kind of situation.” The company

town in that case was a complete space, he argued, one that provided all the amenities found
within a traditional downtown. The Gulf Shipbuilding Co. not only developed a shopping center
for consumption in Chickasaw. It also built residences, streets, sewers and a sewage system, and
other public amenities, including a post office branch. Nothing like that existed in the Logan
Valley Mall. Marshall’s analogy was overly generous, at best. Unlike super-regional shopping
centers and outdoor formats to come—the latter appointed with on-site condominiums in many
instances—the commercial complex near Altoona served as a pretty poor comparison with the
company-owned town of Chickasaw, Black continued:
I think it is fair to say that the basis on which the Marsh decision rested was that
the property involved encompassed an area that for all practical purposes had
been turned into a town; the area had all the attributes of a town and was exactly
like any other town in Alabama. I can find very little resemblance between the
shopping center involved in this case and Chickasaw… All I can say is that this
sounds like a very strange ‘town’ to me. 54

Marsh was the “only possible authority” for Logan Valley Plaza. Yet, the facts in the
first case bore “very little resemblance” to the situation in the second, making Marshall’s
analysis suspect. No rationale existed to deny property rights in a place that performed some, but
not all, of the public functions of a downtown business district or even its privately owned
equivalent. Any answer to Black’s question in both cases, “Under what circumstances can
private property be treated as though it were public?” did not pertain in shopping malls. To
54

Ibid., at 331. My emphasis.

176

emplace one there, to protect union picketers on the privately owned property where they sought
to deprive Weis Market of its lifeblood, was “to create a court-made law wholly disregarding the
constitutional basis on which private ownership of property rests” in the United States. Black
agreed that the union enjoyed the freedom to speak and make its case against the supermarket.
But its members did not have a corollary right to compel property owners to furnish space for
their protest. That sort of affirmative right was not within the scope of the First Amendment he
preferred in his Marsh opinion two decades earlier.
Justice White stood with Black, apart from the Court. In his dissenting opinion, he
offered remarkable foresight and a look ahead to future decisions involving shopping centers.
White agreed that Marsh was an inapposite in Altoona, since Logan Valley’s property owners
never took on the mantle of the state. 55 White also objected to Marshall’s overlapping
spatialization of public access and function on the property. The shopping center’s invitation to
outsiders pertained to one practice inside, commercial intercourse:
Logan Valley Plaza is not a town but only a collection of stores…. The public is
invited to the premises but only in order to do business with those who maintain
establishments there. The invitation is to shop for the products which are sold.
There is no general invitation to use the parking lot, the pickup zone, or the
sidewalk except as an adjunct to shopping… The point is that whether Logan
Valley Plaza is public or private property, it is a place for shopping and not a
place for picketing. 56

If the majority’s reasoning was extended to its logical conclusion, argued White—perhaps
predicting subsequent struggles for the Court—then all sorts of unorthodox activity could ensue
on shopping mall property, including speech and related forms of expression having little or
nothing to do with its commercial ends. Marshall’s take on association was too unbounded:
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This rationale, which would immunize nonobstructive labor union picketing,
would also compel the shopping center to permit picketing on its property for
other communicative purposes, whether the subject matter concerned a particular
business establishment or not… I do not agree that when the owner of private
property invites the public to do business with him he impliedly dedicates his
property for other uses as well. 57

Neither would the rest of the Court in just a few short years. The mall was now a
disputed space in First Amendment jurisprudence. A constitutional conflict, a tension over what
Habermas calls an “ideal speech situation,” was now spatialized by Marshall and the dissenters
in Logan Valley Plaza. That battle between free expression and private property was waged
outside the doors of Weis Market in the mid 1960’s. In the next case, public space would be
contested in the climate-controlled environment of a fully enclosed shopping mall. The Court
would be faced with the kind of heterodoxy anticipated by Justice White in Logan Valley Plaza.
It would have to determine whether speech was protected inside malls under the logic of the
cases above, or whether private property rights gave owners the power to arrange their shopping
center communities by excluding unwanted practices of publicity. 58

Speech goes inside the mall, gets turned back: Lloyd Corporation
Not long after Logan Valley Plaza, and just days after the election of President Richard
Nixon in 1968, a group of Vietnam War protesters walked onto one of the pedestrian malls
inside the Lloyd Center, a large commercial complex located east of the Willamette River in
Portland, Oregon, and began handing out leaflets to passersby about a nearby demonstration.
Their ejection triggered the second major shopping mall contest, Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v.
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second chapter.
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Donald Tanner, et al, decided in 1972. 59 I will return to the facts of the case in a moment. The
spatial dimension in Lloyd Corp bears mention, however, because this time the Court ruled on a
free speech controversy inside a shopping center of the modern, iconic variety. To the extent
that the rights contested in Logan Valley Plaza a few years earlier became implicated in an
archetypical mall—a model built in more places outside the United States today than within its
borders—the geography of the Lloyd Corp. decision is a good deal richer, spatially and legally.
The challenge between public space, indicated in part by Walzer’s unexpected activities, and the
constitutional authority of a private property owner to exclude those activities, had now
commenced within the interior of that mall, too.
Lloyd Center opened in 1960, following years of construction on publicly owned
property that was vacated and then razed for the complex. Development of the site was initially
made possible through a 1954 land clearance ordinance approved by the city.

In 1958,

emergency legislation was adopted by Portland to allow developers additional time to finish
construction of the mall, without prejudice, thereby satisfying bond terms included in the city’s
agreement with the Center. 60 Upon completion, the shopping center was fully enclosed and
spanned more than twenty-five acres, including 850,000 square feet of parking, enough to
accommodate more than one thousand cars. The mall itself contained over sixty business and
professional offices, all located within a single facility, on multiple levels. There were six streets
that bordered the complex. None of the streets traversed the Center’s commercial mall, though a
small number of stores inside could also be accessed from adjacent public sidewalks outside.
59
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Most were accessible from the interior mall alone. In fact, there was evidence to suggest that
Lloyd Center’s mall was segregated from the city’s streets, by design. 61
By today’s standards, Lloyd Center was modest in size, but comparable in scale with
large shopping malls at the time. It was much larger and more commercially diverse than Logan
Valley Mall, housing a mix of retail and office space, as well as gardens, statues, murals, and
other aesthetic niceties. It included a skating rink and a public auditorium, where non-profit
groups, such as the Girl Scouts, could secure reservations at no charge, while other groups could
rent space at the owner’s discretion. 62 On the mall itself, a host of community events took place,
including football rallies, musical performances, political candidate forums, and even visits by
Presidential hopefuls. Similarly, a variety of civic organizations were permitted to use space in
the mall, including charitable associations such as the Salvation Army and the American
Legion. 63 According to the management, all non-commercial activities were aimed to attract
maximum foot traffic into the mall, enhance community comfort on the property, and generate
“customer motivation,” for business growth. 64
Lloyd Center employed several security guards. The guards were commissioned by the
city of Portland, at the request of owners, and given full police authority within the mall.65 They
were licensed to carry firearms, and their uniforms closely resembled those of police officers.
When five members of the “Resistance Community,” a group opposed to American involvement
in Vietnam, entered the complex and began handing out invitations to an antiwar protest at
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another venue, the guards approached them and informed them that they were trespassing on
private property and could be arrested if they continued distributing their flyers. 66 The guards
advised the protesters about the Center’s policy against handbilling, which was intended to
facilitate pedestrian movement, reduce litter, and prevent any activity that might create customer
discomfort or become incompatible with commerce. The Center’s policy was codified in its
“rules of use” notices, posted throughout the mall:
NOTICE – AREAS IN LLOYD CENTER USED BY THE PUBLIC ARE NOT
PUBLIC WAYS BUT ARE FOR THE USE OF LLOYD CENTER TENANTS
AND THE PUBLIC TRANSACTING BUSINESS WITH THEM.
PERMISSION TO USE SAID AREAS MAY BE REVOKED AT ANY TIME.
LLOYD CORPORATION, LTD. 67

There was no evidence of disruption, though the trial record did show one complaint in
the security log, along with a few unsympathetic reactions by patrons. 68 The guards indicated
that the activists could distribute their handbills on the streets and sidewalks outside the mall,
which they did, in order to avoid what they perceived as an imminent arrest. Afterwards, they
filed suit in the U.S. Court for the District of Oregon, seeking an injunction and relief against the
Lloyd Corporation. They claimed the owner violated their rights to free speech and assembly.
Declaring the mall open to the public and a “functional equivalent of a public business district,”
the District Court granted the injunction. It was later upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals,
which also focused on the public function of the Center, citing Marsh v. Alabama and Logan
Valley Plaza to support First Amendment expression therein.
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Lloyd Corporation appealed to the Supreme Court. It claimed that its private property
protections had been unconstitutionally denied, that the protesters’ activity undermined the
Center’s commercial purpose. It also argued that the decision in Logan Valley Plaza did not
apply in Portland, where alternative venues were available for antiwar activism outside the mall.
Thus, what began as a narrower dispute over free speech and assembly in the mall had become
more multidimensional by the time the Court agreed to hear the case. It was now asked to
reconcile First Amendment safeguards with the sovereignty of private property protected by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 69
In a narrow decision, five members of the Court ruled for the mall owners. A recent
appointee of President Nixon, Justice Lewis Powell, wrote the opinion for the majority. Powell
focused on three arguments. While the Logan Valley Plaza decision was supported by the facts
in suburban Altoona, where union pickets were aimed directly at commercial practices inside the
Weis Market—that is, where speech pertained to the space protesters hoped to impact—handbills
being passed out in Lloyd Center were about a conflict in Southeast Asia and had nothing to do
with the immediate purpose of the shopping center in Portland. Next, since the handbills did not
relate to the Center directly, antiwar expression could be effected on the surrounding streets and
sidewalks outside the mall, without harm to activists or property owners. Finally, because the
privately owned Lloyd Corporation excluded Donald Tanner and his Resistance Community
speech, no state action was involved in the case.
After distinguishing the social background in Marsh and Logan Valley Plaza—and
highlighting Justice Black’s critique of Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the first to
substantiate the second—Powell turned to the factual differences between the Lloyd Center and
Logan Valley. Unlike the union picket, the Vietnam protesters’ use of a Portland shopping mall
69
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to promote opposition to a foreign war raging thousands of miles away did not satisfy a crucial
requirement in Logan Valley Plaza: that First Amendment expression on private property be
directly related to the purposes of that property.

As Powell noted, “The handbilling by

respondents in the malls of Lloyd Center had no relation to any purpose for which the center was
built and being used.” 70
The protesters had claimed that the mall was open to the general public; therefore Lloyd
Corporation was legally prohibited from excluding their handbills. They relied on the Court’s
earlier decision in Logan Valley Plaza. Powell disagreed. He maintained a need for immediacy
between the day-to-day activities that took place inside publicly accessible private property and
the constitutional protection of expression there. Reprising Justice Marshall’s opinion in Logan
Valley, Powell interpreted it as an argument against unexpectedness in the mall. He therefore
rejected the antiwar activists’ free speech position:
It is…argued by respondents that, since the Center is open to the public, the
private owner cannot enforce a restriction against handbilling on its premises.
The thrust of this argument is considerably broader than the rationale of Logan
Valley. It requires no relationship, direct or indirect, between the purpose of the
expressive activity and the business of the shopping center. The message sought
to be conveyed by respondents was directed to all members of the public, not
solely to patrons of Lloyd Center or any of its operations. Respondents could
have distributed these handbills on any public street, on any public sidewalk, in
any park, or in any public building in the city of Portland. 71

There had to be an admissible context for expression and association on the property,
Powell contended. The unlimited invitation interpreted by the war activists was simply never
made by the Lloyd Corporation.

The Center was built for commercial intercourse, alone.

Borrowing from Justice White’s dissent in Logan Valley Plaza, Powell admonished the
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protesters about the nature of the shopping mall, whose owners had been enjoined by the lower
courts from preserving their property’s protected purpose:
Respondents’ argument…misapprehends the scope of the invitation extended to
the public. The invitation is to come to the Center to do business with the tenants.

In parrying the Resistance Community’s complaint that the Center had routinely permitted
numerous non-commercial activities within its enclosed mall, Powell defended the bottom line
for the Lloyd Corporation, as White had tried to do unsuccessfully in Logan Valley. Of other
occasions in the mall, Powell argued, the goal was nonetheless commercial in nature:
The obvious purpose, recognized widely as legitimate and responsible business
activity, is to bring potential shoppers to the Center, to create a favorable
impression, and to generate goodwill. There is no open-ended invitation to the
public to use the Center for any and all purposes, however incompatible with the
interests of both the stores and the shoppers whom they serve. 72

In his view, the corollary of antiwar handbills in the mall was unfettered expression on
commercial property “across the country,” with scarcely any distinction between the remoter
“private enclaves” of suburban Pennsylvania, and metropolitan areas like Portland, where an
abundance of public spaces were available for protest.

Powell now turned to his second

argument in defense of the Lloyd Corporation and its property rights: the presence of alternative
venues for speech, which scarcely existed in Logan Valley Plaza. To Powell, “the union pickets
in that case would have been deprived of all reasonable opportunity to convey their message,”
had the injunction stood. The demonstration in suburban Altoona was relegated well beyond the
reach of publics to whom they wished to speak. Moreover, picketers incurred safety risks while
circulating their message from narrow earthen berms that bordered roadways some 500 feet
away from their intended audience. In this case, on the other hand, the Resistance Community
72
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could well have continued to handbill audiences, which they did when asked to leave the mall.
Powell saw no adverse consequences as a result of their exclusion. Therefore, the situation in
Lloyd Center was totally unlike the one in Logan Valley Plaza. 73
Given the differences, the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Logan Valley Plaza to require
handbilling in the Lloyd Center mall stripped its owners of their property rights under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet, it did not augment available space for public expression in
Portland. The cost-benefit ratio failed to satisfy Powell. In his view, the Lloyd Corporation
enjoyed constitutional rights, too:
It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to
yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where
adequate alternative venues of communication exist. Such an accommodation
would diminish property rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right
of free speech. 74

After deploying Justice White’s dissent in Logan Valley Plaza, Powell offered his final
argument in Lloyd Corp. His inspiration came from Justice Black’s dissent in the previous
contest this time. He addressed state action—in First Amendment jurisprudence, a doctrine that
prevents government alone from abridging free speech in publicly accessible places, under all
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but a few circumstances. 75 Private actors, however, may be left to their devices in this regard.76
Powell framed the issue of state action inside Lloyd Center as follows:
The basic issue in this case is whether respondents, in the exercise of asserted
First Amendment rights, may distribute handbills on Lloyd’s private property
contrary to its wishes and contrary to a policy enforced against all handbilling. In
addressing this issue, it must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on
state action, not on action by the owner of private property used
nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only. The Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are also relevant to this case…
Although accommodations between the values protected by these three
Amendments are sometimes necessary…this Court has never held that a
trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on
property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes
only. 77

Powell targeted Justice Marshall’s opinion in Logan Valley Plaza. In that case, Marshall
had reimagined the shopping center as the analogue of public property, functionally speaking,
rather than a static object of private ownership. Tanner’s argument, Powell believed, relied
heavily on Marshall’s analogy, which elicited a view of state action based on the functions of
mall space. In effect, the antiwar protesters had rationalized their usufruct of privately owned
property using it.

They contended that Lloyd Center’s interior mall functioned like any

downtown, giving them the “same right of free speech” therein. Powell scoffed at the analogy,
while raising concern about the implications of blurring private property and public space. He
would not disavow the public function rationale used in Marsh v. Alabama itself, but he did
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quarrel with its application in Logan Valley, as well as in the lower courts. Finally, he attempted
to stem any further misappropriation of that parallel inside the Lloyd Center:
The argument reaches too far. The Constitution by no means requires such an
attenuated doctrine of dedication of private property to public use… In the instant
case there is no comparable assumption or exercise of municipal functions or
power. 78

While Powell and the Court declined to overrule either of the two precedents above, they would
treat neither one of them as determinative on the grounds of the Lloyd Center. The invitation
extended by the mall’s owners was a limited one, to shoppers only:
Nor does property lose its private character merely because the public is generally
invited to use it for designated purposes. 79

Interestingly enough, Powell concluded his opinion by hinting that the public function
threshold might obtain within a privately owned shopping center of superior scale and spatial
diversity—the kind that flooded America’s suburban real estate market after he handed down the
Court’s decision in Lloyd Corp. Inside Lloyd Center’s modest environment in 1972, however,
the mall did not occasion such public functionality. Therefore, it was neither possible to argue
that free speech occupied a preferred position vis-à-vis property rights within the Center, nor that
that its mall functioned like public space. Powell concluded:
We hold that there has been no such dedication of Lloyd’s privately owned and
operated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents to exercise therein
the asserted First Amendment rights. 80
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The mall is where the people go. Marshall’s dissent
Having written for the majority four years earlier, in Logan Valley Plaza, Justice
Marshall now found himself in the minority on the Court, dissenting on behalf of free speech and
public space in a privately owned shopping center. From Marshall’s point of view, Justice
Powell posed a distinction without a difference, by refusing to endorse some form of reciprocity
between Marsh and Logan Valley, and then by failing to apply the public function analogy in
both of those cases to the situation in Lloyd Corp. 81 Did the Court mean to jettison the doctrine
of preferred position, wondered Marshall? Had it permanently placed a burden of constitutional
proof onto speakers vying to practice expression inside functionally public spaces that might
play host to civic engagement? Constitutional challenges over speech in places where publics
assembled had once implicated First Amendment freedoms, as in Marsh and Logan Valley. Now
they seemed to hinge on private property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
posing a threat to public space and association. Observing this unfortunate shift, Marshall
summarized the dilemma in Lloyd Corp.:
The question presented by this case is whether one of the incidents of petitioner’s
private ownership of the Lloyd Center is the power to exclude certain forms of
speech from its property. In other words, we must decide whether ownership of
the Center gives petitioner unfettered discretion to determine whether or not it
will be used as a public forum. 82

With the issue reframed in this way, Marshall touted the Court’s previous rulings, which
spatialized free expression on publicly accessible private property according to the practical roles
those properties played for people who spent time there. Turning to Portland’s Lloyd Center,
Marshall saw an even greater synergy between the private complex and ways in which its mall
functioned publicly—both inside the property and within the city where it was built. For one, the
81
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Center was much larger than the Logan Valley Mall. It also delivered a more diverse array of
commercial and non-commercial services to visitors. The mall had been completely integrated
into the city’s economic redevelopment scheme, which was driven by an urgent need for jobs.
As above, the Center was spearheaded through a municipal ordinance that cleared several city
streets for its construction. Moreover, Portland gave the mall’s security guards full police
authority, at the request of the property owners, in the interest of broadly protecting public
safety. The mall was a vital part of the city’s fabric, therefore. In fact, Lloyd Center was a much
more public space than the Logan Valley Mall, Marshall argued:
In sum, the Lloyd Center is an integral part of the Portland community. From its
inception, the city viewed it as a ‘business district’ of the city and depended on it
to supply much needed employment opportunities. To insure the success of the
Center, the city carefully integrated it into the pattern of streets already
established and planned future development of streets around the Center. It is
plain, therefore, that Lloyd Center is the equivalent of a public ‘business district’
within the meaning of Marsh and Logan Valley. In fact, the Lloyd Center is much
more analogous to the company town in Marsh than was the Logan Valley
Plaza. 83

Treating Lloyd Center as publicly functional space, and citing considerable municipal
involvement in its creation and operation, not to mention Portland’s fiscal dependence on it,
Marshall now elaborated his objections to the Court’s indifference to free speech and assembly
inside. Marshall reminded the majority that the First Amendment had always protected peaceful,
non-obstructive political dissent—in this case, handbilling against the Vietnam War, which was
not widely criticized at the time that Tanner and his group entered the Center in 1965. Marshall
also focused on common uses of the interior mall for non-commercial speech, including many of
the activities mentioned above.

In view of those activities, he concluded, Lloyd Center

functioned as a space for discourse on a wide variety of public interests.
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Marshall was now forced to shift into another gear, rhetorically. Since he had argued in
Logan Valley Plaza that the First Amendment protected free speech and assembly on publicly
accessible private property, but that such expression needed to relate to the basic function of that
property, Marshall urged that Lloyd Center’s mall served conventionally as an expressive space.
The owners invited outside communication in the mall, not unlike the proprietors in Marsh or
Logan Valley. As Marshall maintained, “Lloyd Center had deliberately chosen to open its
private property to a broad range of expression…having done so it could not constitutionally
exclude respondents…” Inasmuch as the Center functioned publicly as a First Amendment
space, he continued, the Resistance Community could no more be banished than the Girl Scouts,
or the American Legion. They ought to have enjoyed equal accommodation with Presidential
candidates who appeared in the mall at election time, and who “presumably” stumped on “war
and peace,” too. Marshall defended political heterodoxy within the space:

I perceive no basis for depriving respondents of the opportunity to distribute
leaflets inviting patrons of the Center to attend a meeting in which different points
of view would be expressed from those held by the organizations and persons
privileged to use Lloyd Center as a forum for parading their ideas and symbols.
I believe that…respondents’ activities were directly related in purpose to the use
to which the shopping center was being put.
I cannot see any logical reason to treat differently speech that is related to subjects
other than the Center and its member stores. 84

Marshall held that unpopular speech was nevertheless protected speech; that the size and
diversity of Lloyd Center’s mall, combined with its many non-commercial invitations to public
use, demanded toleration for the views of antiwar activists and others outside the mainstream.
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Indeed, he went further, suggesting that the preferred position once accorded expression in
places such as Chickasaw now be revisited by the Court in the Lloyd Center:
We must remember that it is a balance that we are striking—a balance between
the freedom to speak, a freedom that is given a preferred place in our hierarchy of
values, and the freedom of a private property owner to control his property.
When the competing interests are fairly weighed, the balance can only be struck
in favor of speech. 85

The mall’s value as a place for civic engagement grew in proportion to increased commercial
intercourse inside, Marshall added. Given the abundance of goods and services available at the
Lloyd Center—not to mention challenges faced in trying to communicate with patrons driving in
and out of its parking lots from surrounding city streets—Marshall considered the pedestrian
mall to be Portland’s best available site for political association. As Presidential candidates and
others knew, Lloyd Center was where Portland’s citizens were to be found. Yet, protesters did
not enjoy the resources of those seeking high office. To Marshall, that made the mall even more
critical as public space. So, too, did its totality, not unlike Chickasaw’s:
For many Portland citizens, Lloyd Center will so completely satisfy their wants
that they will have no reason to go elsewhere for goods or services. If speech is to
reach these people, it must reach them in Lloyd Center. 86

Given the prohibitive costs of mass communications, face-to-face democracy inside the mall was
an only option for Tanner, his group, and most other advocates:
The only hope that these people have to be able to communicate effectively is to
be permitted to speak in those areas in which most of their fellow citizens can be
found. One such area is the business district of a city or town or its functional
equivalent. And this is why respondents have a tremendous need to express
themselves within Lloyd Center. 87
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Marshall acknowledged the potential for annoyance among mall goers being given
unwanted handbills. Still, he dismissed the claim that “customer motivation” would decline as a
result of leafleting in the Lloyd Center. Free expression was more important in any case, urged
Marshall, who was unmoved by Lloyd Corporation’s argument that the handbills caused
excessive litter in the mall, along with impediments to foot traffic. In fact, antiwar speech was
less likely to be disruptive than the on-site pickets upheld in Logan Valley Plaza, since the latter
were intended to motivate employees to unionize, and customers to boycott. Hinting at the
politics of Supreme Court appointments and judicial realignment under President Nixon,
following Logan Valley, Marshall suggested that picayune issues such as litter were a cover for
the Court’s ideological swing after that decision was handed down in 1968. 88
Still eager to unearth the meaning of social background facts in shopping malls, Marshall
concluded that the bigger issue in Lloyd Corp. was a continued shift in American geography,
along with continued abatements of what Zick calls our “expressive topography.” In Marshall’s
view, the suburbanization of commerce inside shopping malls had propelled privatizations of
urban public space by municipal administrations like Portland’s, which were keen on attempting
to keep pace with rapid economic development in suburbs. The city’s land clearance ordinances
and other accommodations it made to Lloyd Center’s construction were merely tips of an
iceberg. 89

Seeming to anticipate contemporary public-private arrangements, for example,

today’s business improvement districts, Marshall feared that public space for open political
discourses would be overwhelmed by urban development—as had city streets outside Lloyd
88
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Center, and protest groups such as the Resistance Community inside it. 90 The effect of these
changes would be inauspicious, not unlike the Court’s decision in Lloyd Corp.:
As governments rely on private enterprise, public property decreases in favor of
privately owned property. It becomes harder and harder for citizens to find means
to communicate with other citizens.
When there are no effective means of communication, free speech is a mere
shibboleth. 91

In view of the perils above, Marshall recapitulated his support for a return to the legal reasoning
in Marsh, as well as his own emplacement of free expression in Logan Valley Plaza. He exuded
confidence that the latter remained on solid ground; that it was still a “binding” interpretation of
the First Amendment in shopping malls, “unless and until…overruled.” Four years later, that
eventuality would come to pass before Marshall’s eyes.

Morphology in the mall and the final unraveling of public function: Hudgens 92
An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall was the most vociferous
champion of public space in modern American shopping centers, I would argue. He was also
one of the most outspoken in defense of free speech in contemporary spaces, too. Though there
is no immediate evidence to prove it, the combination may explain why he drafted the Court’s
opinion in Logan Valley Plaza. In writing for the Court, Marshall had to resolve a contest
between two of the nation’s oldest values against inside a totally new environment: the freedom
of expression in shopping malls that were replacing traditional public forums, versus the right of
90
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owners to dispose of their property as they wished. At the same time, he had to construct an
argument that would attract the votes of a majority of his colleagues. The responsibility was
unenviable, notwithstanding the support of Chief Justice Warren, who presided over many of the
Court’s most celebrated decisions in favor of free speech and press.
In carrying out his assignment, Marshall insisted on an important qualification for First
Amendment speech in malls. He stipulated that speech was only protected in shopping centers
when those properties served as the functional equivalents of the business district in Marsh v.
Alabama, and then only insofar as that speech pertained directly to the purpose of any contested
space—in Logan Valley Plaza, the parcel pickup area outside Weis Market.

Some of his

colleagues, for example, Justice White, who dissented in Logan Valley, considered that
qualification a torturous one. It survived scrutiny in Lloyd Corp., but would finally unravel four
years later, in Scott Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, et al. 93
Given the evolution of environments and proprietary relationships within modern
shopping centers, Marshall’s qualification was sure to provoke legal challenges. In Lloyd Corp.,
the publicness of malls depended on both the context and the content of the discourses inside.
Whether he appreciated it or not, this was the byproduct of Marshall’s ruling in Logan Valley
Plaza; that much seemed to be settled in Lloyd Corp. But the geometry of space and speech was
often difficult to determine inside increasingly mammoth shopping centers sprouting up in the
United States. How, then, would questions of commercial access and political association be
reconciled in a constitutionally consistent manner? Were malls public space, under Logan
Valley, or were they private property, under Lloyd? Did the content of expressive practices
express publicity within the context of large shopping centers?
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These questions would be settled, on the federal level at least, through the ruling in
Hudgens. The case history was more circuitous than those that preceded it, owing to its legal
and statutory background. There were also extra constitutional considerations, specifically, the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a federal law that has regulated employee-employer
relationships since the New Deal. It created separate free speech protections for unionized
workers. 94 And yet some of the complication in Hudgens resulted from the logic Justice
Marshall relied on to emplace the First Amendment in malls in his Logan Valley Plaza opinion,
as well as the awkward fit between that case, and its successor, Lloyd Corp.
The Hudgens contest began in 1971, when a small group of warehouse employees from
the Butler Shoe Company went on strike to protest their employer’s tactics during contract
negotiations with their union. 95 The strikers organized a picket outside Butler’s somewhat
remote warehouse. They also planned protests in front of each retail shoe store owned by the
company, nine in total. One of those stores was located inside the North DeKalb Shopping
Center, in suburban Atlanta.

Briefs submitted to the Court indicate that North DeKalb’s

architectural design resembled that of Lloyd Center, though it was larger in size. It consisted of
one enclosed mall complex, surrounded by parking lots for 2,600 automobiles. The Center
housed more than sixty retail stores. Most of them were accessed through the interior mall alone,
including the one owned by Butler. 96
Four strikers entered the North DeKalb mall, carrying placards that read, “BUTLER
SHOE WAREHOUSE ON STRIKE, AFL-CIO LOCAL 315.” Their picket was not aimed at the
shopping center, but rather at the shoe store leased inside the mall. When the strikers entered the
94
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property, however, the mall’s general manager approached them and indicated that they were
prohibited from picketing inside the center and its parking lots. He also informed them that they
would be arrested under a Georgia criminal trespass statute if they did not leave the facility. The
employees exited, but they returned a short time later and began to picket near the entrance to the
Butler shoe store. After thirty minutes, the general manager confronted the picketers again,
promising arrest this time. They all left. Following the incident, the union for the warehouse
employees filed an unfair labor practice claim with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
against the mall owner, Scott Hudgens. The union cited a legal right to organize under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and alleged that Hudgens interfered with that right. It
claimed that the pickets were aimed at other shoe company employees.
The NLRB issued a cease and desist order against Hudgens, in response. Because the
pickets related to the operation of the shoe store, the Board cited Logan Valley Plaza. It also
relied on organizational/non-interference provisions of the NLRA, but concluded that Logan
Valley fully protected the strikers’ First Amendment freedoms inside the mall.

Hudgens

petitioned the Court of Appeals. While his request was being weighed, in 1972, the Supreme
Court handed down Lloyd Corp., along with a decision mentioned in the last chapter, Central
Hardware CO. v. NLRB. That ruling upheld exclusions against labor organizers on a privately
owned parking lot. 97 In light of Lloyd Corp. and the companion ruling, the Court of Appeals
remanded the case back to the NLRB, with instructions to reconsider its cease order against the
mall. The NLRB now enlisted an Administrative Law Judge, to review the dispute in the North
DeKalb Shopping Center—specifically, in the context of conflicting Supreme Court rulings on
rights of ownership, labor law, and the First Amendment. The judge agreed that Hudgens had
committed an unfair labor practice. He also agreed that the striking workers had used the
97
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shopping center property in the appropriate spirit of the NLRA. In effect, the judge supported
the NLRB order, holding that labor pickets on the mall were the most effective, least intrusive
form of public advocacy, vis-à-vis rights of workers and owners.
The NLRB wanted a more robust determination, however.

It contended that free

expression in the North DeKalb mall was a corollary of First Amendment jurisprudence in Logan
Valley Plaza, not Lloyd Corp. That is, the decision in Lloyd Corp. needed to be reconciled with
Logan Valley. The union local and Hudgens were both content to maintain their challenge at the
level of the NLRA for their different reasons. 98 On the other hand, the NLRB was poised to
fight for a more open “free speech zone” in the North DeKalb center, where strikers could reach
other workers, but also people who shopped there. It contended that the First Amendment
emitted from Hudgens’ invitation to the general public, not just the protection of discourse that
related to his property, specifically. There was a spatial dilemma, however. Although the
pickets were aimed at the Butler store alone, its entrance was ultimately located in a large
enclosed mall, immediately adjacent to numerous other stores. 99 In such an atmosphere, where a
mall owner maintained concomitant interests in all leased property, including shops and stores of
no moment to the union activists, the commercially adverse consequences seemed more
significant. Were the pickets sufficiently associated with Butler’s labor dispute, and therefore
protected under Logan Valley Plaza? Or did the modern architecture of indoor shopping malls
mean that the union’s expression reached beyond the shoe store and became seemingly unrelated
to the dispute, thereby triggering ownership rights protected by Lloyd Corp.?
98
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Seemingly exasperated by these questions, not to mention the mystery surrounding
applicable precedents, Justice Potter Stewart delivered an opinion for five members. It was
joined separately by Justice White, a dissenter in Logan Valley Plaza. Ultimately, Stewart saw
the dispute as a product of the misfit between the principal interpretations of free expression in
shopping centers: Logan Valley and Lloyd Corp. Stewart, who had joined Justice Marshall’s
dissent in Lloyd Corp., believed that case failed to resolve the confusion created by Logan Valley
Plaza, where easements for First Amendment expression were emplaced in a privately owned
shopping center, owing somehow to the property’s public function. Logan Valley misconstrued
Marsh v. Alabama, thought Stewart. It overlooked the fact that the Constitution protected
citizens against actions by the state, not other citizens. True, Marsh exempted the state action
requirement and upheld free speech on private property, based on the public function analogy. It
was an exception that proved the rule, however. The property in that case delivered all public
services to visitors. Shopping centers did not.
Thus, the fit between the business block in Marsh, on the one hand, and shopping malls
in Logan Valley Plaza and Lloyd Corp, on the other, was Procrustean, Stewart complained, and it
produced incompatible constitutional outcomes in those cases. It also fomented a torturously
complex contest between Hudgens and a small group of strikers, who had no dispute with him,
his business practices, or his mall. Lloyd Corp. withdrew protection for unauthorized expression
that had no relationship to commercial operations inside shopping centers. But it still left the
First Amendment in place when outside speech related to the property relationships there. The
problem, for Stewart, was that such speech would most certainly reach, and might indeed be
aimed to influence, unrelated audiences, for example, customers and other proprietors in the
North DeKalb Shopping Center. That kind of situation fell outside the protection of free speech
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in Logan Valley, and Lloyd Corp. failed to address it. In other words, Logan Valley posed
unjustifiable threats to property rights, while Lloyd Corp. let them stand. A more muscular
jurisprudence was in order, therefore, and Stewart indicated his mission to deliver it:
The Court in its Lloyd opinion did not say that it was overruling the Logan Valley
decision… But the fact is that the reasoning of the Court’s opinion in Lloyd
cannot be squared with the reasoning of the Court’s opinion in Logan Valley. 100

So, Stewart expressly overturned Logan Valley Plaza. In undertaking this bold move against the
First Amendment, he anticipated the objections of Justices Marshall and Brennan, Warren Court
holdovers and stalwarts on free speech at a time of ongoing transition into the Burger era:
It matters not that some Members of the Court may continue to believe that the
Logan Valley case was rightly decided. Our institutional duty is to follow until
changed the law as it is now, not as some Members of the Court might wish it to
be. And in the performance of that duty we make it clear now, if it was not clear
before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court’s decision in
the Lloyd case…the ultimate holding in Lloyd amounted to a total rejection of the
holding in Logan Valley. 101

The First Amendment, severely circumscribed in shopping centers in Lloyd Corp., had
now been excluded from malls entirely. In defending the Court’s decision, Stewart parlayed its
public forum doctrine, notably, the requirement that restrictions on speech and related forms of
expression be content neutral. In effect, he used the qualification that Justice Marshall placed on
public space in Logan Valley Plaza to overturn it. Free speech required on private property in
Logan Valley ought not have depended on Marshall’s parsing of related content if that property
was really analogous to a public forum. Indeed, that distinction would be constitutionally
intolerable under First Amendment analysis. Marshall had linked publicity to shopping center
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speech and apposite activity. Such stipulations were unnecessary when publicly accessible
spaces functioned as public fora, Stewart countered:
If a large self-contained shopping center is the functional equivalent of a
municipality, as Logan Valley held, then the First and Fourteenth Amendments
would not permit control of speech within such a center to depend upon the
speech’s content. 102

Time, place, and manner regulations might have been more suitable in shopping malls,
provided the public forum applied legally, Stewart suggested. It did not, however. Marshall’s
content considerations in Logan Valley Plaza, followed by the Court’s opinion in Lloyd Corp.,
proved that much. Turning private property into public space through the qualifications above
demonstrated how tenuous Marshall’s analogy was. The union pickets at Logan Valley Mall
were no more entitled to protection under a state action exception than the antiwar handbills
were inside the Lloyd Center. So it was with the strike in the North DeKalb mall:
[I]f the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First Amendment right to
enter this [sic] shopping center to distribute handbills concerning Vietnam, then
the pickets in the present case did not have a First Amendment right to enter this
shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike against the Butler Shoe
Co.
We conclude, in short, that under the present state of the law the constitutional
guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this. 103

Given how unusual they are, there was some internal commentary about the overrule—
Justice Powell indicating in hindsight that he might have gone as far in Lloyd Corp., Justice
White suggesting that Lloyd was decided correctly, though it did not, contrary to Justice
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Stewart’s assertion, overturn Logan Valley Plaza by itself. 104 In any case, Hudgens’ privately
owned shopping center was not alienable under the public function analogy carried over from
Marsh v. Alabama. Nor did Marsh’s doctrine of preferred position for speech pertain to First
Amendment analysis in malls. The Court had constructed a new, narrow morphology in the
mall. It unequivocally denied the argument once made by Justice Marshall, and now the NLRB:
that the interdependence of commercial and public invitations in malls made them mutually
compatible as spaces of consumption and association. 105
Blomley uses the term hybridization to explain his idea that the singularity of private
property may always be threatened by the flow of outside users. 106 Staeheli and Mitchell
complement this geographic analysis, arguing that rights of publicity logically flow from popular
access to property, and may actually stimulate acceptable forms of usufruct there. 107 The
antithesis of this flow is what Blomley calls territorialization, a segregation of property, and
static control exercised by its owner. That control may be sustained by legal force, when the
state regards the title to property to be a zero-sum good. 108 In looking at how First Amendment
jurisprudence unfolded in publicly accessible but privately owned shopping center spaces, it
appears that the hybridization of Logan Valley Plaza became conditioned in Lloyd Corp. In
Hudgens, however, it was finally done in by the Court’s territorialization of all mall property.
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A coda on space in the mall: Marshall’s eulogy to public functionality
Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Hudgens seemed a culmination of the argument
he had been trying to construct for eight years, ever since he handed down Logan Valley Plaza in
1968. Marshall opened by remarking on an extraordinary undertaking by the Court, which
overruled Logan Valley less than ten years after handed it down, an unusually short lifetime for a
Supreme Court decision. 109 Reprising his opposition in Lloyd Corp., Marshall argued that
embodied speech in an immensely popular modern place, the suburban mall, had been dealt a
major blow. In Hudgens, moreover, the advocates of controversial ideas, recently cut off from
some audience segments in the mall, would no longer be able to speak to anyone inside. 110 At
the heart of Marshall’s dissent, joined by Justice Brennan, was his criticism of the Court’s
exclusion of all First Amendment speech and assembly from the mall.

He bemoaned the

overrule that accomplished this undoing:
Turning to the constitutional issue resolved by the Court, I cannot escape the
feeling that Logan Valley has been laid to rest without ever having been accorded
a proper burial. 111

Marshall never agreed with the decision in Lloyd Corp. However, he did believe it could
coexist with his own opinion in Logan Valley Plaza. The majority’s ruling to the contrary in this
case substantively ignored the social background facts of suburban commercial development, not
to mention the privatization of huge swaths of public space throughout the United States.
Citizens in such places were entitled to civic discourse, too. 112 The Court had recognized a right
to expressive space in Marsh, Marshall suggested.

It therefore treated Chickasaw as

prototypically municipal place, even though it was privately owned. And there was “nothing in
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Marsh to suggest that its general approach was limited to the particular facts of that case.”113
More than any other, the issue in that seminal decision was public citizenship, a something that
was justifiably preferred to private ownership.

Marshall’s majority understood this in the

Court’s first shopping center ruling, where it constructed mall space based on how it functioned
publicly, not on who owned it. The current Court had failed to follow suit, however:
In Logan Valley we recognized what the Court today refuses to recognize—that
the owner of the modern shopping center complex, by dedicating his property to
public use as a business district, to some extent displaces the ‘State’ from control
of historical First Amendment forums, and may acquire a virtual monopoly of
places suitable for effective communication. The roadways, parking lots, and
walkways of the modern shopping center may be as essential for effective speech
as the streets and sidewalks in the municipal or company town. 114

Since places like Chickasaw and the North DeKalb mall both stood in for the public fora
traditionally protected by the First Amendment, Marshall protested, the Court was really
overruling Marsh, too, whether or not Justice Stewart admitted it. To the extent that Justice
Black found state action in Marsh, the Court was now displacing two hard earned precedents,
which had balanced property rights with much needed publicity in American constitutional law.
In his final remarks, Marshall chided Stewart for overlooking the Court’s preference for free
expression in Marsh. He also anticipated Justice Brennan’s critique of judicial formalism, which
stripped First Amendment fora of space, as we saw at the end of the last chapter:
In the final analysis, the Court’s rejection of any role for the First Amendment in
the privately owned shopping center complex stems, I believe, from an overly
formalistic view of the relationship between the institution of private ownership
of property and the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech. No one
would seriously question the legitimacy of the values of privacy and individual
autonomy traditionally associated with privately owned property. But property
that is privately owned is not always held for private use, and when a property
owner opens his property to public use the force of those values diminishes. 115
113
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As for Hudgens, and the property relationships he voluntarily formed with the thousands of
visitors in his mall:
A degree of privacy is necessarily surrendered; thus, the privacy interest
that petitioner retains when he leases space to 60 retail businesses and
invites the public onto his land for the transaction of business with other
members of the public is small indeed. 116

Marshall acknowledged Hudgens, the Lloyd Corporation, each owner at the Logan Valley Mall,
and the Gulf Shipbuilding Company as self-interested proprietors. But he hoped to reimagine
them as members of what Staeheli and Mitchell call civitas, the larger community, an idea traced
to Roman republicanism and associated with democracy for centuries:
And while the owner of property open to public use may not automatically
surrender any of his autonomy interest in managing the property as he sees fit,
there is nothing new about the notion that that autonomy interest must be
accommodated with the interests of the public. 117

Marshall seemed keen on the constitutionality of public space in the shopping mall,
particularly when speech and related forms of expression pertained to its commercial functions,
as in Logan Valley Plaza. His dissent in Hudgens did not look at political activity in the mall, as
it did in Lloyd Corp. Still, he would be given one more opportunity to weigh in on the shopping
center as a “space of appearance” in matters that were expressly political. Likewise, the Court
seemed to wrap things up neatly where First Amendment flows posed a threat to property
protections found in the Constitution. The evolution of the shopping mall as practicable public
space was not yet complete, however. A new dispute would pit free speech against property
rights in a different judicial arena. It would also place them in their most evident relief thus far.
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That evolution meant that Mitchell’s “geography of law” would be dispersed, and would
generate more legal contestation over public space, if not more public space, necessarily.

Pruneyard and American federalism in the shopping mall
One of the things that distinguished the Supreme Court’s consideration of public space in
the shopping mall is how rapidly the storyline of its rulings unfolded. In a matter of eight years,
the Court had opened shopping centers to commercially oriented expression, hardened them
against political dissent, and then closed their doors to First Amendment speech entirely. In fact,
the controversy that precipitated the Court’s decision in Hudgens was barely underway when
Lloyd Corp. was handed down. Similarly, oral arguments in Lloyd Corp. suggest that the owners
of the shopping center in eastern Portland had just finished amending their non-commercial
speech policy, in response to Logan Valley Plaza, when antiwar protesters entered the mall with
their handbills. 118 Precedents were practically set and renounced before the ink had dried on old
rulings being disclaimed by new ones in malls.
The breakneck pace of legal determinations on private property versus publicity in
shopping centers meant that the Court was furiously relating a myriad of new social background
facts spreading throughout the nation to old constitutional tenets. As the size and number of
suburban shopping centers grew, the environmental changes once projected by Justice Marshall
in Logan Valley Plaza turned out to understate the scale of uses and legal interests in their now
ubiquitous malls. And as attendant civic concerns related to malls continue to grow, the Court
saw fit to distribute the labor of judicial review over free expression inside. It did so in its final
First Amendment ruling, Pruneyard Shopping Center, et al. v. Robins, et al. 119
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The facts in Pruneyard took place in California, perhaps the most resonant locale for
large shopping malls in our collective imagination. The Pruneyard Shopping Center, owned by
Fred Sahadi, was a newer regional variety in Santa Clara County’s suburb of Campbell, just
outside the city of San Jose. It sat on twenty-one acres of land—sixteen of which provided the
foundation for an enclosed mall filled with 75 shops and restaurants, as well as a cinema. The
remainder of the property was made up of adjacent parking lots. The Center was square-shaped,
bordered on two sides by other business complexes, and on two sides by public streets.
On a Saturday afternoon in 1975, two high school students from San Jose’s Temple
Emanu-El, Michael Robins and Ira David Marcus, entered Pruneyard.

Accompanied by a

schoolteacher, Roberta Bell-Kliger, they set up a card table in the mall’s principal common
space, the “Grand Plaza.” Their aim was to meet with shoppers, pass out pamphlets, and collect
signatures for two petitions to be sent to the President and Congress. One petition called on the
United States to denounce Syria for its persecution of Jews, who were trying to emigrate out of
that country. The second called for opposition to a United Nations resolution that labeled
Zionism as a form of “racism.” 120
According to their briefs, the students set up the table in Pruneyard on a Saturday because
of school and because most streets and outdoor public spaces in San Jose were normally empty
on weekends, when vast numbers of city residents were in shopping malls. 121 The students were
peaceful. There were no complaints from mall goers. 122 Nevertheless, shortly after they entered,
a security guard approached the students and informed them that they had to leave. Their
petitioning effort had violated the Center’s ban on non-commercial expression in the mall. The
120
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policy was universal and non-discriminatory.

It did not include any exceptions or special

permissions. After conferring with the guard’s supervisor, who suggested they adjourn to public
streets outside the Shopping Center, the students left. They did not continue to speak with
people or collect additional signatures on nearby streets.
Following the exclusion, a guardian and attorney for Robins filed suit in the California
Superior Court of Santa Clara County. Robins asked the Court to enjoin the Center from
denying access to its interior mall for the purpose of petitioning. The trial court declined to issue
an injunction. It held that Pruneyard was privately owned, and therefore the students were not
free to petition inside, under the federal or state constitutions. The lower court also argued that
there were “adequate, effective channels of communication,” namely, the streets outside the
Center, where the students were permitted to set up their table. The California Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling. Robins appealed to the California Supreme Court. In a 4-3 vote, the
California Court ruled in favor of the students, relying on the free speech and petition provisions
in the state’s constitution. 123

Robins v. Pruneyard: political space and welfare in a Californian milieu
The California court weighed the impact of Lloyd Corp. on the state’s free speech and
petition provisions, especially in relation to its unique political culture, and its structural need for
practicable public space to support citizen participation. 124 This meant analyzing California’s
civic demands against the backdrop of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Those federal
123
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amendments protected the private property rights of shopping center owners, under Lloyd Corp.
In balancing the state’s constitutional free speech protections with property rights, the California
court’s determination provided the foundation for the federal Supreme Court’s decision that will
follow below. A thorough account of the state court’s holding is necessary to understand the
stakes in the larger contest, therefore.
In reviewing Robins’ challenge, the California court faced two questions. First, did the
federal reading of property rights in Lloyd Corp. prevent California from using its own free
speech and petition provisions to permit civic activity in a shopping mall, notwithstanding a
ruling against First Amendment expression in that case? Second, if the U.S. Constitution did not
fully immunize property rights, then did California’s speech and petition articles protect the high
school students inside Pruneyard and other shopping malls in the state? 125
The answer to question one turned on whether Lloyd Corp. also spoke to property rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, versus the First Amendment alone. Pruneyard
argued that Lloyd Corp. did more than exclude antiwar protest from Portland’s Lloyd Center. It
guaranteed federal protection for property rights. The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, in
Article VI, meant that those rights were privileged in California, too. Therefore, the state could
not deny Sahadi’s substantive right to property without due process, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor could it take his property for public use without due compensation, under the
Fifth. 126 Robins countered that Lloyd Corp. never really addressed property rights; that it only
excluded the antiwar protesters’ free speech rights, as they were enumerated in the First
Amendment. Moreover, Robins claimed, it was fully within California’s power to regulate
private property in the public interest—in this case, to safeguard a mall user’s liberty to freely
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speak and petition. These freedoms were essential to the state’s political scheme, which relied
on citizen initiatives, referenda, and recall. 127
In deciding the property rights question, a slim majority of the California court argued
that Lloyd Corp. was “primarily a First Amendment case.” Writing for the Court, Judge Frank
Newman limited the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment issues in Lloyd Corp. to the state action
dispute. In his interpretation, the only property inquiry in that case was whether the privately
owned Lloyd Center functioned publicly for First Amendment purposes, as had the company
town in Marsh. Next, could the mall be exempted from the doctrine of state action, as a First
Amendment space? Hudgens had raised the property issue, but that case exposed shopping
center owners to enforceable regulations through common law and statutory protection of free
expression, even though the First Amendment did not. 128 In short, the existing case law may
have preferred property to expression, but it did not place the shopping mall outside the legal
reach of free speech interests. As Newman pointed out, “Lloyd by no means created any
property right immune from regulation” where speech interests were at stake. 129
Neither did Lloyd or Hudgens place shopping mall ownership above the state’s general
welfare. Property was a cherished right in California, said Newman. However, it was not the
supreme right.

Under certain circumstances, “property rights must yield to the public

interest.” 130 In this instance, the suburbanization of the state’s commercial landscape might
undermine other constitutionally prescribed practices in California, unless the court intervened.
San Jose’s emptied public streets, coupled with the imperative of automobile use throughout the
127
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state, pushed Robins’ civic activity in Pruneyard over the owner’s right to exclude him. The card
table in the Grand Plaza expressed the grammar of California’s political culture, as well as the
state’s unique commitment to direct democracy. Quoting an earlier California opinion that also
tempered the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments on behalf of free speech, Newman framed the
state’s regulation of private property as a form of political self-protection:
‘As the interest of society justifies restraints upon individual conduct, so, also,
does it justify restraints upon the use to which property may be devoted. It was
not intended by these constitutional provisions to so far protect the individual in
the use of his property as to enable him to use it to the detriment of society. By
thus protecting individual rights, society did not part with the power to protect
itself or to promote its general well-being. Where the interest of the individual
conflicts with the interest of society, such individual interest is subordinated to the
general welfare.’ 131

Notwithstanding Lloyd Corp., therefore, California was within its authority to regulate
private property in the public interest. That also meant the state’s highest court was empowered
to respond to changing circumstances:
[T]he power to regulate property is not static; rather it is capable of expansion to
meet new conditions of modern life. Property rights must be ‘redefined in
response to a swelling demand that ownership be responsible and responsive to
the needs of the social whole. 132

The California court found that the social background facts in the case had changed quite a bit
after the advent of suburban shopping centers. Echoing Justice Marshall’s seminal argument in
Logan Valley Plaza, Newman relied on data supplied by Robins to support the view that
Californians had abandoned central business districts all around the state. They now lived in
suburban areas, where they were fully dependent on shopping centers to meet many of their
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commercial needs. As Marshall argued later, in his Lloyd Corp. dissent, malls were where
people go in an era of suburbanization. Robins would have to reach them in those malls. 133
The situation was especially urgent in California, Newman thought. Shopping centers
uniquely important to the state’s scheme for political association. More than citizens of other
states, Californians voted on statewide initiatives, public referenda, and recall of elected officials.
Public deliberation and petitions were especially crucial in California, therefore, and those forms
of activity necessitated practicable space in every reach of the state. To permit shopping mall
owners to exclude sorely needed public space on their property, to protect an unlimited right “to
prohibit expressive activity in the centers,” was to “impinge on constitutional rights beyond
speech rights.” Proprietary exclusions of the kind in Pruneyard threatened California’s system of
government, which relied on constant engagement and input by members of the public. Newman
saw Robins’ exclusion as no less than a public health problem:
To protect free speech and petitioning is a goal that surely matches the protecting
of health and safety, the environment, aesthetics, property values and other
societal goals that have been held to justify reasonable restrictions on private
property rights. 134

In view of the social and political demands above, the California court decided that the
state’s Constitution protected expressive activity in the mall, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Newman and the majority were sure to specify that
their decision applied to large-scale shopping centers, visited by at least 25,000 people per day.
Time, place, and manner rules could be assigned, too. These concessions did little to satisfy
Judge Richardson and the dissenters. They argued that the California court ignored the letter of
the law in Lloyd Corp. The majority had thereby relegated the rights of shopping center owners
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“to a secondary, disfavored, and subservient position vis-à-vis the ‘free speech’ claims of”
Robins and his friends. 135 Echoing briefs submitted by the International Council of Shopping
Centers (ICSC), Richardson claimed that Newman had ignored the primacy of property rights in
a federal precedent, “creating” a de novo right to free expression in shopping centers, in violation
of the nation’s Constitution. 136
Judge Newman and his side prevailed, though. The California court constructed its own
state constitution to supplement the First Amendment in Lloyd Corp., as well as to circumvent
the wholesale removal of that amendment in Hudgens. Public space could be legally practiced
inside shopping centers in the state. Under federal law, however—and over the objections of
Robins and several “friends of the court,” who did not fancy their chances in the nation’s High
Court—California’s free speech provisions were still reviewable as statutes, de facto. 137 The
decision of the California court, therefore, would not be the last word on Robins’ exclusion from
the Pruneyard Shopping Center.

Pruneyard v. Robins: a myriad of considerations
By the time the Supreme Court granted review of the case, the contours of the dispute
had shifted and expanded. The contest now involved Robins’ free speech and petitioning rights
in the mall, as construed by the California court, versus the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of its owner, Fred Sahadi, to exclude him. But a new wrinkle was added: Sahadi’s First
Amendment right not to speak, specifically, his freedom to withhold his private property from
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open political discourse on which he wished to take no public position.

This cocktail of

considerations left the High Court with a complicated task. It would have to make a decision
about the elasticity of California’s free speech provisions, vis-à-vis its previous determinations
against expressive activity in the mall; property rights within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment and due process protections guaranteed to the mall’s owner; the Fifth Amendment’s
takings clause, since California’s interpretation had deprived Sahadi of his ability to exclude
unauthorized speakers from his own property; and, now, for the first time, a mall owner’s right
under the First Amendment to maintain his privacy by declining to speak on public affairs.
In spite of this multiplicity of questions, and in notable contrast with the preceding cases,
the Court handed down a unanimous decision (with concurrences, unsurprisingly). An Associate
Justice in 1980, William Rehnquist wrote for the Court. Rehnquist began by pointing out that
the case fell within the Court’s federal purview, much to the chagrin of Robins’ supporters. 138
Their concerns would be allayed, however, when he affirmed the California court ruling and
upheld Robins’ right to use the mall for his political petition. Rehnquist supported the California
court decision on three grounds. First, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause did not
prohibit the state from interpreting its constitution to extend expressive freedoms beyond the
scope of the First Amendment.

Second, the California court’s interpretation of its own

constitution did not constitute a taking of Pruneyard’s property without just compensation, nor
did it violate the Fifth Amendment. Finally, Robins’ attempt to publicize his petition inside the
mall did not force Sahadi to speak against his will or infringe on his First Amendment right to
refrain from doing so on his own property.
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Pruneyard and its allies, the ICSC, in particular, were less than charitable towards the
California court in their written briefs. They alleged that the state bench had committed multiple
offenses in ruling against the mall owner. In their collective view, the relationships articulated
by Judge Newman, between the Californian constitution, the state’s general welfare, and the
availability of public space were matters of “sketchy analysis.” As they argued, Robins’ petition
was unrelated to any statewide initiative, referendum, or recall. 139 To privilege his public
canvass inside the mall—on behalf of a written petition aimed at officials all the way in
Washington, DC—was to ignore “controlling precedent” in Lloyd Corp. Denying settled law in
the contest, the California court “sacrificed Mr. Sahadi’s constitutional rights on the altar of its
own notion of public policy.” 140 In fact, the ICSC urged, the situation inside the Pruneyard
mirrored the one in Lloyd to the letter: the speech in both malls was unrelated to their daily
operations; there was never any dedication of common spaces to unauthorized use; and there
were adequate alternatives for political advocacy, outside each complex. Similarly, no ban had
been imposed on what Robins said, only where he said it. 141 Joining that last argument,
Pruneyard reminded the High Court that speakers might be fairly consigned to spaces they did
not like. In the wake of Lloyd Corp., especially, and the protections it afforded private property
via the Fourteenth Amendment, those who wished to advocate public positions were never
guaranteed “the best available soapbox,” nor the most convenient one. 142
Justice Rehnquist and his colleagues saw things differently. While there is no evidence
that they endorsed the political substance of Judge Newman’s analysis, nor his argument that
free speech in shopping malls could help mitigate a decline of civic space in the state—as Robins

139

Brief for Appellants, pg. 17.
Ibid., pg. 21.
141
Amicus brief for Appellant, by ICSC, pg. 10.
142
Brief for Appellants, pp. 20-21.
140

214

had urged—they did support the California court’s judicial authority to advance that analysis as
part of its jurisprudence. 143 That court, said Rehnquist, considered the state’s interest in free
expression to be vital to its well-being. Notwithstanding First Amendment limitations in Lloyd
Corp., the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause did not constrain California’s judicial
construction of free speech in its own law:
Our reasoning in Lloyd, however, does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of
the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution. In Lloyd…there was no state constitutional or statutory
provision that had been construed to create rights to the use of private property by
strangers, comparable to those found to exist by the California Supreme Court
here. 144

Appearing less than eager to share the mantle with Justice Marshall’s concurring opinion,
that is, that a decision for Pruneyard would amount to substantive due process, circa late 19th
judicial activism, 145 Rehnquist began to bridge his second argument:
It is, of course, well established that a State in the exercise of its police power
may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do
not amount to a taking without just compensation or contravene any other federal
constitutional provision. 146

The mall owner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim went hand in hand with his Fifth Amendment
argument against the California court ruling. The brief submitted by Pruneyard to the Supreme
Court contended that the freedom to exclude Robins was so essential to its owner’s due process
rights that any interference with that ability amounted to a “taking” without just compensation.147
During oral arguments, Pruneyard complained that the California court decision had turned every
143
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shopping center, large or small, into the functional equivalent of a municipality, a complete
mischaracterization of private property and mall ownership. The effect of this interpretation was
to treat the proprietor like a homeowner, one who held a small garage sale, yet, was somehow
required to host a neighbor’s political expression on his lawn and in his driveway. 148 The Fifth
Amendment prevented this kind of taking, maintained Pruneyard. So, too, did the High Court, in
its prevailing shopping center decisions.
Rehnquist sided with Robins, however.

The latter argued that Pruneyard’s general

invitation to the public meant it had “waived its right to exclude” the students’ petition. When
the mall opened its doors to customers every day, it instigated an organic sequence in which the
public assembled in the mall’s common spaces. That assembly conduced to public expression, a
“natural byproduct” of shared space. Any exclusion of this sequence inside the mall transcended
legal exercises of property rights; it attempted to control the rights of publics. 149 Rehnquist and
the Court agreed that the Fifth Amendment never extended that far.

While the opinion

acknowledged that property, too, was heterogeneous, even exclusionary at times—and that the
California court had indeed committed a limited “taking” of some kind—the threshold required
for Fifth Amendment protection had not been reached in the Pruneyard:
It is true that one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right
to exclude others. And here there has literally been a ‘taking’ of that right to the
extent that the California Supreme Court has interpreted the State Constitution to
entitle its citizens to exercise free expression and petition rights on shopping
center property. But it is well established that ‘not every destruction or injury to
property by governmental action has been held to be a “taking” in the
constitutional sense.’ 150
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In essence, Pruneyard had failed to demonstrate substantial deprivation of relational power
enjoyed by property owners. Under the California court’s interpretation of free speech both
inside and outside the shopping center, a burden of proof now fell on owners. According to
Robins, Lloyd Corp. never prevented reapportionment of that burden, while Hudgens had proved
that speakers could find protection in malls, on “non-First Amendment grounds.” 151
Rehnquist found no evidence that the property had been usurped materially, either. 152
Limits on Sahadi’s relational rights to exclude them aside, the students’ speech and assembly
caused no physical or financial damage to the Pruneyard. If his property could be degraded by
easements on expressive activity—that is, if civic engagement impinged the mall’s commercial
client base so dramatically—then it was unlikely that Robins would have used it for public
outreach in the first place. In point of fact, many patrons exhibited appreciation for Robins’
message, according to the trial court record. The shopping center was a big facility, with both
community and regulatory capacity. If a forcible taking had occurred inside the common spaces
of the mall, Rehnquist thought, Pruneyard was unable to show it:
Here the requirement that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected
rights of free expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does not
amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants’ property rights under
the Takings Clause. There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from
prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their
property as a shopping center. The PruneYard [sic] is a large commercial
complex that covers several city blocks, contains numerous separate business
establishments, and is open to the public at large. The decision of the California
Supreme Court makes it clear that the PruneYard may restrict expressive activity
by adopting time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any
interference with its commercial functions.
A state is, of course, bound by the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, but here appellants have failed to demonstrate that the ‘right to
151
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exclude others’ is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that
the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a ‘taking.’ 153

Thus, California’s interest in political participation among its citizenry had legitimated
free practices of public space within its shopping malls. The state court’s construction of public
interest had trumped Sahadi’s rights to private property as a form of due process shielded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the same way, the High Court reasoned, civic interests outweighed
his protection against unconstitutional takings under the Fifth Amendment.
But what about Sahadi’s free speech—in this case, his freedom not to speak, a right
guaranteed by the First Amendment? That question had never been addressed in any of the
previous cases. In fact, Pruneyard had not raised it before the case was appealed federally, to the
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, in briefs and oral arguments, Pruneyard maintained that its policy
against non-commercial expression inside the mall applied to all users, irrespective of content,
because its owner wished to avoid any public association with political controversies outside the
Center. The ban included speech by non-controversial groups, such as the Salvation Army, who
were denied permission to solicit donations, even during the holidays. No public forum obtained
here, it was that simple. 154 Speech activity inside the mall was sure to produce the impression or
the misimpression that the owner was advancing certain points of view, Pruneyard contended. In
effect, Sahadi had been “forced” to speak about the petition against the United Nations, first by
Robins, and then by the California court, whether or not he chose to do so. Citing a 1977
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precedent against compulsory political speech by private citizens, Pruneyard contended that the
First Amendment proscribed speech thrust on Sahadi by Judge Newman and the state court. 155
The argument impressed Justice Powell, who had written the Court’s opinion in Lloyd
Corp. Powell agreed that the California court was authorized to rule for Robins. However, he
reserved his full concurrence on this particular point. Powell thought the decision in this case
could place property owners in inconvenient positions. When it came to political ideas that
engendered intense emotions, or worse, perhaps, one could envisage harms befalling proprietors.
They might be misperceived as expressing solidarity with viewpoints publicly addressed in
malls. Powell imagined out loud about a rally organized by the Ku Klux Klan, or the American
Nazi Party. How would Sahadi’s customers respond if they encountered hate speech on the
Grand Plaza, he wondered? 156 To say the least, such occasions would be bad for business, as the
ICSC had suggested in its brief for Pruneyard. The situation would be worse inside the countless
shopping centers that were too small to absorb the unintended consequences of extreme speech
or divisive conduct. 157 Rehnquist’s opinion, complained Powell, seemed to do too little to
support an owner’s freedom to exclude heterodoxy on mall property. Although Pruneyard did
not prove its case in this instance, Powell noted, he believed property owners might indeed be
able to do so under different circumstances:
I agree that the owner of this shopping center has failed to establish a cognizable
First Amendment claim in this case. But some of the language in the Court’s
opinion is unnecessarily and perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state action
that transforms privately owned property into a forum for expression of the
155
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public’s views could raise serious First Amendment questions…A person who has
merely invited the public onto his property for commercial purposes cannot fairly
be said to have relinquished his right to decline to be an instrument for fostering
public adherence to an ideological point of view…even when no particular
message is mandated by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by state
action that forces a property owner to admit third-party speakers. 158

Rehnquist saw no evidence of advocacy forced on Sahadi by the California court, nor any
proof that Pruneyard’s owner had somehow been obliged to publicize Robins’ cause therein.
Instead, Rehnquist agreed with the respondents, who reprised an idea once promoted by Justice
Marshall, in his Lloyd Corp. dissent: the prodigious scale of the Pruneyard, along with its
commercial atmosphere, made it unlikely that the property owner would be perceived as culpable
for the many viewpoints communicated on its Grand Plaza. 159 Rejecting the garage sale analogy
above, Rehnquist maintained that the huge regional shopping center admitted twenty-five
thousand people inside on a daily basis; its sheer size and openness to the public addressed the
hypothetical concerns raised by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion:
Most important, the shopping center by choice of its owner is not limited to the
personal use of appellants. It is instead a business establishment that is open to
the public to come and go as they please. The views expressed by members of the
public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not
likely be identified with those of the owner. 160

In light of this rediscovery of the mall’s publicness, following Lloyd Corp. and Hudgens,
the Court endorsed Robins’ claim that Pruneyard’s owner had never been obligated to referee
orthodoxy versus heterodoxy, nor sanction the Center’s “community voice” in any way. By the
same token, however, Sahadi’s First Amendment liberties did not empower him to censor open
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Pruneyard, at 97-98. My emphasis.
Brief for Appellees, pgs. 13 and pp. 39-40. As above, Marshall was focusing on the usefulness of the mall to
outside speakers, due to its attractiveness as a commercial space.
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political discourse on his publicly accessible property, either. 161 In Rehnquist’s view, any
concerns about the property owner’s involuntary association with unwelcome viewpoints could
be addressed practically, since he always maintained the capacity to publicly distance himself
from the contents of non-commercial communication in his mall:
Finally, as far as appears here appellants can expressly disavow any connection
with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or
handbillers stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the
message and could explain that the persons are communicating their own
messages by virtue of state law. 162

Of course, signage required the owner’s affirmative effort, which missed the point,
according to Powell. In his opinion, the California court had placed Sahadi in a precarious
position. If Sahadi remained silent—his right under the First Amendment—then he ran the risk
that customers would think he lent tacit consent to expressive practices inside the Pruneyard. On
the other hand, if he accepted Rehnquist’s invitation and publicly disavowed a petition such as
the one Robins had circulated, then he had communicated, even though he preferred not to speak
at all. Powell believed, therefore, that Sahadi “has lost control over his freedom to speak or not
to speak on certain issues.” Similarly, “[t]he mere fact that he is free to disassociate himself
from the views expressed on his property” left Powell unsatisfied that the California court had
not “impermissibly” damaged Sahadi’s privacy rights through its interpretation of the state’s
speech and petition articles. 163
In general, Powell seemed disinclined to endorse a judicially prescribed arrangement in
which the owner of a private shopping center would be required to host members of the public
who wished to use his mall for unauthorized expression. Yet, he still supported the Court’s final
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determination.

In the end, Pruneyard failed to offer more persuasive First Amendment

objections to California’s interpretation of its constitution.

Powell therefore joined Justice

White, who was also sufficiently satisfied that the Center’s size and scale distinguished it from
smaller properties, which might be adversely affected by the Court’s ruling. They both agreed
with Rehnquist’s stipulation that the California court decision applied to Pruneyard’s common
spaces alone. Further, they reaffirmed that its proprietor maintained his use of time, place, and
manner rules to regulate expressive conduct in the mall.
Powell qualified his support for the decision in another way. His closing condition was
that the Court’s judgment never be interpreted “as a blanket approval for state efforts to
transform privately owned commercial property into public forums.” 164 This was a significant
disclaimer, particularly in light of the cautions added by Justice White in his concurring opinion.
Neither the California court ruling, nor the High Court’s affirmance, impacted the already
circumscribed relationship between private property, free speech, and practicable space in malls,
under the federal Constitution. And nothing in Judge Newman’s mandates applied to any other
state’s interpretation of property, space, and expression inside its shopping centers.

I will

elaborate on White’s qualifications in a moment.
For now, it seems fair to say that inside twelve years, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
ran a gamut between public space and private property in shopping malls. In 1968, the High
Court handed down Logan Valley Plaza. It reinterpreted the public function analogy in Marsh v.
Alabama, and adapted it in order to reimagine the fast multiplying shopping center as an
American agora. Four years later, however, the Court’s composition changed. So, too, did the
contested mall space—this time, an enclosed model, the kind many of us imagine today. In turn,
a realigned majority closed the mall to unauthorized expression if it was unrelated to the
164

Ibid., at 101.
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operation of the property. Lloyd Corp. abandoned the public function analogy drawn in the two
opinions above, along with the notion that the First Amendment was always preferred to the
property rights of shopping center owners. That swing was crystallized in the 1976 Hudgens
decision. There, the Court went a step further, removing the First Amendment entirely from
privately owned shopping malls. It was hardly returned in Pruneyard v. Robins, where a mall
owner unsuccessfully invoked his First Amendment right to free speech, albeit in an effort to
maintain his silence on public affairs. However, the 1980 ruling did signal a shift, insofar as free
expression was permitted in the common space of a large California mall. While the First
Amendment remained off limits to speakers and listeners after Pruneyard, individual states
might open public space in malls, via free speech provisions found in their constitutions.
A multiuse conception of the mall might have appeared imminent, legally encoded in
American federalism and the Court’s commitment to judicial self-restraint under the Chief
Justices that followed Warren. After 1980, states could interpret their own constitutions and
social background facts when resolving contests between private property and public discourse
inside shopping centers. In California, an independent policy analysis led that state’s highest
court to interpret its constitution to protect public space in a context in which geographical
opportunities for civic capacity building had been undermined by the commercialization of its
heavily suburban landscape. Alleging a causal connection between more shopping malls and
fewer public spaces, the California court concluded that reopening discursive terrain could
ameliorate popular participation in the state’s democratic process, though it acknowledged that
doing so might “impose a public forum burden on shopping centers.” 165 When the Supreme
Court affirmed that position, as well as California’s legitimacy in protecting speech and

165

James Marcus Bowman, “Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center: Free Speech Access to Shopping Centers under
the California Constitution,” California Law Review, Volume 68, Issue 4, 1980, pg. 656.
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petitioning inside the Pruneyard Shopping Center, the larger contest for public space in malls
may have seemed settled in favor of speakers. Surely, the encouragement taken from the judicial
outcome in California remains strong among advocates of civic engagement in new mixed-use
shopping center formats sprouting up around the country, in American suburbs, and even within
numerous cities that continue to emphasize redesign of commercial malls as reliable tools of
urban economic development. 166
It may therefore seem fitting to conclude this chapter with a note about Justice Marshall’s
concurring opinion in Pruneyard. Marshall, whose participation in the mall debate has been
featured throughout this case history, once complained that the Court moved in an interminably
bad direction in the cases that preceded Pruneyard. That much is evidenced in his dissents in
Lloyd Corp. and Hudgens. So he praised the California decision, which represented a nod to his
earlier rationale in Logan Valley Plaza. In Marshall’s view, the socio-economic conditions that
steered his argument in Logan Valley had only become more compelling in the twelve years
between his 1968 opinion and the 1980 decision in Pruneyard. If his colleagues were still intent
on excluding the First Amendment from the mall, then the adjustment in the lattermost case at
least freed the California court and others to conduct their own analyses of social background
facts, namely, property, space, and free expression therein:
I applaud the court’s [sic.] decision, which is a part of a very healthy trend of
affording state constitutional provisions a more expansive interpretation than this
Court has given to the Federal Constitution. 167

As we have seen on previous occasions, however, Marshall rarely enjoyed the final word
in federal shopping center jurisprudence. In the last analysis, his celebration of the Pruneyard
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decision and the High Court’s support for California’s construction of public space in its malls
needs to be considered against the backdrop of the other concurring opinions in that case. I cited
Justice Powell’s caveats above. His criticisms against the objectionable treatment of ownership
rights in Pruneyard must loom over any further federal analysis in this area, particularly because
the Court has never reintroduced the First Amendment into shopping malls, old or new.
Yet, it is Justice White’s concurring remarks that most warrant our attention at this stage,
given both legal and substantive developments during the last three decades. Having dissented
in Logan Valley Plaza and then sided with the majority in Lloyd Corp. and Hudgens, White
qualified the outcome in Pruneyard, as well as the privately owned property on which any
subsequent jurisprudence might be effected:
I agree that on the record before us there was not an unconstitutional infringement
of appellants’ property rights. But it bears pointing out that the Federal
Constitution does not require that a shopping center permit distributions or
solicitations on its property. 168

In addition, and anticipating my interests in the remaining chapter, White urges us to remember
that the California court’s interpretation of public space produces no legal requirement for any
other state to follow suit—barring a return of First Amendment protections for free expression
and political association inside privately owned shopping malls:
Insofar as the Federal Constitution is concerned, therefore, a State may decline to
construe its own constitution so as to limit the property rights of the shopping
center owner. 169

From the point of view of appreciative advocates of public space—and much to the
chagrin of their opponents, who tend to champion the private property rights of mall owners—
California has sustained its defense of free expression in commercial shopping centers. In fact,
168
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the state’s highest court reaffirmed Judge Newman’s decision above as recently as 2008. 170
However, thirty years after Pruneyard was handed down, and notwithstanding the birth of superregional centers such as the world famous Mall of America—or new urbanist innovations
sprouting up around the country—all but a few states have expressly declined the Supreme
Court’s invitation to extend free speech and assembly inside malls under their constitutions. I
will detail the figures in Chapter Five, but suffice to say for now that half have failed to even
reconsider the relationship between property and space inside malls, in light of Pruneyard. I
believe this raises some fair questions about the positive value of that judicial decision where the
practice of public space is concerned, particularly in view of major geographical changes and the
emergence of new commercial topographies where people go. I will turn to these questions in
what follows.
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Chapter Five
Will Pruneyard Do?
Toward a Second Chance for the
First Amendment in Third Places 1
“[N]o one is free to perform an action unless there is somewhere he is free to perform it”
- Jeremy Waldron 2

By the time the Supreme Court handed down its Pruneyard decision in 1980, First Amendment
expression was excluded from privately owned shopping centers. Once accessible by virtue of
the Court’s early interpretations of mall space, legal protections were suspended in short order
for speakers seeking listeners inside the common areas of those centers. Not unlike the one
surveyed in the third chapter, then, the arc traced in Chapter Four bent away from defense of
speech and related forms of expression in spaces now construed by the Court to be functionally
non-public. In Pruneyard, though, the Court determined that California’s judiciary could extend
that state’s free speech protections to its citizens, thereby expanding practicable space in its
regional shopping centers if it saw fit to do so. This conditional invitation to public expression in
shopping malls was well received by Thurgood Marshall. Marshall had framed his mall opinions
in order to defend place and public function inside the commercial hubs he thought tantamount
to America’s downtowns.

So he put his faith in the rightness of California’s free speech

position, and its scalability throughout the rest of the country.
Things may have appeared equally promising to civil libertarians and other free speech
advocates when Pruneyard was announced. More than two-thirds of the states have speech and
1

I am borrowing the term “third places” from Ray Oldenburg, who uses it to describe spaces outside the home and
workplace, where people can meet regularly and forge civic bonds. See Ray Oldenburg, The Great Good Place:
Cafes, Coffee Shops, Bookstores, Bars, Hair Salons, and Other Hangouts at the Heart of a Community (New York:
Marlowe and Company, 1999). My decision to do so here anticipates a later section, in which I describe the new
urbanism that relies on Oldenburg’s idea as an important component of its design canon.
2
Jeremy Waldron, “Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom,” UCLA Law Review, 39 UCLA L. Rev., 1991, pg. 296.
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petition provisions in their constitutions, including the nation’s largest and most populace ones. 3
Similarly, California and other states have structured their free expression articles around more
affirmative language—unlike the First Amendment, which mandates that “Congress shall make
no law…” abridging freedom of speech and assembly. 4 Yet Pruneyard’s promise has scarcely
been realized during the three decades after it was decided. Since 1980, only a few states have
accepted the High Court’s invitation to extend their constitutional freedoms beyond the scope of
the First Amendment or the rulings that excluded it in the 1970s. In this regard, we should
reflect once more on Justice White’s concurring opinion in Pruneyard. White pointed out that
the expressive protections found conclusive in California had no bearing on the First
Amendment, since its free speech clause was not applicable to malls—at least not in light of
prevailing federal jurisprudence. Similarly, White maintained that California’s interpretations of
space and speech did not apply to the private citizens of any other state in the nation.
The purpose of this final chapter, then, is to reimagine public function and expression in
privately owned but state subsidized shopping malls, notwithstanding the formalism of the
Court’s current doctrines or the inconsistencies that have arisen from independent interpretations
by inferior courts. The goal is not to settle each legal argument reflected in this complex debate.
Nor can one account address the full patina of social and economic considerations that surround
that debate. Rather, I hope to stir discussion about the possibility of “re-inviting” the First
Amendment onto commercial property; to create space for further deliberation.
The ideas that follow are not intended to disparage rights of ownership, which are also
protected by the Constitution. Nor are they intended to deny shopping center developers any

3

See Gregory C. Sisk, “Uprooting the Pruneyard,” Rutgers Law Journal, 38 Rutgers L. J., Summer 2007, 1145,
1164. According to Sisk, thirty-four states have free speech articles in their constitutions.
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Mark C. Alexander, “Attention Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping Mall,” Arizona Law
Review, Spring 1999, 41 Ariz. L. R. 1, 32.
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substantive benefits that attach to real estate. Indeed, the reverse may be imagined, especially in
view of marketplace swings that have occurred since Pruneyard was handed down, a point to
which I will return. My argument proceeds from the idea that shopping malls work best as
multifunctional, and therefore multi-determined spaces in a diversifying American landscape, its
suburbs, in particular; likewise, that their discursive functions as public fora can and should be
expanded as the nation’s human geography continues to change in the 21st century.
The judicial doctrines traced in the two previous chapters have tended to segregate
publicly accessible space from property, though there were some instances in which built
environments were hybridized via constitutional construction. In my view, the prevailing legal
position toward speech in shopping centers does disservice to the intersecting interests of publics
that spend time inside malls, and owners who have regrettably looked to immunize them from
the unexpectedness that makes urban spaces vital to the production of civic capacity. A zerosum game approach has yielded a decline in constitutionally protected expressive space, while it
has done little to relieve the commercial stresses that haunt mature shopping centers in need of
renewal. 5 The market is adapting to those stresses now, moving beyond malls to suburban
environments built to articulate the space and publicness of the city, in some measure at least.
Three decades after Pruneyard, however, the law will need to catch up with the new urbanism
that informs commercial development across our increasingly diverse suburbs.
A review of post-Pruneyard decision-making reveals fragmentation among the states that
have weighed the legality of free speech in their malls. Though a small number of state courts
require civic activity in privately owned shopping centers, most have recapitulated the Supreme
Court’s exclusion of expression there. In order to highlight the principal division between these
5

I will discuss the financial difficulties currently facing older shopping malls below. I would be remiss, however, if
I did not admit at the outset that there are multiple causes behind those difficulties—including newer patterns of
commercial development and consumerism.
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states, I will examine judicial interpretations of private property versus public space in New
York and New Jersey, respectively. These two nearby states share nearly identical free speech
articles, along with comparable political traditions. Yet their courts treat Pruneyard’s invitation
differently, embracing opposing meanings of publicity inside shopping malls as a result. The
polarity between states like New York and New Jersey might be resolved by reintroducing the
First Amendment in malls, as a matter of law. This would allow that law to properly mediate the
impact of social background facts evolving in America’s landscape, specifically, changes to
design and practice explored in the first two chapters of this study. I will come back to these
following my survey of the legal terrain on which public space has been adjudicated.

The unbearable lightness of Pruneyard: declined invitations and status quo in the states
It is fair to say that many have been less than enamored with the outcome in Pruneyard.
Quite apart from the argument advanced here in support of a more speech-protective federal
standard, the decision has its share of detractors on the opposing end. Before the Supreme Court
ruled in that case, an ICSC amicus brief argued that any judgment against the mall owner would
undo an “evolutionary process” that had rightly removed the First Amendment from his property.
After the High Court ruled in 1980—and following affirmations of free speech by the California
court as recently as 2008—reproaches against Pruneyard have become de rigueur among
defenders of property protections for the state’s mall owners. 6 One legal scholar has emphasized
their point of view in a recent critique. Eschewing more temperate calls to “prune” Pruneyard
on behalf of property claims, Sisk urges a radical fix:
6

For example, a noted real estate attorney in California, Paul J. Weinberg, has criticized that state’s Supreme Court
for what he considers its baseless application of Pruneyard to defeat regulations of labor union activity in a regional
mall, in Fashion Valley Mall, LLC. v. National Labor Relations Board, 42 Cal. 4th 850. See “The Shopping Center
as Hyde Park Corner: Free Speech or Invasion of Property Rights?” in Zoning and Planning Law Report, Vol. 32,
No. 11, December, 2009.
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Pruneyard is not…an overgrown tree that, if carefully trimmed, may productively
be tended in its own orchard. Rather, Pruneyard is a weed in the garden of
constitutional jurisprudence. Pruneyard should be shorn off at the roots, lest its
noxious vegetation crowd out the growth of a healthier approach to constitutional
interpretation. 7

Notwithstanding criticism of legally required free speech and petitioning in Californian
malls, Pruneyard’s net impact on practicable public space in regional shopping centers around
the country has been modest, to say the least. 8 Appellate level courts of twenty-four states have
interpreted their constitutions’ free speech, petition, and election articles in deciding cases
involving public expression inside shopping centers. 9 This means, of course, that more than half
have yet to judge the matter at all. Within those states, in turn, rulings issued in the 1970’s stand,
meaning no legal safeguards exist for expressive activities inside shopping malls.
Among the state courts that have weighed contests over free speech in shopping centers
following Pruneyard, practicable public space has not fared too well. Quite apart from any
substantive consideration of space for speech in malls, most have framed their legal contests in
terms of state action versus private agency. That is, they have elected to weigh the right of
property owners, as one class of private citizens, against the right of speakers, yet another class
of private citizens. 10 Given the duality they establish between state actors and mall owners,
these courts have overwhelmingly concluded that their charters do not require non-commercial
expression or association in regional shopping centers. A few—Florida, Maryland, and Texas,

7

Sisk, op cit., pp. 1148-49.
NB: Regional shopping centers are currently categorized as those consisting of 400,000-800,000 square feet in
Gross Leasable Area (GLA). See: “ICSC Shopping Center Definitions: Basic Configurations and Types for the
United States,” International Council of Shopping Centers, 2004.
9
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shopping center owners, worldwide. See “Scorecard of Pruneyard Litigation,” Edward J. Sack, Esq., for the ICSC.
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Alexander, op cit., pp. 32-34. For an early yet effective analysis, see also, Curtis J. Berger, “Pruneyard Revisited:
Political Activity on Private Lands,” New York University Law Review, 66 NYU L. Rev., 1991, 633, 661. My
repeated use of the term “private” is intentional and will bear on a discussion of the state action doctrine, below.
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for example—have only tried the issue in their courts of findings, likewise denying access to
malls for speech and related expression. 11
That leaves a mere five states that currently endorse some form of speech-protected space
in their shopping malls: California, Massachusetts, Washington, Colorado, and New Jersey. I
will elaborate on the last state in a moment. First, it should be noted that the highest courts of
Massachusetts and Washington protect speech and association only in relation to elections and
ballot initiatives, and strictly along limited timelines that correspond to voter petitions and
signature gathering requirements in those states. 12
Colorado has taken a more tolerant position on free expression in the common spaces of
its shopping centers, based on evidence of state action inside them. Its highest court has banned
the prohibition of pamphlet distribution and issue-based petitioning in malls, arguing that “the
First Amendment is a floor” for speech protection in that state. In Bock v. Westminster Mall Co.,
the court identified multiple examples of government intervention in a large regional shopping
center. In addition to its location across the street from city hall, the mall housed a police
substation and holding facility within the commercial complex. The property also received over
$2 million in infrastructure improvements, financed by local government through the sale of
municipal bonds. 13 Bock focused almost exclusively on state action via bond sales and the police
substation. The court in that case indicated that the publicness of the mall was an upshot of the

11
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city’s economic development policy, as well as municipal operations housed inside. 14 It did not
focus on the public functionality of malls as civic spaces.
There are multiple indices of government involvement in malls. Consider the largest, the
Mall of America. One conservative comment has estimated that public financing accounts for
twenty-one percent of the Mall’s development. 15 The Minnesota Supreme Court itself put the
figure at $105 million in tax increment financing for the mall itself, and $80 million in bond sales
for highway reconstruction around the property. 16 Those sums did not factor in the daily
operation costs associated with policing the 4.2 million square foot facility. Nor did they include
the expenses borne by taxpayers for a larger police substation than Colorado’s, a post office, or a
public school building on the property. Finally, they do not speak to the role the Mall plays in
adjacent communities, or the civic and recreational activities frequently sponsored inside the
huge complex, such as a giant amusement park. The Mall of America is one of the nation’s
premiere destinations.

Yet, despite substantial public investment and entanglement, the

Minnesota court has refused to protect speech access in the mall.
My point here is that legal analysis of expression and association in shopping centers
should include but not be limited to government involvement. It should involve a “thicker”
theory of public place and functionality inside malls. The Supreme Court once posited the idea
of public function, in Marsh v. Alabama, when it posed an important counterargument to the
claim that civil liberties were immune from interferences by the state alone. It is true that Marsh
looked at the nexus between private property and its municipally styled services, such as the
sewer system in Chickasaw. But the Court’s opinion concentrated on the actual use of that

14

Sisk, op cit., pg. 1193. NB: This state action focus in Colorado was referenced in the opinion handed down by the
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property, I would argue, as well as the broad scope of invitations supplied by owners to
surrounding publics. Marsh also defended property’s significance to democratic engagements,
and the role of public place in sustaining them. This concept of public function was carried over
in Logan Valley Plaza, but abandoned by the time the Court turned to Lloyd Corp. and then
Hudgens. It was rediscovered in California, in the lead up to Pruneyard.
As I hope to show below, an argument for the public functionality of shopping malls is
found in New Jersey, in contrast with most states. Most state benches remain faithful to the
doctrine decried by many free speech observers as both confusing and outmoded: state action. 17
In New York, where an early post-Pruneyard test took place—and where a recent ruling has
reinforced that test—indices of state action are nowhere to be found in malls according to its
Court of Appeals, notwithstanding many overlaps between government assistance, property
development, and tenancy. The state’s largest super-regional mall, “Destiny USA,” in Syracuse,
was reconstructed in 2007 with PILOTs and other public supports described below. 18 In the
downstate region, a shopping mall complex on Manhattan’s West Side is currently slated to
receive $328 million in city tax abatements over a 20 year period. In Brooklyn, elected officials
worked with the state’s Metropolitan Transit Authority to expand surface transportation to Kings
Plaza Mall, a 1.2 million square foot property, thereby enhancing community access to shoppers
without automobiles, while turning back two decades of financial losses.
A good deal of fragmentation appears on the post-Pruneyard landscape, then. In order to
illuminate the divisions in this regard, specifically, the gaps that exist between the doctrines of
17

See, for example, Timothy Zick, Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First Amendment Liberties in Public Places
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 165-67; Gary Peller and Mark Tushnet, “State Action and a
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state action and public function in malls, I would like to examine key rulings in New York and
New Jersey. Besides their geographic proximity, the constitutions of these two states contain
identical free speech provisions. 19 Yet they are poles apart on a legal spectrum that encompasses
private property versus state action, on the one hand, and the bond between public functionality
and practicable space, on the other.

New York versus New Jersey, or state action formalism versus avant-garde public functionalism
Appetites to test Pruneyard’s implications were whetted rapidly in New York State, as
evidenced in SHAD Alliance et al. v. Smith Haven Mall. 20 In July 1980, just one month after the
Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Pruneyard, “No Nukes” activists from the SHAD
Alliance entered the Smith Haven Mall on Long Island and began handing out leaflets opposing
the use of nuclear power. 21 The group’s tactics were educational and non-violent. Members
took to the mall to encourage its customers to attend a series of demonstrations against a nearby
nuclear production facility, the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. The Mall imposed a blanket
policy against political leafleting and other public activities on the property, though its owners
periodically welcomed community events on their parking lots. Elected officials would meet
with senior citizens and veterans there; healthcare functions, such as blood and eye exams were
also permitted on the lots. Following their exclusion from both the interior mall and parking lots
for hand billing, the SHAD Alliance activists challenged the shopping center owners under
Article I, Section 8 of the New York State Constitution, which reads:

19

Indeed, in State v. Schmid, a key precedent in New Jersey’s seminal shopping mall ruling, the justices noted that
their constitution’s free speech article “was modeled” on the language of New York State’s 1821 free speech article,
below. See State v. Schmid, 423 A. 2d 615, 627 (1980). I quote both free speech clauses in the case studies below.
20
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Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. 22
In weighing the Alliance’s charges against the Mall, the Court of Appeals wasted no time
remarking that First Amendment safeguards would not be forthcoming in light of previous
federal decisions, such as Lloyd Corp., which held that the nation’s free speech clause prevented
government alone from proscribing expression, as opposed to property owners.

With that

proviso out of the way, the only question on Long Island was whether New York’s charter
should be interpreted to waive the Supreme Court’s state action requirement, as California had
done five years earlier. Writing for the state’s top court, newly appointed Judge Vito Titone—a
proponent of judicial restraint—focused his opinion on the origins of New York’s free speech
provision. Responding to SHAD Alliance’s argument, that the affirmative wording of the 1821
article meant it reached farther than the First Amendment’s free speech clause, Titone found
nothing in the text or tradition of the state constitution to merit legal protection for expression by
activists in privately owned shopping centers:
Plaintiffs…urge us to construe our State Constitution’s free speech provision
more broadly. The linchpin of their argument is that no State action requirement
exists or should exist under our State Constitution so that the free speech
provision may be read as imposing an affirmative limitation on private conduct.
The history of the State action requirement, traditional usage and understanding
and contemporary approaches to constitutional adjudication, lead us to a contrary
conclusion. 23

22

The wording of the two separate clauses has fueled ongoing debates about original intent among the framers of the
New York State Constitution, i.e., whether the affirmative language of the first clause should be combined with the
omission of any specific government actor in the second clause to apply to state action and private agency in kind.
Sisk, op cit., pg. 1171, has argued that such a combination is unwarranted, based on omissions in other parts of the
constitution that pertain to state action alone, for example, its due process clause. Okula has argued for a more
flexible reading of the free speech provision following publication of the opinion below, based on the very same due
process clause. See Stanley Okula, “Towards Rendering New York’s Free Speech Clause Redundant: SHAD
Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall,” St. John’s Law Review, Issue 4, Volume 60, Summer 1986, 799, 809.
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SHAD Alliance, op cit., at 500.

236

In support of his finding, Titone produced a history lesson on New York’s constitutional
convention and its 19th century free speech article. At the heart of his lesson was an oft-repeated
observation that the state’s charter shielded public expression from government prohibitions
alone, rather than exclusionary actions by private citizens, namely, property owners. The idea
was self-evident, Titone thought:
That a Bill of Rights is designed to protect individual rights against the
government is standard constitutional doctrine…while the drafters of the 1821
free speech clause may not have envisioned shopping malls, there can be no
question that they intended the State Constitution to govern the rights of citizens
with respect to their government and not the rights of private individuals against
private individuals. 24

SHAD Alliance had no right to leaflet in the Smith Haven Mall, therefore. To hold otherwise,
Titone argued, was to overlook a chief tenet of constitutionalism: preventing abuse of civil rights
by the state. He maintained, in turn, that a different declaration would violate the separation of
powers, which was also embedded in the original design of the state’s charter. A judgment for
the Alliance would signal judicial activism, the kind evidenced in California, where that state’s
highest court had recently created “a blueprint for the judiciary to turn what it perceives to be
‘desirable’ social policies into law.” 25 Eschewing Judge Newman’s broad constructions on the
West coast, Titone suggested that the legislature would have to act first to change New York’s
state action limitations, no matter how “socially desirable” his colleagues in the minority thought
free speech in shopping centers might be. 26
Having disclaimed direct state action in the Smith Haven Mall, the court held that there
was no further cause for judicial scrutiny in the case. Specifically, there was no need to inquire
24

Ibid., at 502-03.
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In fact, a bill was introduced in the New York State Assembly, in the 2003-2004 legislative session, A. 4163-A. It
would have amended the state’s civil rights law to require free expression in shopping malls. The bill was referred
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whether the property functioned publicly among shoppers or residents of the Long Island town.
Holding that the mall was “not the functional equivalent of a government,” Titone concluded that
his only legal interest pertained to whether the town itself was involved in the exclusion of the
anti-nuclear activists from the property. As a later case in the Upstate region should demonstrate
below, this threshold question continues to color New York’s analysis of state action and free
speech in malls, and it is rarely resolved on behalf of public functionality or association. In
SHAD Alliance, Titone held that “the characterization or the use of the property is immaterial to
the issue of whether State action has been shown. Nor can the nature of property transform a
private actor into a public one.” 27 As we saw in Hudgens v. NLRB, the center’s practical
function as a gathering place was of no moment. Nor were previous instances of community and
political assembly on its grounds. Only state action mattered, legally speaking.
In fact, Titone went a little farther than the Supreme Court in Lloyd Corp. and Hudgens.
He tied free speech protections on New York property to demonstrable evidence of significant
state action in malls like Smith Haven’s—hardly a semantic difference, as I hope to show
towards the end of this section. That reductionism prompted a dissent from the Court of Appeals
Chief Judge, Sol Wachtler, who viewed the Smith Haven Mall as a functionally public place. He
also thought its open invitation to visitors warranted a broader, more diverse interpretation of the
property’s characteristics.

Wachtler protested that the Mall’s potential for nurturing civic

capacity on suburban Long Island had been undermined by Titone’s doctrinal devotion to state
action. The majority’s formalism meant that an almost impossible burden of proof had to be met
by speakers before the state constitution could be invoked on publicly accessible private
property. In practical terms, people did not just shop in the Mall, Wachtler complained. They

27
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assembled and simply lingered, relying on public amenities provided by the owners to do so.
They also experienced community life on the property, in myriad forms.
The majority’s retrospection on the history of New York’s constitution made little sense,
then, particularly when its founders incorporated an affirmative right to free speech in text they
drafted in 1821 (“Every citizen may freely speak…”). More to the point, Wachtler argued that
the framers could not have anticipated that privately owned shopping malls “would come to
replace town squares and downtown business districts as the public gathering centers in many
communities.” 28 The advent of these commercial spaces required greater flexibility than Titone
and the majority had allowed in their narrow reading of New York’s free speech article. As
Wachtler added, it was due to “the willingness of courts to interpret such constitutional
provisions in light of changing conditions that our freedoms have remained intact and our
Constitutions have survived for so long.” 29 An appropriate understanding of the article, the
Chief Judge concluded, would have recognized that the Mall’s prohibition on free speech
inhibited the spread of public information to the community. Self-government went hand in
hand with that information, so the state action requirement should have been triggered as soon as
the SHAD Alliance was excluded from the property. In changing times, the Mall’s public
functionality engendered full protection for democratic space:
Our State Constitution is an innovative document. It was intended to ensure that
rights and privileges granted in the past would be preserved in the future under
changing conditions. In the past, those who had ideas they wished to
communicate to the public had the unquestioned right to disseminate those ideas
in the open marketplace. Now that the marketplace has a roof over it, and is
called a mall, we should not abridge that right. 30
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Chief Judge Wachtler’s appeals did not triumph in New York. His position on the
topographical impact of shopping malls on the public sphere found a more receptive audience in
New Jersey about a decade later, though. In 1994, that state’s Chief Justice, Robert Wilentz,
authored the opinion in New Jersey Coalition Against the War in the Middle East, et al. v. J.M.B.
Realty Corporation, et al. 31 In New Jersey Coalition, a loosely affiliated cluster of organizations,
all opposed to U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf, sought access to nine regional shopping
centers and one community center, in order to hand out leaflets during Veterans Day Weekend in
1990. 32 The leaflets urged mall goers to contact their congressional representatives and demand
that they vote against American military action in Iraq, following its invasion of Kuwait that
summer. 33 Four shopping centers permitted distribution of the handbills, but the remainder
denied access to the activists. The Coalition appealed to the state’s trial and appellate courts, to
no avail. They sought review in the New Jersey Supreme Court under the state constitution’s
free speech clause, which mirrored New York’s. 34
In deciding the case, Justice Wilentz took an altogether different tack than had Judge
Titone and the SHAD Alliance majority. Wilentz did not puzzle over the original text of the
state’s charter, nor did he even quote it directly in his opinion. Instead, he insisted that the
salient issue in New Jersey Coalition was the breadth of civic engagements inside the state’s
shopping centers. This expanse had turned vital at a time when social background facts within
31
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the state had changed after the first half of the 20th century. Like Chief Judge Wachtler in New
York, Wilentz believed that the manner in which modern malls functioned in his state demanded
a more spacious interpretation of what made them public. Going further, perhaps, Wilentz looked
to reimage the debate over public expression, focusing on the environmental texts produced by
shopping centers—both inside their malls, and throughout New Jersey—rather than relying on
the historical texts of the state’s 1844 constitutional convention. 35
Using measures advanced in an earlier ruling that upheld free expression on the private
campus of Princeton University, Wilentz analyzed the ways in which shopping center owners
had successfully transformed their malls into latter day public spaces, well beyond their
commercial triumphs. 36 In contrast to Judge Titone in New York, he eschewed a strict
interpretation of state action in excluding speech from malls. Instead, Wilentz directed his
opinion to the question of whether mall spaces were civic spaces; whether the invitation to use
them was sufficiently broad in scope to accommodate leafleting and other forms of expression;
and whether the practical relationship between property and space therein made commerce
compatible with political association. Based on these three inquiries, Wilentz signaled his
intention to look at spatiality and functionality over property and title:
Although the ultimate purpose of these shopping centers is commercial, their
normal use is all-embracing, almost without limit, protecting a community image,
serving as their own communities, encompassing practically all aspects of a
downtown business district, including expressive uses and community events.
We know of no private property that more closely resembles public property. The
public’s invitation to use the property…is correspondingly broad, its all-inclusive
scope…is not just an invitation to shop, but to do whatever one would do
downtown, including doing very little of anything.
35

I am borrowing the idea of “texts” from Iveson. Among other examples, he relies on a shopping mall (in
Australia) to demonstrate how publics create codes of use inside, which are monitored in turn by authorities charged
with regulating publicly accessible private property. See, Kurt Iveson, Publics and the City (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2007), pg. 215.
36
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241

Turning specifically to the advocacy by members of the New Jersey Coalition:
As for the third factor of the standard—the relationship between the purposes of
the expressional activity and the use of the property—the free speech sought to be
exercised…is wholly consonant with the use of these properties. Conversely, the
right sought is no more discordant with…property than is the leafleting that has
been exercised for centuries within downtown business districts… 37

Wilentz’s entire opinion was colored by the compatibilities above, along with a theme
found in Justice Marshall’s dissents, as well as in California a decade and a half earlier: declining
practicable space in publicly owned downtowns. Topographical transformations in New Jersey
required emplacement of free expression in shopping malls, as de facto gathering places. The
Coalition joined countless stakeholders affected by the privatization of public space. Tracing the
unprecedented growth of shopping centers throughout the state, Wilentz believed their owners
now shared a civic responsibility with urban municipalities:
We…find the existence of a constitutional obligation to permit the leafleting
plaintiff seeks at these regional and community shopping centers; we find that the
balance of factors clearly predominates in favor of that obligation; its denial…is
unreasonably restrictive and oppressive of free speech; were it extended to all
regional and community shopping centers, it would block a channel of free speech
that could reach hundreds of thousands of people, carrying societal messages that
are at its very core. The true dimensions of that denial of this constitutional
obligation are apparent only when it is understood that the former channel to
these people through the downtown business districts has been severely
diminished, and that this channel is its practical substitute.

In the retail boom of the 1990’s, moreover, a social and legal duty existed among mall owners
intent on filling the market voids they helped open:
Defendants have expended enormous efforts and funds in bringing about the
success of these centers. We hope they recognize the legitimacy of the
constitutional concern that in the process of creating new downtown business
districts, they will have seriously diminished the value of free speech if it can be
37
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shut off at their centers. Their commercial success has been striking but with that
success goes a constitutional responsibility. 38

Wilentz’s thoughts on success and civic obligation can be reconsidered later, especially
when we look at how malls are currently faring in the retail market, as well as how their owners
might revisit the dynamic between multi-functionality and commercial viability. For now, it is
evident that he was privileging public practice over private purpose, while treating state action
unlike Titone in New York. That choice was an outlier, as Wilentz himself confessed. By 1994,
many states had already declined the invitation extended in Pruneyard. Yet the law was on the
Coalition’s side, he opined, because of the myriad functions that New Jersey shopping centers
had welcomed in their malls. The court produced a litany of non-commercial activities in the
decision. It even attached an appendix at the end of its opinion, which detailed dozens of public
events hosted inside each center that joined the contest. 39
The fluidity of space in New Jersey malls, coupled with the state’s affirmative free
speech provisions, warranted an analysis based on public function. Narrow interpretations of
state action overlooked the nature of mall space, even though it was qualitatively “allembracing.” So, too, was the invitation issued to publics by property owners, a “predominant
characteristic” of the mall, “not at all changed by the fact that the primary purpose of the centers
is profit and the primary use is commercial.” 40 Single use suburban zoning essentially vanished
within shopping centers, Wilentz suggested. The diversity inside belied uncomplicated rights to
exclusion among owners and property managers. Equally, the open invitations they extended to
outsiders required toleration for heterodoxic practices inside:
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The almost limitless public use of defendants’ property, its inclusion of numerous
expressive uses, its total transformation of private property to the mirror image of
a downtown business district and beyond that, a replica of the community itself,
gives rise to an implied invitation of constitutional dimensions that cannot be
obliterated by defendants’ attempted denial of that invitation, an implied
invitation that included leafleting on controversial issues. The regional and
community shopping centers have achieved their goal: they have become today’s
downtown and to some extent their own community; their invitation has brought
everyone there for all purposes. 41

Turning to the final thread in his argument, Wilentz held that free expression was
eminently compatible with the operation of shopping centers in New Jersey. Accommodation of
speech and assembly was embedded in their wholesale replacement of the quintessential public
fora found in downtown business districts. In other words, malls naturally functioned like urban
spaces. They also invited members of the public inside for a host of activities. Therefore, they
delivered spatial intersections found on traditional public property, where discursive practices
such as the Coalition’s anti-war leafleting once flourished among speakers and listeners. To the
extent that shopping centers presented the public functionality and diversity of streets and
sidewalks, the openness and accessibility historically associated with the latter were now apropos
inside the former. Clearly, Wilentz was making a different use of history than Judge Titone had
in SHAD Alliance. Unlike Titone, Wilentz found practicable public space within shopping malls,
and thus in his own state’s constitution.

He also disputed the alarms sounded at the prospect

that speech might be given breathing space inside malls:
This is the new, the improved, the more attractive downtown business district—
the new community—and no use is more closely associated with the old
downtown than leafleting… In a country where free speech found its home in the
downtown business district, these [shopping] centers can no more avoid speech
than a playground avoid children, a library its readers, or a park its strollers.
More importantly, we find that the more than two hundred years of compatibility
between free speech and the downtown business district is proof enough of its
41
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compatibility with these shopping centers. The downtown business districts at
one time thrived: no one has ever contended that free speech and leafleting hurt
them. The extent of their downfall has had nothing to do with free speech and
leafleting. This record does not support the proposition that one dollar’s worth of
business will disappear because of plaintiff’s leafleting even though some
shoppers and non-shoppers may not like it. 42

Relating his defense of free speech in New Jersey malls to their natural public function,
far-reaching invitation, and replacement of traditional public spaces, Wilentz now confronted the
state action objections raised in Lloyd Corp., Hudgens, and several states, including New York.
The legal contest hinged not on who excluded expression in malls, he thought, be it government
or their owners. Rather, the concern ought to be about rights of free speech, which were being
excluded in new places where they had high value. 43 The theory behind Marsh was alive and
well, albeit in New Jersey. The preferred position of speech seemed to enjoy a comeback, too,
based on social background facts. Combining the characteristics above with what he dubbed “a
changed society,” Wilentz concluded that the state’s free speech article still protected civic
engagement from the prohibitions of government and property owners alike:
In New Jersey, we have an affirmative right of free speech, and neither
government nor private entities can unreasonably restrict it. It is the extent of the
restriction, and the circumstances of the restriction that are critical, not the
identity of the party restricting free speech. Were the government ever to attempt
to prohibit free speech in the downtown business district, without doubt our
Constitution would prohibit it, and in New Jersey when private entities do the
same thing at these [shopping] centers, our Constitution prohibits that too.44
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Echoing Justice Marshall’s dictum about suburbanization in Logan Valley Plaza, and
updating it to account for more waves that followed that decision in 1968, Wilentz framed his
own public function rationale in normative terms. Modern jurisprudence, he urged, should
evaluate history and precedent in resolving existing contests. However, it must also take stock of
changing circumstances and surfacing needs. In Coalition, New Jersey’s shopping malls had
been transformed into the state’s new town centers, while replacing its old ones:
We look back and we look ahead in an effort to determine what a constitutional
provision means. If speech is to mean anything in the future, it must be exercised
at these [shopping] centers. Our constitutional right encompasses more than
leafleting and associated speech on sidewalks located in empty downtown
business districts. It means communicating with the people in the new
commercial and social centers; if the people have left for the shopping centers,
our constitutional right includes the right to go there too, to follow them, and to
talk to them.

In light of the topographical transformations above, Wilentz believed his interpretation of New
Jersey’s free speech article had to respond to conditions unimagined when it was drafted during
the 19th century. This theory of judicial review assumed greater import when new circumstances
undermined opportunities for popular participation. Modern developments required jurists to
look beyond what Ely calls the “four corners” of constitutional provisions, which have never
been self-contained when they address democratic rights. And just as the First Amendment was
intended to withstand changing political conditions after the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791,
the state’s free speech article was framed to adjust to new forms of commerce:
We do not believe that those who adopted a constitutional provision granting a
right of free speech wanted it to diminish in importance as society changed, to be
dependent on the unrelated accidents of economic transformation, or to be
silenced because of a new way of doing business. 45
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Concluding that the rights of New Jersey citizens to use malls “to make their views
known, however popular or unpopular” had grown out of the state’s altered socio-spatial
landscape, Wilentz would face opposition from his bench.

Justice Marie Garibaldi, who

supported the federal free speech exclusions upheld in the previous chapter, voiced the fiercest
criticism. Garibaldi dissented, protesting against the dangers of a limitless free speech doctrine
in New Jersey shopping centers. In her view, the court’s decision had actively created legal
compatibilities based on alleged functions, invitations, and annexations that theoretically
protected speech in all too unexpected spaces:
[U]nder the majority’s reasoning, whether the property…was dedicated to the
public for public discussion is irrelevant. All that matters is that the property was
open to the public, as is a shopping mall or any other large gathering space. An
example of a publicly-accessible place that will become an open forum for
expression under the majority’s analysis is Great Adventure Theme Park. That
result is plainly absurd. 46

Notwithstanding the fact that the nation’s largest indoor amusement park is housed in a
shopping center, the Mall of America, Wilentz appeared chastened by Garibaldi’s dissent,
particularly her objection to wholesale applications of his decision to New Jersey’s commercial
properties. The majority also heeded her argument about the added costs of speech in malls, and
her warning that retailers would invariably pass those costs onto consumers. While no direct
evidence was ever offered to support these premonitions, Wilentz conceded some territory to
Garibaldi and the state’s mall owners. First, he narrowed the court’s holding to the state’s
regional centers, though one community shopping center was a party to New Jersey Coalition, a
fact to which I will return in a moment. Next, he confined shielded expression to leafleting and
related speech activities. Wilentz would allow no “bullhorns, megaphones, or even a soapbox”;
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no “placards, pickets, parades, and demonstrations,” only “normal speech.” 47 Finally, he
followed California’s lead, by inviting New Jersey shopping center owners to regulate expressive
activities through time, place, and manner rules. Going even farther than Judge Newman had in
Robins fifteen years earlier, Wilentz added that owners throughout the state possessed
“extremely broad” power to impose those rules inside their malls. 48
That last concession may have fueled hopes for a reversal of fortune as the new
millennium dawned and the state’s mall owners waged another battle against expression; this
time inside the smaller community center covered by New Jersey Coalition: The Mall at Mill
Creek.

The comparably modest size of that property (325,000 square feet of leasable

commercial space) was a minor consideration in Green Party of New Jersey v. Hartz Mountain
Industries, Inc. 49 The major questions in 2000 concerned the regulatory powers delegated to
shopping center owners in the court’s 1994 decision. How far could owners go in asserting
control over speech-protected space after New Jersey Coalition? Could they use the time, place,
and manner rules stipulated by Chief Justice Wilentz, to defray the costs of political activity
projected by Justice Garibaldi in her dissent—specifically, by passing them onto speakers who
were now legally permitted to follow listeners into malls?
The case began in earnest in 1997, when a patron and “Merry Miler” of The Mall at Mill
Creek, James Mohn, tried to gather 2,000 signatures for that year’s Green Party gubernatorial
candidate inside the complex. 50 Mohn had successfully petitioned in the Mall a year earlier,
during the 1996 Nader Presidential Campaign. Following his request to do so again, however,
property managers sent him a copy of the Mall’s licensing agreement. It included three user
47
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regulations. First, any non-profit organization seeking speech access to the Mall was required to
purchase a $1,000,000 insurance policy, which compensated property owners for any disruptions
or loss of business that resulted from its activities. Second, outside groups had to sign a “hold
harmless” agreement as a condition for use, in cases of accidents among speakers or targeted
listeners. Finally, leafleting and related speech activities were limited to one day per year, or a
few days at most, between January 1 and October 31.

After seeking insurance premium

estimates stemming from the first regulation, Mohn joined the Green Party and challenged the
licensing agreement under New Jersey’s free speech and assembly articles. 51
The state’s court of finding, its Chancery Division, reviewed the agreement under the
New Jersey constitution and the federal First Amendment, defining the Mall as a public forum,
de facto, based on New Jersey Coalition. Using a public forum standard, it ruled that the Mall’s
time, place, and manner rules were not narrowly tailored to achieve their purpose. Specifically,
the insurance requirement was cost-prohibitive for “splinter political groups,” effectively pricing
them out of free expression on the property. Upon review, though, the state’s Appellate Division
reversed and held in favor of the property owners. It concluded that the agreement was based on
a “good faith exercise of reasonable business judgment.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appeals court decision, though it questioned
the legal determinations of both inferior courts. Writing for a unanimous majority, Justice
Daniel O’Hern held that the trial court’s classification of the Mall as a public forum was
mistaken. The property was private, after all, and narrow tailoring rules strictly applied to
government action on public property. Likewise, he argued, New Jersey Coalition gave mall
owners “extremely broad” regulatory power to establish time, place, and manner rules. The
51
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Chancery Division’s decision that they be “narrowly tailored” was inconsistent with Coalition.52
Still, O’Hern believed the “reasonable business judgment” standard used by the Appellate
Division to be more ill suited to the situation inside The Mall at Mill Creek:
We disagree…that the business judgment rule is the proper standard… We are
not so certain that what is good for mall owners is good for the country, or, in this
case, good for the citizens of New Jersey who seek to exercise their free speech
rights. 53

It is here that the publicity of private property becomes further inscribed in the state’s
jurisprudence—both as a matter of constitutional analysis, and as a form of spatial remediation.
O’Hern paired New Jersey’s free speech and assembly articles, describing rights afforded by
them as “broader than practically all others in the nation.” He also noted that the state had long
been “at the historical center of debate over speech and assembly,” in cases such as Hague v.
CIO, which originated in Jersey City. Those decisions had offset pre-New Deal jurisprudence,
which had once permitted owners “unfettered control over property.” New Jersey Coalition
followed in the tradition of Hague, surpassing it, really, by redressing structural imbalances
between space and property in the wake of late 20th century suburbanization. Justice Wilentz
sought to return practicable space to the state, places where speakers could identify listeners in
spite of significant geographical shifts. He fairly handed mall owners “extremely broad” power
to regulate, but not to exclude, that space, noted O’Hern. What was needed, then, was a fair
accommodation of property and expression inside The Mall at Mill Creek. That meant focusing
on three objects: “the nature of the affected [speech] right, the extent to which the mall’s
restriction intrudes upon it, and the mall’s need for the restriction.” 54
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Creating a context in which to review those objects, the Green Party court unanimously
adopted “public space” as its term of art. This was the first time the phrase was used in any of
the cases traced in this chapter, not to mention the previous one. Such emplacement seemed to
telegraph an expansive notion of public functionality in New Jersey, and a stronger rejection of
New York’s doctrinal deconstruction of malls as “non-places.” 55 O’Hern even traced the public
ancestry of modern shopping centers, all the way back to the Athenian agora. He added, “There
is a strong correlation between a free market in goods and a free market in ideas.” 56 Noting the
rich history between marketplaces and political association in America, too, O’Hern criticized
The Mall at Mill Creek licensing agreement, adding, “We would have hoped that the mall
owners would sense the connection between the colonial pamphleteers who secured our liberties
and the pamphleteers who today seek access to the new forums of commerce.” 57
Instead, the owners tried to price out discourse from those forums. Underscoring New
Jersey Coalition, and the state’s tradition of defending its citizens against denial of public
accommodations by other citizens, O’Hern concluded that the Mall’s insurance, indemnification,
and scheduling rules effectively excluded leafleting and related speech. The agreement was
particularly onerous on third parties and other indigent activists, who were unable to afford the
insurance premiums required under its first guideline. Similarly, the hold harmless clause was
couched in terms of “slip and fall” risk scenarios, yet there was not a scintilla of evidence that
speakers and petitioners were more prone to accidents than customers. The agreement did not
appear to be grounded on “objective factors,” O’Hern argued—none that distinguished Green
Party rank-and-file members from “skylarking teenagers, who accept the general invitation of the
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Mall and pursue expressive activities that would appear to pose a greater risk,” yet were “not
asked to pay anything for that privilege.” 58 Finally, the scheduling maximums were unrealistic.
Given New Jersey’s primary and general elections, one or two days annually would hardly be
enough to sustain “high value” expression between speakers and listeners, particularly at pivotal
times in its voting cycles. 59 A ban on electioneering and other activities would undermine the
state’s democratic process, which now relied on shopping centers as much as any historical
marketplace where political participation had previously proceeded.
As the 21st century dawned in New Jersey, then, the courts reimaged malls as publicly
functional speech environments, notwithstanding their private ownership. As it commenced in
New York, on the other hand, legally protected space declined further in malls, as did the
prospect that publicly accessible property would accommodate expression or ideological dissent.
Over the objections of the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) and an individual lawyer
named Stephen Downs, the state’s Appellate Division ruled in 2010 that content was irrelevant
where privately owned malls were concerned, though the facts of a case in an Albany suburb
suggest otherwise. Just as Green Party reinforced New Jersey Coalition in The Mall at Mill
Creek, a new contest in New York fortified the Court of Appeals’ 1985 decision in SHAD
Alliance, when it was held that “significant state action” had to be implicated in the exclusion of
free speech in order for its constitution to be invoked.
Stephen Downs v. Town of Guilderland began on March 3, 2003, when Downs and his
son, Roger purchased two custom made t-shirts at the Crossgates Mall. 60 One of the shirts read
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“Peace on Earth” on the front, and “Give Peace a Chance” on the rear. The other read “No War
with Iraq,” and “Let the Inspections Work” on the reverse. In Iveson’s geography of public
address, the origins of the case might have preceded the purchases made inside the mall—as the
United States prepared for invasion of Iraq in the wake of 9/11, and Downs ordered his t-shirt in
anticipation of sharing its message with customers at Crossgates. 61 To that end, Downs and his
son removed their coats following the purchase, put their new t-shirts on over the clothing they
entered with, and proceeded to walk together through the common areas of the mall.
While father and son stood in the Crossgates food court, two security guards approached
them and ordered them to either remove their t-shirts or leave the premises. In briefs submitted
to the court by the property owners, the security guards testified that another department store
detective relayed a report to them concerning “a commotion” in the mall’s common areas,
initially raised by another customer. 62 According to Downs’ briefs, however, neither he nor his
son was ever observed by security personnel engaging in any kind of disruption. 63
When asked to remove their t-shirts, the Downs refused. They were asked again, and
they refused again. The impasse continued for some time, when Guilderland Police Officer
Adam Myers entered the fray. Myers was at Crossgates on another matter, to complete some
administrative duties at a police substation located on the property. After being called over by
the guards and having the situation explained to him, he joined them in ordering Downs and his
son to remove their t-shirts.

While this was happening—perhaps in a patent instance of
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“heckler’s veto,” one may argue—an unidentified passerby threatened Downs. He shouted, “I
ought to kick the shit out of you motherfuckers!” according to the police officer’s deposition.
Following the threat, and some additional urgings to Downs and his son, Officer Myers
phoned his superior about the standoff. He in turn contacted the Town Attorney. After receiving
Myers’ relayed report, the Attorney advised that the officer was legally authorized to arrest the
father and son for criminal trespass, provided that the mall agreed to press charges against them
if he did so. At that point, Roger Downs removed his t-shirt. Stephen Downs refused to remove
his t-shirt, however, and was promptly arrested by Officer Myers. Downs was peacefully
escorted to the police substation in the mall, to be issued a desk ticket by the officer. When the
former made it plain to the latter that he intended to wear his t-shirt in the mall after the desk
ticket was issued, he was handcuffed and escorted to the Guilderland Town Hall, where he was
charged with trespass. The charges were dropped shortly thereafter, following separate protests
outside Crossgates by local residents, who objected to the arrest.
Nevertheless, Downs sued the town and the mall, jointly. He contended that his free
speech rights had been violated under Article I, Section 8 of the state’s constitution. Represented
by the NYCLU, he claimed the protections of that article were triggered inside Crossgates. He
relied on SHAD Alliance, which held that shopping malls could lawfully exclude speakers,
unless significant state action was involved in doing so; in other words, when government itself
did the excluding. In Downs’ view, the state was implicated directly in his removal from the
mall, in a few ways. First, it was Guilderland Police Officer Myers who carried out his removal,
under a state trespass statute. Second, a police substation inside the mall facilitated Myers’
involvement in the incident, and served as the initial processing site for Downs’ arrest. Finally,
the mall and the town had formed a “joint enterprise” to exclude and arrest Downs for refusing to
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remove his “Peace on Earth/Give Peace a Chance” t-shirt. 64 This collusion, added the NYCLU,
was further evidenced by close coordination between Officer Myers, the Town Attorney, and the
management at Crossgates, who assented to pressing trespass charges against Downs if he was
arrested, following repeated entreaties to him about his t-shirt.
While SHAD Alliance dealt with multiple overlaps between shopping center and state in
the form of community events hosted on the grounds of Smith Haven’s Mall, Downs and the
NYCLU focused on Crossgates’ direct “invocation of the apparatus of government” to exclude
his expression. Not only was there coordination between the town and the property owners prior
to his arrest by a law officer. That arrest was initially executed inside a municipal police facility
housed on the property at no cost to the owners. Even more, the mall’s management paid the
town an annual fee of $25,000 to supplement public safety inside Crossgates. 65 In sum, there
was significant state action in the mall and in Downs’ exclusion, they charged, in the form of
government entanglement in the day-to-day operation and security of the complex.

This

demonstrable nexus between government power and property ownership had to trigger the
constitutional protections outlined in SHAD Alliance.
Countering that Downs’ aim was “to manufacture a case to challenge established New
York Court of Appeals precedent,” the Pyramid Management Group—with malls across the
state, including Syracuse’s super-regional “Destiny USA,” above—maintained that no state
action was involved in the exclusion. 66 Its argument proceeded as follows: Crossgates adopted a
“behavior code” in its capacity as a private actor. Since neither the Town of Guilderland nor its
police force played a role in drafting that code, state action never pertained. In addition, Officer
Myers happened to be inside the mall on a discrete matter. He was not onsite to exclude Downs
64
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on behalf of the management, though it was lawfully permitted to seek “assistance from the
police to enforce its private property rights” under SHAD Alliance. 67 As in most states, such as
Minnesota, Pyramid argued, the presence of police substations in malls did not legally constitute
state action on shopping center property. Downs’ exclusion resulted from the enforcement of
mall policy, not police policy, nor town policy. The matter was strictly a private one, therefore.
Since neither Crossgates nor Pyramid were government actors, state action did not apply within
the framework of New York’s free speech article in SHAD Alliance. 68
The Appellate Division unanimously agreed. And the brevity of its opinion rivaled its
apparent lack of sympathy for Downs’ position. The appeals court reiterated Judge Titone’s
argument that the nature of mall property was irrelevant to free speech, dismissing Downs’
characterization of Crossgates as a public forum that functioned as part of a larger community.
The court singled out Pruneyard and New Jersey Coalition as outliers, reaffirming that “New
York has interpreted its constitution regarding this issue in a manner essentially consistent with
the federal courts and the majority of state courts.” 69 From there, the court essentially rehashed
the state action analysis included in the appellees’ briefs, while summarily dismissing each nexus
between the mall, town, and police advanced by Downs and the NYCLU.
Matching that brevity, and finding no evidence that significant state action was involved
in the Downs contest, the New York Court of Appeals declined to review the case further. It
concluded that no constitutional issue was raised in Guilderland. Maybe Downs had intended to
disrupt good law in SHAD Alliance, as Pyramid charged, or perhaps he “just wanted to wear a tshirt in the mall,” as he reported. In either case, New York’s bench, which had previously
dismissed the public function of private property inside Smith Haven Mall, now doubled down in
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its denial of state action inside Crossgates Mall, too. In so doing, it persisted in its unwillingness
to consider any notion of public space or forum in shopping centers. Instead, the court elected to
segregate private property from spheres of political expression, association, and dissent in a postPruneyard milieu.

Reimaging property as space in an age of fluctuating fortunes: state action, the new urban way
I have been privileging the public functionality of marketplaces throughout this study,
shopping centers included. I trust I will not surprise anyone when I admit that I intend to do so
in the remainder. It should also come as no surprise by now that the state action doctrine has
consistently proven hostile to practices of public space in privately owned malls. The Downs
contest provides a useful snapshot of the doctrine, which has been construed in New York and
most states to exclude expression from the common areas of malls. 70 Now, we have seen other
instances of state action in the form of municipal easements for commercial development, as
well as operational enhancements in regional shopping centers—not only in this chapter, but also
the previous one. Yet Downs signals the deployment of the state’s police apparatus to supply a
mall owner with legal force needed to regulate political expression on private property, that is, to
include and exclude speech activity. The case reveals an exclusionary approach that we had not
seen previously, while providing fresh evidence of how the state action doctrine delimits public
space in malls. And yet a number of exceptions have been incorporated into the doctrine since
the Supreme Court formulated it over a century ago. 71 In light of how malls perform as
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community hubs today, those exceptions could help recreate breathing space on commercial
property, while new planning approaches look to do the same in suburbs, generally.
In Marsh v. Alabama, the Court outlined a key exception to the seminal interpretations of
state action proffered in the wake of 14th Amendment ratification. Prior to Marsh, a laissez-faire
doctrine had prevailed throughout the post-Civil War 19th century and into the first third of the
20th century, when FDR’s Court-packing threat prodded judicial acquiescence towards a host of
New Deal policies reconciled with the Constitution in the late 1930s, with help from his recent
appointees. 72 Within ten years of Roosevelt’s realignments, the Marsh Court held that the public
functionality of a company owned and operated town had been embedded in its recreation of the
urban public properties opened to speech in Hague v. CIO, coupled with the open invitations
made by that town to members of surrounding communities. It also reasoned that private
property might function publicly in necessitous circumstances, i.e., when commercial places
were vital to civic engagement and an informed citizenry. New Jersey’s highest court echoed
each of those rationales in its two mall rulings, as we saw above.
New York’s benches declined to weigh the public function exception in malls, both in
SHAD Alliance and Downs. Notwithstanding those declinations, it seems plausible that Downs
might have triggered at least one other exception to the state action doctrine, if not two: direct
intervention by the state in speech exclusion, and a nexus between government and owner in the
development and operation of publicly accessible private property. These exceptions may help
us reexamine the meaning of state action in Smith Haven, Guilderland, or any place where malls
are integral parts of metropolitan fabrics. Interestingly, the Supreme Court formulated them
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before shopping malls landed on its docket. More significantly, each one was formulated
pursuant to the Court’s protection of civil rights and liberties in places of public accommodation,
during transitional periods in American social history.
In Shelley v. Kraemer, decided just two years after Marsh, the Court ruled that there was
significant state involvement in an otherwise private arrangement whereby white property
owners in a St. Louis neighborhood collectively refrained from selling their homes to African
Americans. Though the “restrictive covenant” made by private citizens did not violate the 14th
Amendment in itself, held the Court, the Missouri judiciary, including its highest bench, had
enforced the pact. This meant that it, too, was complicit in violating the equal protection rights
of still other private citizens. 73 In other words, the public imprimatur given by state courts to
private discrimination constituted state action in 1948. Sixty years later, the NYCLU contended
that Stephen Downs’ exclusion from Crossgates Mall violated his free speech guarantee under
the New York constitution. While the behavior code used to exclude Downs was itself the
product of a private act, it formed the basis for his arrest by a town police officer, finally, and
therefore triggered the state action exception advanced in Shelley.
Although Pyramid and the New York courts saw the incident in Guilderland differently—
each agreeing that Crossgates’ owners were within their right to request police protection of their
private property interests—I think it is possible to argue that significant state action was involved
in Downs’ free speech exclusion. In fact, the property owners were unable to enforce their own
rights to ban his expressive conduct, or anyone else’s, without employing the police power of
Officer Myers, the Guilderland Town Attorney, or New York State’s Appellate Division. As
Alexander points out, “there is state action in the way in which expressive activity is silenced in
malls… The owners of the shopping center are able to exclude…only because government has
73
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granted them a legal right to do so.” 74 Staeheli and Mitchell have adapted Blomley’s analysis to
argue that disciplining proprietary space always calls for some measure of municipal authority,
and may indeed be rooted in that authority. 75 Ultimately, the laws that govern property and
space will expand or encroach on the legitimacy of public practices within a community. In this
sense, Downs’ exclusion resulted from immediate enforcement of Crossgates’ behavior code by
the town police, as well as the otherness through which his t-shirt was framed in mall policy and
Guilderland’s public safety apparatus, notwithstanding his peaceful conduct.
Critical geography does not examine the state action doctrine, per se, so I would like to
reserve further discussion until the last section. At the moment, I am attempting to encourage the
emplacement of civic engagement in malls, as well as sustainable exceptions to a state action
doctrine that has undermined free expression inside New York’s and most others around the
country. An additional area in which the Supreme Court has interrupted the formalism of its
doctrine is worth mentioning, therefore. In the past, the High Court has found that state action
occurs when there is an observable nexus between government development activity and the
agency of private actors in places of public accommodation.
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Court reviewed a challenge to racial
discrimination that arose out of the sit-ins staged during the late 1950s. 76 The owner of a coffee
shop located in a public parking garage routinely denied African-Americans service. Even
though the denial took place on private property, the Court focused on the fact that the
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establishment was housed inside a municipally controlled facility, which supplied the business
owner with heat, water, and other public supports. Moreover, evidence in the case demonstrated
that the parking authority abided by the coffee shop’s racial discrimination due to its interest in
maintaining a “mutual benefit” with the property owner, and its competitiveness with other
garages in the Delaware city. Because a “symbiosis” of place and interest existed between the
shop and municipality, the Court concluded that the property owner’s discriminatory practices
legally triggered the 14th Amendment’s state action requirement. 77 Thus, another exception was
made in the area of civil rights protection on private property.
Owing to a number of decisions handed down after Shelley and Burton, it would be an
overreach to stake either of them as proof positive for protection of federal speech rights in
American shopping centers, that is, as incontestable state action exceptions. In fact, the Court
narrowed the influence of both those cases during the Burger and Rehnquist years. It did so in
legal disputes involving the private supply of public goods, as well as government imprimatur
for, and entanglement with, private decision-making. 78 “The current challenge,” Barak-Erez
suggests, “is how to update the state action doctrine in a way that preserves the distinction
between state and private actions and is still capable of recognizing new forms of activity in the
public sphere.” 79 Meeting that challenge here requires reevaluating the applicability of the
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doctrine to malls, specifically, in light of the multiple intersections between public support and
function, on the one hand, and private development on the other. 80
Since my main interest is in the public sphere to which Barak-Erez refers, I believe that a
proper perspective on breathing space for free expression in malls should entail a healthy
suspicion about narrow state action interpretations that overlook the public-private partnerships
that build and sustain malls. A growing number of regional and super-regional shopping centers
opened after the fate of speakers and listeners had been decided at the federal level support this
wariness. In the 1970s, significant financial support was infused in mall developments, via
government budgets and policy-making, particularly during their boom cycles in the years that
followed. 81 Today, in the midst of a bust, that spending continues, if for different reasons. In
response to declining profits and rising vacancies inside older shopping centers, public decision
makers have found themselves assisting owners through financing and land use arrangements
aimed at preserving or re-leveraging mall marketability throughout the nation. 82
Due to significant metropolitan and regional economic dependence on hundreds of
enclosed malls, many declared “too big to fail,” neither states nor municipalities are free to walk
away from them. Its reputed fiscal austerity policies aside, New Jersey recently provided $200
million in low interest loans to the landlords of an indoor commercial mall and entertainment
complex, sited on state-owned land and started before the nation’s economic downturn. The
“American Dream Meadowlands” (formerly, “Xanadu”) continues to receive post-recession
80
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public financing on the heels of $1 billion in highway and infrastructure improvements. That
support is made possible through the sale of state bonds, which are backed by the pension funds
of almost one hundred thousand New Jersey government employees. In New York, the city of
Syracuse delivered a 25-year PILOT to Pyramid Companies—the same property management
corporation sued by Stephen Downs, above. Moreover, the city appropriated environmental
remediation funding and directly financed access roads to help turn the regional Carousel Center
into the super-regional “Destiny USA.” 83
The reimaging I am recommending might be buoyed by the commercial conditions now
facing older malls, too. Shopping centers around the country continue to ripen for greater public
intervention by policy makers and the local administrations accountable to them. As they do, a
modernized interpretation of the state action doctrine could eschew the zero-sum game between
property and space observed in the courts of New York, for example. It may be fair for Sisk to
say that shopping centers are indistinct from other privately owned places that receive state
investment, since virtually every property development is supported by public expenditures in
one way or another. 84 Still, malls are unlike homes, stand-alone stores, or even big box retailers
that obtain government funding and land use benefits. They are touted by developers, owners,
and municipalities coming to their rescue as the environmental annexes of local and regional
communities. This is particularly true in larger malls, where numerous relationships and public
activities are housed inside—not to mention a growing number of government agencies. 85
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Shopping centers are a $4 trillion industry in the United States. They generate over $35
billion in local sales taxes and more than $127 billion for state governments around the
country. 86 However, revenue has been declining in malls, and it began to do so before the 2008
recession. While super-regional centers have continued to profit in most parts of the country
during the last decade, the rise of online commerce, or “e-tailing,” and big box options such as
Walmart have clearly hurt the nation’s 1,200 smaller formats. 87 Diminishing retail has led to a
thirty-five percent vacancy rate inside these properties, nationally. 88
Perhaps more suggestive of draining lifeblood in shopping centers are the dipping
averages of “time spent” in malls that once overflowed with people spending money and hours
inside the climate controlled downtowns opened after World War II. 89

A recent trade

publication points out that Americans now spend between 45 minutes to two hours inside malls.
Those numbers are down from a three-hour average in 1990. And the primary criticism found
among dissatisfied and erstwhile customers is a lack of opportunity for discovery inside. 90 In
fact, the most commonly cited complaint in a 2008 survey conducted by the business school at
Wharton was “a lack of anything new or exciting at the mall.” 91
Now, I am not suggesting that the surveys above are tracking a statistical yearning for
enforceable speech rights or political dissent inside malls. I would submit, however, that the
missing “discovery” cited by consumers and retail observers alike radiates from cultural demand
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for heterogeneity within shopping centers; the kind associated with cities—where more mixeduse spaces help furnish jobs, safety, and favorable impressions that have been drawing huge
numbers of Americans back during the last decade. The urbanism of Jane Jacobs was built on
many of the desiderata we saw in the first chapter, including diversity, toleration, and
accommodation. 92 Today it finds its defense in the work of Richard Florida and others, who
look to undo the vestiges of singularity in suburbs and exurbs by importing values of openness,
community, and unexpectedness that bolster publicity and commercial creativity. 93
I also do not wish to say that mall owners are unaware of the need for multiplicity in their
centers. They know that noncommercial activities give customers reasons to come, and stay,
inside. 94 Legally speaking, though, the picture appears to be different. Justice Marshall’s
defense of publicness in his Lloyd Corp. dissent is worth remembering at this point. Marshall
believed that the relationship between private property and public expression in malls was best
conceived as a continuum. 95 That is why he welcomed the prospect that Pruneyard might
restore the spatiality he advanced in Logan Valley Plaza. However, doctrinal formalism in New
York and many other states has reinforced the dichotomies that transform malls into non-places
decried by anthropologists and geographers, who consider topographical space a key element of
democratic processes through which people associate with one another as members of publics. 96
Questions of free speech aside, the evidence above suggests that the commercial viability of
malls will diminish as opportunities for publicity ebb. Over the last decade, one might argue, a
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deficiency of place inside shopping centers has helped fuel big box consumption in quick stop
modes, not to mention instantaneous online commerce from home. 97
An empirical correlation between commercial profitability and speech rights under any of
the exceptions above proves difficult to show; no less because there are now so few places to
ground test civil liberty in privately owned malls. On the other hand, there is growing evidence
that innovative third place formats have been capitalizing on the declining fortunes of older
shopping centers, while responding to community demands for mixed-use experiences excluded
inside malls. The champions of the new urbanism recognize the experiential gap. They have
been quick to fill it, earning the attention of consumers and merchants who wish to reach them.
There is certainly no dearth of suspicion toward the new urbanism, which continues to expand
along with metropolitanism and regionalism in the United States. Yet its advocates are fairly
resolving a thirst for shared space and communality in the suburbs. 98 Whether one defines its
motives as environmental or commercial, or both, the Congress for the New Urbanism is making
a considerable impact on the way suburban topography is arranged today.
The new urbanism is doing this by retrofitting suburban marketplaces with streets and
spaces once held in trust for civic engagement. Renewed legal considerations seem inevitable
under those circumstances, in my judgment. Likewise, Justice Black and Marshall’s migrations
of legally protected public fora to shopping centers ought to guide those considerations, if and
when they occur. In view of the innovative outlooks on social change expressed by both
97
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Justices, it seems possible that a public function exception could again pierce the Supreme
Court’s state action requirement, while reestablishing the preferred position of speech inside
today’s malls. Though Logan Valley Plaza was reversed by a subsequent ruling, the Court has
never explicitly overturned its decision in Marsh v. Alabama, a fact that augurs well in this
regard—and one that could become more salient in the context of the new urbanism.
The new urbanism was inaugurated roughly a generation ago by a group of planners,
designers, and architects who were anxious about the effects of sprawl on America’s suburban
landscape, the nation’s environmental health, and its long-term community capacity. In order to
stem the development patterns we saw towards the end of the second chapter, reduce automobile
dependency and carbon emissions, and instill a sense of place in the suburbs as 21st century
metropolitanism and regionalism evolve, the movement has created its own congress and issued
a strategic charter. At the heart of that charter is the emplacement of mixed-use space and
traditional centers, which new urbanists rely on to temper and reverse the structural singularities
on which edgeless suburbs and myriad ecological threats are reproduced.

The congress

addresses these threats by centering shared suburban spaces, that is, by consolidating them so
their points become contiguous and walkable. 99 As one signatory to its 2013 charter notes, the
new urbanism promotes elastic functions within design environments:
The ultimate flexibility comes from abandoning conventional land use
designations, such as residential, commercial, institutional, and so forth, that are
embedded in our current zoning codes. For towns to be truly responsive to the
market, to emerging business environments, and to a healthy jobs/housing
balance, buildings need to be designed to be multiuse, not single use. They
should be thought of as being able to accommodate workplaces, stores, and
domiciles. 100
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This encouragement of mixed-use development has inspired a blueprint for one of the
movement’s principal contributions to the suburbs: “lifestyle centers.” Lifestyle centers are
novel commercial districts spouting up around the country; in many cases atop abandoned malls
razed and replaced by these new urbanist designs. Described to me as “multiuse shopping
centers” by a guest services representative at the Ridge Hill development in Westchester, the
ICSC likewise defines them as upscale commercial and entertainment venues. Lifestyle centers
are outdoor formats, built to recreate the optics of city streets where people shopped before the
advent of enclosed malls in the late 20th century. 101 Inasmuch as they are designed to give
shoppers direct access to retail from downtown styled streets, lifestyle centers reestablish the
relationship between storefronts and spaces such as sidewalks, which have historically supported
all manner of civic functions. While they are privately owned, therefore, lifestyle centers model
the immediacy between public space and First Amendment fora opened to free expression in
Hague v. CIO and subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
These new shopping centers feature water fountains and children’s playgrounds, all
within the same footprint as restaurants, hangouts, and other third places. Notably, and truly
evocative of the Court’s opinion in Marsh v. Alabama, New York’s Ridge Hill and complexes
like it now boast onsite housing components within their property portfolios. Condominiums are
being sited right in the middle of these mixed-use commercial facilities. Of course, that means
their owners deliver a full gamut of indispensable services to residents, for example, sewers and
other infrastructures that once triggered a state action exception in Marsh.
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From an environmental perspective, lifestyle centers help reduce VMTs (vehicle miles
traveled) and meet other conservation needs urged by new urbanists. 102 Yet, the porosity
between private and public functions within these commercial complexes reflects recognition
among those rallying to build them that the older ecologies of shopping malls are being
outmoded by popular demands for place in suburbs. Though the law has been slow to catch up,
developers and owners appear responsive to this emerging social background fact. The nation’s
largest Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are now concentrating their capital on lifestyle
centers, frequently demolishing malls in order to build mixed-use retail formats. 103
State action is following suit. We have seen several examples of public intervention in
enclosed malls, intended to sustain private sector employment and local tax bases. In other
cases, in which downturns appear irreversible, governments are intervening directly in the
redevelopment of “dead malls” and transitioning them into new urban commercial properties. 104
Municipal involvement has been critical for mall replacement and retrofit projects in places like
The Avenue, the country’s first lifestyle center, near Baltimore; Downtown Park Forest, outside
Chicago; Mizner Park, in Miami; and Willingboro Town Center, one of the original Levittown
prototypes, on the outskirts of Newark. In addition to capital budget expenditures, suburban
administrations continue to empower any number of public development corporations to
refurbish distressed malls, so they do not pull local communities under financially. 105 The iconic
mall remains politically relevant, but metropolitan and regional authorities are betting on the new
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urbanism in enacting redevelopment policy. As Dunham-Jones points out, that is why so many
properties are now built through public-private partnerships and tax increment financing backed
by state and local governments. It is also why lifestyle center developers are earning master
planning variances (also known as “smart growth” variances) to circumvent single use zoning
policies carried over from post-War suburbanization. 106
My hope is that the law will catch up with social background facts emerging on the
privately owned main streets of lifestyle centers; that it will at last complement the mixed-use
designs introduced by the new urbanism, but also engender much more than the simulacra of
downtown life in places such as Ridge Hill. The state action doctrine advanced by the Supreme
Court, and most recently reprised in New York, belies the multilayered nexus between property
development and public intervention in older shopping centers. Meanwhile, the legal exclusivity
of commercial intercourse in malls is becoming outmoded by their newer iterations. In her study
of malls and other privatized spaces, Kohn makes an important distinction between the diversity
and functionality of commercial formats like lifestyle centers, and enclosed malls, where
political association was excluded in Lloyd Corp. and Hudgens:
It seemed obvious [to the majorities in those two cases] that a mall was simply
devoted to a single activity, shopping, whereas a town was defined by the
physical proximity of diverse spaces and activities, housing and services, leisure
and work, consumption, education, and production. A mall is a place you visit; a
town is a place you live. But this has been slowly changing…New Urbanistinspired developments…mimic the appeal of old-fashioned downtowns… They
link higher density housing with office and retail space, all unified by
architectural cues evoking the turn of the [20th] century. 107

Whether or not one agrees that free speech ought to be safeguarded in shopping malls, it
is unlikely that lifestyle centers and other mixed-use commercial properties will be immune from
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jurisprudence for long. In a recent incident described by Williamson, a publicly supported
mixed-use development near Washington, D.C., Downtown Silver Spring, saw civic unrest after
an amateur photographer was prohibited from taking pictures with camera equipment he bought
on the property. When the photographer and a number of his peers were subsequently expelled
from the outdoor mall for passing out leaflets to protest the first prohibition, they organized a
public demonstration on Independence Day. The property owners eventually gave way on their
no-photography rule and negotiated terms for limited free speech exercises within the complex.
Nevertheless, Williamson argues, the protest in Downtown Silver Spring portends more legal
contests in these developments, as they multiply. 108
If and when newer commercial formats replace older shopping centers on the federal
docket—as they continue to supplant enclosed malls throughout the nation’s suburbs—existing
judicial doctrines will surely control. And unless courts revisit them, free expression will remain
off limits within the first walkable, commonly accessible spaces known to many suburbanites.
These doctrines, particularly state action, should be revised according to the exceptions formerly
made for public functions that occur inside suburban malls and their antecedents upon the
American landscape. The public function exception seems especially apropos today, given the
new urbanist formats replacing malls, which convey all the attributes of downtown shopping
districts delineated by Justice Black in his support of speech on commercial property, both in his
majority and dissenting opinions.
In light of the topographical transformations above, legally reimaging free expression on
publicly accessible private property will hardly loose some sort of philosophically discredited
judicial activism in malls. Nor will it destabilize the meaning of the First Amendment, or overemphasize arbitrary construction of its free speech and assembly clauses by a tribunal of judges
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who enjoy life tenures and a lack of accountability, as Sisk and a couple of the jurists above have
insisted. 109 Rather, it will signal recognition that civic engagement is not self-sustaining; that in
some cases, active assertion of judicial review over the Bill of Rights enhances the democratic
experience, rather than diminishing it, as Madison and the founders understood. 110 In his spirited
defense of judicial interpretation as pragmatism, Ely argues that fairness within the democratic
process actually requires the interventions of an unelected judiciary. Courts alone can look past
the plain text and seemingly self-contained clauses of what Justice Louis Brandeis has called our
“living Constitution,” particularly when political expression and association hang in the balance.
Jurists may stand aloof from the substances ascribed to the law by popularly elected legislators
and other vested interests. Ely cites the rulings of the Warren Court, which did exactly that in its
free speech and civil rights decision-making. Institutionally insulated and more wont to behave
objectively, judges are in a unique position to articulate meanings of the nation’s charter that are
“participation-oriented” and can accommodate changes in American life. 111
Moreover, courts are more capable of advancing what Ely calls “representationreinforcing” rights for groups otherwise marginalized by the political process. 112 This is
especially so in cases involving open discourse by minorities underserved in the body politic;
equally in cases in which free expressions of heterodoxic ideas are at stake. Political dissent is
fundamentally important to American democracy, Ely argues, no matter how discomfiting it may
be to average citizens. 113 Yet, minority stakeholders are unlikely to see their rights of political
association protected by elected officials, who focus exclusively on satisfying majorities, and
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who amass their power by doing so. 114 Inasmuch as those officials are able to aggrandize
themselves politically by squelching oppositional expression and distorting the policy-making
apparatus, an inclusive democratic process may call for judicial interpretation of a broadly
worded Constitution, designed to ensure fair play for all participants by blunting majoritarian
misuses of that process. In a more emphatic assertion of this minority rights theory, Dworkin
contends that judicial review beckons legitimacy for substantive needs of democratic assembly in
the United States, while protecting what he considers the chief values of “constitutionalism,”
among them, civic engagement and participatory self-government. 115
The geographic changes taking place in 21st century metropolitan America demand more,
not less space in which to maintain and enhance civic capacity in our heterogeneous political
culture. From a design perspective, the Charter of the New Urbanism acknowledges a need for
place, and currently articulates it within some of the country’s most successful commercial real
estate. Conversely, the declining fortunes of older shopping centers suggest that property models
that exclude place or opportunities for discovery rival any business risk posed by free speech
inside malls. Expanding practicable space on commercial property might be even reimagined as
smart growth, therefore. And the First Amendment was surely framed to accommodate that
growth, as well political changes that the founders knew would occur after it was written, as Ely
points out. Inhabitants must produce their own civic space, ultimately, as the remaining section
will suggest. Still, legal protection of civil rights to that space would serve to accommodate the
social diversity that has reshaped suburbs during the last decade, especially, while helping to
remake shopping centers—indoor or outdoor—into robust environmental expressions of a
democratic public sphere.
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Rainbow suburbs and the right to the analogous city 116
Design patterns spurred by the new urbanism reflect growing momentum for combining
commercial property with public space in suburbs. Legally protecting those spaces for the
purposes of free expression and association would help rekindle relationships between commerce
and civic engagement, which have historically flourished within urban environments. In Chapter
Two, we saw multiple overlaps between marketplaces and public spheres. In ancient Athens, the
architecture of the agora reflected openness and accommodation for debate within embodied
spaces, where consumers performed as citizens, and vice versa. In medieval and early modern
cities of Europe, a more diverse mix of social classes learned to share space in the outdoor
markets of town centers, where they began to identify community interests and sometimes
unexpectedly forged themselves into visible, resistant publics over the course of four centuries.
Colonial and post-revolutionary Americans carried that mantle through the Civil War, while
early 20th century urbanites reestablished publicity and political toleration, using metropolitan
streets, squares, and markets to openly negotiate social and ideological identities.
Towards the end of each epoch, however, top-down wariness of publicly practicable
space emerged. As a result, suspicious regimes rearranged the political geography of denser
centers. Well before the Dark Ages, post-democratic Greek rulers and their imperial successors
in Rome fragmented agoras, and then forums, by positioning monuments throughout their
midpoints and splitting commercial intercourse from common spaces, open markets from
surrounding stoas. Market squares in France and England were dispersed from the hearts of
Paris and London to outer districts in the 18th and 19th century and eventually turned into arcades
116
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or covered under roofs. In the post-Civil War United States, rowdy street markets of antebellum
cities were scattered or replaced by large and tightly regulated department stores. By the second
half of the 20th century, unprecedented decentralization occurs, when suburbs materialize en
force. This change owed not only to popular choices, but to an array of national highway and
housing policies, as well as zoning decisions in municipalities throughout the country.
The last rearrangement may have been the most pronounced, as I have argued previously.
Until recently, at least, its chief consequence has been single use development and a kind of antienvironmentalism, which has driven edgeless suburban sprawl, literally. While the planning
community now rethinks the unforced errors of past land use in suburbs, marketplaces of goods
remain fundamentally detached from the marketplace of ideas. This is due in large part to an
enduring legal script that has deemed them incompatible. In view of critical geographic studies,
the new urbanism, and significant demographic shifts in suburbs during the last decade, that legal
script merits reconsideration, as does its impact on suburban space. 117
Law can mediate the relationship between structural arrangements of space and embodied
practices by publics who inhabit it, as Mitchell, Blomley, and others have argued. 118 This idea is
adopted from the work of Lefebvre, who wrote that citizens ought to use their civic capacity to
engage in spatial practices and transform cities to meet organic, democratic needs. 119 Lefebvre
knew that professionals charged with managing any city were resolved to control it, though; to
make its shared spaces legible in the interests of property ownership, principally. 120 Utilizing the
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imprimatur of the state’s apparatus, owners and administrators routinely combined to pulverize
cities on behalf of social order and hierarchies of use, legally abstracting available spaces from
the publics that live and consume them.
Spaces hybridized by the active participation of publics are always in danger of being
fragmented, according to critical geographers. They may be legally excluded from opportunities
for open assembly and then homogenized in ways that thwart the diversity, accommodation, and
toleration of unmanaged space. Thus, there is a dialectical tension between those who use place
and those who own or regulate it. It manifests historically in subtle and not so subtle annexations
that transpire in the middles of cities, for example, during the periods mentioned above. The
right to the city, then, is the right of inhabitants not to be marginalized by spatial exclusions; it is
the right not to be removed from the centers of urban life, or relegated away from other
inhabitants of those centers through architectural or administrative decision-making from the top
down; it is the right to assemble freely and practice speech and civic engagement; it is, in sum,
the right of political association. 121 In Mitchell’s update on this thesis, it is finally the law that
prescribes who has the right to the city, by delineating what uses are legally acceptable, among
whom, and where, specifically. 122
The ideas above were rarely explored in the context of suburban space, until recently. It
was generally taken for granted that relationships between property and publicity in suburbs
mirrored their cultural segmentations. Most seem to conclude that political geography in suburbs
was an historical effect of their demography, not its cause. 123 However, suburban America is the
metropolitan United States of the 21st century, according to many contemporary demographers.
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Today’s suburbs are not only comprised of homogenous bedroom communities, consisting of
white middle class commuters. Suburban publics are more diverse than ever before, racially,
ethnically, and economically. 124 Minority inhabitants make up 35% of the overall population in
suburbs, according to the 2010 Census—a figure comparable to the averages of the nation’s
largest cities. In fact, several suburbs have become majority-minority since 2000. 125 “Black
flight” from older cities has produced suburban population growth in both the Northern and
Southern United States, while Hispanic migration and Latino immigration has accounted for
almost 50% of that expansion over the last decade. Asian Americans are settling within suburbs
in surging numbers, with half of those racial groups now making their homes there. In contrast
to these figures, the 2010 count shows that non-Hispanic whites suburbanized by only 10%
during the decade. 126
The anachronisms of melting pot cities and grey flannel suburbs are also giving way to
convergences in the class dynamics of America’s metropolitan landscapes. The working poor no
longer live in cities alone, that is.

Dunham-Jones and Williamson note that suburban

municipalities now host more impoverished Americans than do the largest central cities. 127
From 2000 to 2010, the number of poor suburbanites increased by 64%, to about 17 million,
while totals have begun to decrease modestly in cities. 128 The Urban Land Institute, one of the
nation’s preeminent planning organizations, continues to study demographic changes cited
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above. It has also been encouraging its clientele to recalibrate development of commercial
property to align with principles of the new urbanism. 129 At the same time, social researchers
and justice advocates have turned their attentions to record inequality in suburbs, as they attempt
to tackle equity problems traditionally within the purview of mainstream urbanism. 130
Detailing the sweep of all these changes would go beyond the scope of this study. My
point is that demographic transformations in American suburbs demand reconsideration of the
legal scripts imposed on their putative physical centers—shopping centers—four decades ago.
Jurisprudence should weigh public functionality within old and new malls in light of
contemporary suburbs, so that diverse suburbanites may openly associate or negotiate identities
and ideas in ways reserved to cities. 131 The property catalogues inspired by the new urbanism
feature optics of civic space needed by activists and growing suburban underclasses to produce a
metropolitan public sphere, perhaps many of them. But materializations of those spheres remain
contingent upon the “geography of law,” which currently denies a right to the suburb, that is, a
legal, practicable center in almost every state. Such a right will become indispensable for
advancing social change in the suburbs, I would argue. It already is, says Niedt:
The importance of public space as an arena where marginalized groups use their
visibility to press claims for recognition, rights, and distributive justice is
becoming all the more important as suburbs diversify. 132

The idea of a right to the city may therefore be advantageous for understanding the
interchange between built environments such as shopping centers, on the one hand, and
suburbanites’ political needs, on the other. It may also be useful for examining the capacity of
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the law to resolve tensions between spatial designs and practices; even more so when the legal
apparatus is invoked to safeguard orthodoxies left unquestioned in the public sphere, or when
those orthodoxies are reproduced by the political process without regard to fair play and popular
participation.

This is when the system corrupts, and when public distrust takes root, Ely

argues. 133 In the critical geography inspired by right to the city visions, the state contours who
and what practices are welcomed where. It referees policy through which space is controlled,
and it may communicate hierarchies by permitting that policy to suppress diversity and
heterodoxy. 134

The exclusion of Stephen Downs’ t-shirt and his arrest by town police

communicate such a hierarchy. As innocuous as a few landscape photographs may seem, the
same could be said for the incident in the new urbanist-inspired shopping center, Downtown
Silver Spring, where family photography was permitted, while photography of the property was
expressly prohibited, along with open dissent against the center’s code of conduct. 135
As private developments like Downtown Silver Spring continue to replace older malls,
there may be another reason to harness right to the city arguments for spatialization of free
speech rights in changing suburbs. With few exceptions, these newer mixed-use properties cater
to more homogenous, upscale clienteles. Yet, inhabitants traditionally thought of as urban are
rapidly reshaping suburban geography. 136 It may be fair to wonder, then, if the spread of the new
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urbanism will serve to exacerbate rights contests for expression and association in lifestyle and
new town centers now appearing on suburban property maps. As I pointed out in the previous
section, the new urbanism reiterates the topography of cities, and it theoretically provides access
and anthropological space required by suburbanites to declare themselves amongst one another.
Barring legally protected rights to openly practice association in these privately owned centers,
however, there might be little opportunity to express or negotiate the social diversity that Niedt,
Carpio, and others attribute to today’s suburbs.
Public space may mean that we encounter difference, even strangeness, as I indicated at
the outset. It may also mean that we confront them and see our own orthodoxies interrupted by
the heterodoxies of others. This is why free expression has earned high value among political
theorists, irrespective of chronology or ideology. More than two centuries before Habermas
theorized an ideal speech situation and came under criticism from pluralists like Young for
failing to create space for the “explicit representation of oppressed groups in discussion and
decision making,” Adam Smith defended the value of place, proximity, and diversity. Smith
urged that the publicness of space nurtured visibility and revelation of moral symbols, which
enabled citizens to become sensitized to people unlike them. 137 I think this is an unrealized
promise of shopping malls, which might otherwise function publicly in the spirit of their
inventor, Victor Gruen: as modern agoras, market squares, or downtowns. When shared space is
fragmented, as Kohn and Mitchell each point out—when it is hierarchically split between
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inclusion and exclusion—opportunities for interpersonal discovery of differences are
compromised, and civil rights that inform processes of discovery are threatened. 138
Some new urbanists envisage a connection between social discovery, civil rights, and
embodied spaces inside the boundaries of suburban lifestyle centers and other properties. “The
increasingly diverse publics of suburbia,” argues Williamson, “demand [the] streets with
sidewalks, squares and greens” of these novel downtowns, though they are privately owned. In
this view, the new urbanism can help meet these demands architecturally. 139 Even more, she
says, it is “plausible and thrillingly possible that newly built places designed…to evoke
traditionally urban public spaces will provide cues for people to ‘produce’ public space, in the
spirit of Henri Lefebvre, and, in some measure, to ‘take’ it by asserting and struggling for new
rights and opportunities.” 140 Effective planning would enhance practicable space in the short
run, furnishing ready-made topography for association and negotiation of political differences.
Along with Dunham-Jones, Williamson has also suggested that rallying behind “instant
urbanism” or the “instant architecture” of public space could help bridge the growing diversity of
suburbs to practices of publicity that never existed before. 141 A corollary of this faith in the new
urbanism is that civil rights in diverse suburbs cannot be reserved to the production of political
space via activism or movements alone, since they develop too slowly. 142 This is a provocative,
even persuasive argument. Still, the jurisprudence I described above means that participatory
space for open political discourses cannot be produced lawfully in privately owned centers in
forty-five states—notwithstanding architectural semblances between those suburban centers and
streets and sidewalks protected by what remains of the public forum doctrine. Practicable space
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inside new urbanist-inspired commercial developments would “breathe” just as poorly under
legal precedents reiterated by most state benches, which exclude free speech from older shopping
malls. Arguments from civic design are well intentioned. Yet the capacity of the new urbanism
to animate practices of public space is likewise circumscribed by prevailing law, barring
meaningful reinterpretation of the doctrines outlined in this chapter and previous ones.
This brings us back, finally, to the right to the city, which is in many ways synchronous
with uninhibited participation, what Lefebvre called the oeuvre. 143 The function of civic
engagement is the creation of representational space. 144 This is the space where struggle is
waged against orthodoxy, perhaps where resistance to it is produced. The chief end of that
resistance is most practical. It consists in spontaneous access to what is genuinely urban about
the city: the political agency of people who use it. 145 There is nothing planned about it. This is
why the practice of space is always embroiled in a contest with the representation of space, what
Lefebvre, Mitchell, and others view as an object of simulacrum, an abstraction, as opposed to an
embodied freedom or association. The very spatiality of that representation is exclusive, and
therefore its publicity is always a matter of suspicion unless physically contested. 146
To reprise a theme I raised early in this study, however, the contest between practicable
space, on the one hand, and exclusion, on the other, will invariably be vetted through the
“geography of law.” This now seems to be the case in suburban shopping centers and city
centers. While the law once reflected more favorably on expression and association inside the
analogous city of the mall, it has generally abandoned those practices for four decades. If malls
or lifestyle centers, de facto cores of rapidly diversifying suburbs, are to function as
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representational spaces in 21st century communities, then legal interpretations need to be
updated. Public address must be spatialized in suburbs, so that social diversity may be visibly
articulated and ideological heterodoxy revealed en route to Ely’s notion of fair play in the
democratic process.

Otherwise, shopping centers will have earned their monikers as

representations of space. Indoor or outdoor, they will continue to be criticized as non-places,
which pose “the illusion of public space…without the impingement of the political,” as Miles
argues. 147 Their geographic value will remain suspect in the context of metropolitan change,
when suburbs witness concerns once believed unique to the city, and new suburbanites have too
few places to negotiate identity, as they have done historically in urban spaces. In lieu of new
legal mediation, shopping malls and lifestyle centers will hide social and ideological difference.
They will sanitize and displace processes of discovery that require community, toleration, and
what I have been calling unexpectedness. In the end, malls will indeed prove to be ersatz spaces,
where Habermas’ distorted speech situation materializes, and any notion of a public sphere
activated through democratic deliberation remains “illusory.” 148

In closing, I would submit that existing jurisprudence has largely excluded public space
on behalf of formalistic shopping center doctrines throughout most of the country. Prevailing
legal interpretations have left malls vulnerable to widespread cultural criticism leveled against
them for many years, while doing little to protect them commercially during the last decade. In
light of social background facts now emerging in contemporary suburbs, I believe shopping
centers—whether they are appointed with indoor or outdoor malls and common areas—ought to
be treated by courts as publicly functional places, where new suburbanites are legally permitted
147
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to advance their claims of diverse identity and ideology in the open, as well as visibly negotiate
them in representational space.
Given the power of law to influence the continuum between inclusivity and exclusivity,
and to mediate the relationship between property and publicity, courts will continue to decide
whether the privately owned topographical centers of suburbs proffer more than representations
of space. In the unlikely event that the political process requires free speech and assembly inside
malls, judicial contests over rights to regulate expression and association are sure to be triggered.
Absent that judicial intervention, moreover, political processes within legislatures and policymaking bodies are almost certain to remain stacked against dissent. It is hard to imagine the
“participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing” rights described by Ely finding protection
outside the judiciary; not while property owners and developers maintain their organized efforts
to preserve the status quo inside malls. 149 The International Council of Shopping Centers has
redoubled its efforts to influence the political process through campaign contributions and other
nexuses with legislators and government stakeholders, who may at once be asked to weigh in on
civil rights in privately owned malls. 150 The irony of free speech inside shopping centers may
therefore be that unelected jurists act as guarantors of support for the principles of openness and
accessibility that help us indicate public space.
At present, those principles do not correspond to malls. Pruneyard may have signaled
brighter hopes for free speech and assembly in malls when it was originally handed down over
thirty years ago. Those hopes have been snuffed out in New York, and most other states for that
matter. Only two states have emplaced broader constitutional protections in privately owned
149
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shopping centers since California did on behalf of its diminishing public sphere. Neither public
financing or tenancy inside declining malls, nor the advent of the new urbanism have yet aroused
reinterpretations of the state action doctrine, the chief rationale for exclusions against speech in
most states—notwithstanding Colorado’s recognition of pervasive government entanglement in
the development and operation of shopping centers, or New Jersey’s analysis of how they
function publicly in the lives of most suburbanites.
Given the rapidity of social changes in suburbs, and the continued resistance of state
courts to require free speech and assembly in privately owned, quasi-urban centers where
speakers may be able to identify listeners, and vice versa, a High Court re-invitation to First
Amendment expression in shopping malls may represent the best hope for opening channels of
political association recommended in this study. It may help emplace public spheres that are
produced by individual and collective participation in open political discourses. These are the
sorts of big constitutional responsibilities that Ely rightly assigns to the judiciary. Our “living
Constitution” should afford diverse suburbanites their right to the city. It can prescribe that right
as one of political agency, a la Lefebvre. It already places that right within the purview of
courts, to articulate pragmatic interpretations of democratic fair play under real life conditions.
As Ely argues, it is the duty of courts, specifically, the High Court, to “make sure the channels of
political participation and communication are kept open.” 151 For my purposes, Ely’s charge to
courts has been read to endorse a legally protected right to the city, which Lefebvre regards as
“real and active participation” in the spaces shared by people. 152 That is how an analogous city
becomes practicable or urban. It is how public spheres are produced through the “permanent
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participation of…‘interested parties,’ with their multiple, varied and even contradictory
interests,” and how exchange values of shared space are balanced by use values. 153
One of the recurring themes in this study has been that privately owned shopping centers
have long functioned as the suburban analogues of publicly owned downtowns. In view of the
changes described above, the analogy appears more germane today, notwithstanding widespread
consumer desertions and fiscal shortfalls in malls, which mirror the plight of cities once upon a
time, ironically. And while a right to the city or expressive activity has never been monolithic,
history suggests that urban spaces are ones where civic capacity has been built and harnessed
through political association. If the use value of shopping centers—analogous cities within
diversifying suburbs—is to be reunited with democratic practices wherever people go, then legal
interpretations of public space before and after Pruneyard ought to be reconsidered in light of
significant transformations within today’s metropolitan landscapes.

153

The first idea is quoted from Lefebvre (1991), op cit., pg. 422; the second, on exchange value versus use value,
comes from Lefebvre (1996), op cit., pp. 67-68; see also, Purcell, op cit., pp. 10-11.

286

References

Adorno, Theodore, Horkheimer, Max. 1972. “The Culture Industry.” The Dialectic of
Enlightenment. New York: Continuum Press.
Adut, Ari. 2012. “A Theory of the Public Sphere.” Sociological Theory. Vol. 30, No. 4.
American Sociological Association/Sage Publications
Arango, Tim, Yeginsu, Ceylan. 2013. “Peaceful Protest Over Istanbul Park Turns Violent as
Police Crack Down.” New York Times. June 1.
Arendt, Hannah. 1988. On Revolution. London: Penguin Books.
________ 1977. Between Past and the Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York:
Penguin Books.
________ 1977. “Public Rights and Private Interests.” In (eds.) Michael Mooney and
Florian Stuber, Small Comforts: Hard Times for Humanist. New York: Columbia
University Press.
________ 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Aristotle. 1943. Politics. New York: Modern Library.
Arnold, Matthew. 1993. “Culture and Anarchy.” In (ed.) S. Collini, Culture and Anarchy and
Other Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Auge, Marc. 2006. Non-Places: An Introduction to SuperModernity. London: Verso Books.
Badger, Emily. 2013. “The Suburbanization of Poverty.” The Atlantic Cities. May.
Ball, Howard. 1978. “Careless Justice: The United States Supreme Court’s Shopping Center
Opinions, 1946-1976.” Polity. Vol. 11, No. 2. Winter
Barber, Benjamin. 2002. “Civic Space.” In (eds.) David J. Smiley and Mark Robbins, Sprawl
and Public Space: Redressing the Mall. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
________ 1998. “More Democracy! More Revolution!” The Nation. Vol. 267, No. 13.
________ 1998. A Place for US: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong. New York:
Hill and Wang.
________ 1984. Strong Democracy. California: University of California Press.

287

Barber, James David. (ed.) 1970. Readings in Citizen Politics: Studies of Political Behavior.
Chicago: Markham Publishers.
Barker, Ernest. 1970. Greek Political Theory. London: University Paperbacks, Methuen & Co.
________ 1958. The Politics of Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baum, Lawrence. 1998. The Supreme Court. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc.
________ 1986. American Courts: Process and Policy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Bauman, Gus. 1974. “Private Business Districts and the First Amendment: From Marsh to
Tanner.” Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law. Vol. 7. 199
Benhabib, Seyla. 1996. “Models of Public Space: Hanna Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and
Jürgen Habermas.” In (ed.) Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
________ 1994. “Hanna Arendt and the Redemptive Power of Narrative.” In (eds.) Lewis P.
Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, Hanna Arendt Critical Essays. Albany, New York:
State University of New York Press.
________ 1986. Critique, Norm, Utopia. New York: Columbia University Press.
Benjamin, Walter. 2002. The Arcades Project. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
________ 1978. “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century.” Reflections. New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich.
Bercuvitz, Jeff. 1998. “Sparking Community.” The Long Term View Community and Isolation.
Vol. 4, No. 2. Spring.
Berland, Jody. 1992. “Angels Dancing: Cultural Technologies and the Production of Space.” In
(eds.) Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paul Treichler, Cultural Studies. New
York: Routledge.
Berman, Marshall. 2012. “The Romance of Public Space.” In (eds.) Ron Shiffman, Rick Bell,
Lance Jay Brown, and Lynne Elizabeth, Beyond Zuccotti Park: Freedom of Assembly and
the Occupation of Public Space. Oakland, CA.: New Village Press.
________ 2009. On the Town: One Hundred Years of Spectacle in Times Square. London: Verso
Books.
________1988. All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity. New York:
Penguin Books.

288

Bernstein, Richard. 1983. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Berube, Alan. 2011. “The State of Metropolitan America: Suburbs and the 2010 Census.” State
of Metropolitan America. July
Blackmar, Elizabeth. 2006. “Appropriating ‘the Commons’: The Tragedy of Property Rights
Discourse.” In (eds.) Setha Low and Neil Smith, The Politics of Public Space. New York:
Routledge.
Blomley, Nicholas. 2010, “Cuts, Flows, and the Geographies of Property.” In Law, Culture and
the Humanities. Vol. 7, No. 2.
________ 2010. “Property, liberty and the category.” Geoforum. Volume 41
________ 2004. Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property. New York:
Routledge.
________ 2003. “Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, and
the Grid.” In Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Vol. 93, No. 1.
Boddy, Trevor. 1992. “Underground and Overhead: Building the Analogous City.” In (ed.)
Michael Sorkin, Variations on a Theme Park The New American City And the End of
Public Space. New York: Hill and Wang.
Bollinger, Lee. 1986. The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in
America. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. “Social Space and the Genesis of ‘Classes’” Language and Symbolic
Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bowen, Lauren. 1995. “Do Court Decisions Matter?” In (ed.) Lee Epstein, Contemplating
Courts. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
Boyer, Christine M. 1997. “Cities for Sale: Merchandising History at South Street Seaport.” In
(ed.) Michael Sorkin, Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End
of Public Space. New York: Hill and Wang.
Brash, Julian. 2012. “Politics Out of Place: Occupy Wall Street and the Rhetoric of ‘Filth.’” In
(eds.) Ron Shiffman, Rick Bell, Lance Jay Brown, and Lynne Elizabeth, Beyond Zuccotti
Park: Freedom of Assembly and the Occupation of Public Space. Oakland, CA.: New
Village Press.

289

Brown, Lance Jay. 2012. “Public Space Then and in the Future.” In (eds.) Ron Shiffman, Rick
Bell, Lance Jay Brown, and Lynne Elizabeth, Beyond Zuccotti Park: Freedom of
Assembly and the Occupation of Public Space. Oakland, CA.: New Village Press.
Buckwalter, Jane. 1987. “Securing Shopping Centers for Inner Cities.” Urban Land. April.
Burrowes, Robert. 1969. “Totalitarianism: The Revised Standard Version.” World Politics. Vol.
21, No.2.
Calhoun, Craig. 1996. Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
________ 1996. “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere.” In (ed.) Calhoun, Craig. 1996.
Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Canovan. Margaret. 1994. “Politics as Culture: Hanna Arendt and the Public Realm.” Lewis P.
Hinchman and Sandra K Hinchman (eds.), Hanna Arendt: Critical Essays. Albany, New
York: State University of New York Press.
Caro, Robert A. 1975. The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. New York:
Vintage Books.
Carpio, Genevieve, Irazabal, Clara, Pulido, Laura. 2011. “Right to the Suburb? Rethinking
Lefebvre and Immigrant Acitivism,” Journal of Urban Affairs. Urban Affairs Association
Carr, Stephen, Francis, Mark, Rivlin, Leanne G., Stone, Andrew M. 1992. Public Space. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Carter, Leif H., Burke, Thomas F. 2002. Reason in Law. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.
Chayes, Abram. 1986. “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation.” In (eds.) Walter F.
Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett, Courts, Judges, & Politics. New York: Random House.
Cicero. 1976. On the Commonwealth. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Cohen. Joshua. 1997. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In (eds.) Robert E. Goodin and
Phillip Pettit, Contemporary Political Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
Publishers.
Cohen, Lizabeth. 1996. “From Town Center to Shopping Center: The Reconfiguration of
Community Marketplaces in Postwar America.” The American Historical Review. Vol.
101, No. 4. October.
Cohen, William, Danelski, David J. 1997. Constitutional Law: Civil Liberty and Individual
Rights. Westbury, New York: Foundation Press.

290

Crawford, Margaret. 2002. “Suburban Life and Public Space.” In (eds.) David J. Smiley and
Mark Robbins, Sprawl and Public Space: Redressing the Mall. New York: Princeton
University Press.
________ 1999. “Introduction.” In (eds.) J.L. Chase, M. Crawford, and J. Kalisky, Everyday
Urbanism. New York: Monacelli Press.
________ 1992. “The World in a Shopping Mall” In (ed.) Michael Sorkin, Variations
Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space. New York: Hill
Wang.

on a
and

Croly, Herbert. 1989. The Promise of American Life. Boston, Mass: Northeastern University
Press.
Davis, Mike. 1992. City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles. New York: Vintage
Books.
________ 1990. “Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space.” In (ed.) Michael
Sorkin, Variation on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public
Space. New York: Hill and Wang.
Delgado, Richard, Stefanic, Jean. 1997. Must We Defend Nazis? Hate Speech, Pornography, and
the New First Amendment. New York: NYU Press.
DeLisle, James R. 2007. “Shopping Center Classifications: Challenges and Opportunities.”
Shopping Center Classifications. Runstad Center for Real Estate Studies. Washington.
June
Denton, Nancy A, Gibbons, Joseph R. 2013, “Twenty-First Century Suburban Demography:
Increasing Diversity Yet Lingering Exclusion.” In (ed.) Christopher Niedt, Social Justice
in Diverse Suburbs: History, Politics, and Prospects. Philadelphia, PA: Temple
University Press
Dery, Mark. 1998. “Past Perfect: Disney’s Celebration and the Theme-Parking of Public Space.”
The Long Term View: Community and Isolation. Vol. 4, No. 2. Spring.
De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1990. Democracy in America, Volumes 1 & 2. New York: Vintage
Books.
Dewey, John. 1955. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Mentor Books.
________ 1954. The Public and Its Problems. Ohio: Swallow Press.
Dinnerstein, Dorothy. 1976. The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human
Malaise. New York: Harper & Row.

291

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. 1973. “The Grand Inquisitor.” The Brothers Karamazov. New York:
Penguin Classics.
Douglas, William 0. 1954. An Almanac of Liberty. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
Dunham-Jones, Ellen. 2013. “The Irrational Exuberance of Rem Koolhaas.” Places: Forum of
Design for the Public Realm. San Francisco, CA.: Design Observer Group. April.
Dunham-Jones, Ellen, Williamson, June. 2011. Retrofitting Suburbia: Urban Design Solutions
for Redesigning Suburbs. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Eisenberg, Arthur. 2012. “Some Unresolved Constitutional Questions.” In (eds.) Ron Shiffman,
Rick Bell, Lance Jay Brown, and Lynne Elizabeth, Beyond Zuccotti Park: Freedom of
Assembly and the Occupation of Public Space. Oakland, CA.: New Village Press.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1995. Democracy on Trial. New York: Basic Books.
________ 1981. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Ely, James W. 1998. The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property
Rights. New York: Oxford University Press
Ely, John Hart. 1980. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
Emerson, Thomas. 1970. The System of Freedom of Expression. New York: Random House.
Epstein. Lee. (ed.) 1995. Contemplating Courts. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
Epstein, Lee, Walker, Thomas G. 1995. “The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society:
Playing the Reconstruction Game.” In (ed.) Lee Epstein. Contemplating Courts.
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
Epstein, Richard A. 1987. “Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error.” In (eds.) James
A. Dom and Henry Manne, Economics Liberties and the Judiciary.
Fainstein, Susan, Stokes, Robert. 1997. Spaces for Play: The Impact of Entertainment
Development on New York City. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy
Research, Rutgers University.
________ 1994. Justice, Politics and the Creation of Urban Space. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University.

292

Feldstein, Stanley, Costello, Lawrence. 1974. The Ordeal of Assimilation: A Documentary
History of the White Working Class, 1830’s to the 1970’s. New York: Anchor Books.
Fisher, Louis. 1999. Constitutional Law. South Carolina: South Carolina Press.
Fishman, Robert. 2002. “Towards an Open-Minded Space.” In (eds.) David J. Smiley and Mark
Robbins, Sprawl and Public Space: Redressing the Mall. New York: Princeton
Architectural Press.
________ 1987. Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia. New York: Basic

Books.

Fiss, Owen. 1996. The Irony of Free Speech. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Florida, Richard. 2012. The Rise of the Creative Class, Revisited. New York: Basic Books.
________ 2011. The Great Reset. New York: Harper Business.
Foucault, Michel. 1984. “Space, Knowledge, and Power.” In (ed.) Paul Rabinow, The Foucault
Reader. New York: Pantheon Books.
________ 1980. “The Eye of Power.” In (ed.) Colin Gordon, Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon
________ 1979. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume I. New York: Vintage.
________ 1978. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage.
Franck, Karen, Stevens, Quentin. 2006. Loose Space. New York: Routledge.
Fraser, Nancy. 1992 “Sex, Lies, and the Public Sphere.” In Critical Inquiry. Vol. 18, No. 3.
________1990. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy.” Social Text. No. 25/26
Frey, William H. 2011. “The New Metro Minority Map: Regional Shifts in Hispanics, Asians,
and Blacks from Census 2010.” State of Metropolitan America. Brookings, August.
________ 2011. “Melting Pot Cities and Suburbs: Racial and Ethnic Change in Metro America
in the 2000s.” State of Metropolitan America. Brookings, May.
________ 2011. "Rainbow Suburbs.” Milken Institute Review. Fourth Quarter.
Gans, Herbert. 1967. The Levittowners. New York: Pantheon.
Garreau, Joel 1991. Edge City: Life on the New Frontier. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell

293

Publishing Group, Inc.
Glazer, Nathan, Lilla, Mark. (eds.) 1987. The Public Face of Architecture: Civic Culture and
Public Spaces. New York: The Free Press.
Goldstein, Leslie F. 1995. “By Consent of the Governed: Directions in Constitutional Theory.”
In (ed.) Lee Epstein, Contemplating Courts. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
Gordon. Colin. 1980. Colin Gordon, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other
Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon
Graham, Stephen. 2010. Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism. New York: Verso.
Gratz, Roberta Brandes, Mintz, Norman. 1998. Cities Back from the Edge: New Life for
Downtown. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Green, Hardy. 2010. The Company Town: The Industrial Edens and Satanic Mills That Shaped
the American Economy. New York: Basic Books.
Gruen, Victor, Larry, Smith. 1960. Shopping Towns USA: The Planning of Shopping Centers.
New York.
________ 1957. “Introverted Architecture.” Progressive Architecture. Vol. 38. No. 4.
Gutmann, Amy, Thompson, Dennis. 1997. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1997. “The Public Sphere.” In (eds.) Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit,
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
Publishers.
________ 1996. “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere.” In (ed.) Craig Calhoun,
Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
________ 1994. “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power.” In (eds.) Lewis P.
Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.
________ 1991. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
________ 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
________ 1989. Theory of Communicative Action (Vol. 2) Lifeworld and System. Boston:
Beacon Press.

294

________ 1973. Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press.
________ 1970. Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest Science and Politics. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Halpern, Stephen C., Lamb, Charles M. 1982. (eds.) Supreme Court Activism and Restraint.
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
Hanchett, Tom. 1998. “Talking Shopping Center: Federal Tax Policy, Commercial Sprawl, and
the Decline of Community.” The Long Term View Community and Isolation. Vol. 4, No.
2. Spring.
Harris, Neil. 1975. “Spaced-Out at the Shopping Center.” The New Republic. December.
Harvey, David. 2006. “The Political Economy of Public Space.” In (eds.) Setha Low and Neil
Smith, The Politics of Public Space. New York: Routledge.
Hayden, Delores. 2006. “Building the American Way: Public Subsidy, Private Space.” In (eds.)
Setha Low and Neil Smith, The Politics of Public Space. New York: Routledge.
Healy, Vikki Ortiz, Walberg, Matthew. 2013. “Suburban Poverty Growth Outpacing Urban
Cores.” Governing. May.
Heilbroner, Robert. 1987. (ed.) The Essential Adam Smith. New York: Norton.
Hinchman, Lewis P., Hinchman, Sandra K. 1994. (eds.) Hanna Arendt: Critical Essays. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
Hohendabi, Peter Uwe. 1996. “The Public Sphere: Models and Boundaries.” In (ed.) Craig
Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Hou, Jeffrey. 2012. “Making Public, Beyond Public Space.” In (eds.) Ron Shiffman, Rick Bell,
Lance Jay Brown, and Lynne Elizabeth, Beyond Zuccotti Park: Freedom of Assembly and
the Occupation of Public Space. Oakland, CA.: New Village Press.
________ 2010. Insurgent Public Space: Guerilla Urbanism and the Remaking of
Contemporary Cities. New York: Routledge.
Ides, Allan, May, Christopher N. 1998. Constitutional Law: Individual Rights. New York: Aspen
Publishers Inc.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
Iveson, Kurt. 2007. Publics and the City. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing.

295

Jackson. J.B. 1987. “Forum Follows Function.” In (eds.) Nathan Glazer and Mark Lilla, The
Public Face of Architecture: Civic Culture and Public Space. New York: The Free Press.
________ 1987. “The Discovery of the Street.” In (eds.) Nathan Glazer and Mark Lilla, The
Public Face of Architecture: Civic Culture and Public Space. New York: The Free Press.
________ 1984. Discovering the Vernacular Landscape. New Haven: Yale University Press.
________ 1980. The Necessity for Ruins, and Other Topics. Amherst: The University of
Massachusetts Press.
________ 1980.”The American Public Space.” The Public Interest. Winter.
Jackson, Kenneth T. 1996. “All the World’s a Mall: Reflections on the Social and Economic
Consequences of the American Shopping Center.” American Historical Review. Vol. 101,
No. 4/ October.
________ 1985. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Jacobs, Jane. 1987. “The Uses of the Sidewalk: Contact.” In (eds.) Nathan Glazer and Mark Ulla,
The Public Face of Architecture: Civic Culture and Public Space. New York: The Free
Press.
________ 1961. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Random House.
Jefferson, Thomas. 1975. The Portable Thomas Jefferson. New York: Penguin Publishers.
Johnson, Frank M. 1986. “The Role of the Judiciary with Respect to the Other Branches of
Government.” In (eds.) Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett, Courts, Judges, &
Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process. New York: Random House.
Jordan, Jeff. 2012. “The Death of the American Shopping Mall.” The Atlantic Cities. December.
Judd, Dennis R, Fainstein, Susan S. 1998. Places to Play The Remaking of Cities for Tourism.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Judd, Dennis R., Swanstrom, Todd. 1998. City Politics Private Power and Public Policy. New
York: Addison Wesley Longman. Inc.
Kahan, Michael. 1999. Media as Politics: Theory, Behavior, and Change in America. New
Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Kalven, Jr., Harry. 1965. The Negro and the First Amendment. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

296

________ 1965. “The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana.” The Supreme
Court Review. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kaplan, Sam Hall. 1985. L.A. Follies: A Critical Look at Growth Politics and Architecture.
Santa Monica: California Press.
Kayden, Jerold. 2000. Privately Owned Public Spaces. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Keller, Lisa. 2012. “The Grass is Always Greener: A Brief History of Public Space and Protest
in New York City and London.” In (eds.) Ron Shiffman, Rick Bell, Lance Jay Brown,
and Lynne Elizabeth, Beyond Zuccotti Park: Freedom of Assembly and the Occupation of
Public Space. Oakland, CA.: New Village Press.
________ 2010. Triumph of Order: Democracy & Public Space in New York and London.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Kemmis, Daniel 1990. Community and the Po1itics of Place. Oklahoma: University of
Oklahoma Press.
Kimmelman, Michael. 2013. “In Istanbul’s Heart, A Leader’s Obsession, Perhaps Achilles
Heel.” New York Times. June 8.
Kneebone, Elizabeth, Berube, Alan. 2013. Confronting Suburban Poverty in America.
Washington: The Brookings Institution.
Koolhaas, Rem. 1998. S,M,L,XL. New York: Monacelli Press.
Kohn, Margaret. 2004. Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public Space. New
York: Routledge.
Kowinski. William 5. 1992. “The Mallennium Factors: Mallcondo Continuum, Fortress of the
Future, or Where No Mall Has Gone Before.” In (eds.) Dennis R Judd and Paul S.
Kantor, Enduring Tensions in Urban Politics. New York: Macmillan.
________ 1985. The Mailing of America. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
Kunstler, James Howard. 1998. “The Public Realm and the Common Good.” The Long Term
View: Community and Isolation. Vol. 4, No. 2 Spring.
Landes, Joan B. 1988. Women and the Public Sphere In the Age of the French Revolution.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Lang, R.E., Nelson, Arthur C., Sohmer, Rebecca R. 2008. “Boomburg downtowns: the next
generation of urban centers.” Journal of Urbanism. Vol. No. 1, March.

297

Lefebvre, Henri. 1996. “The Right to the City.” In (eds.) Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas,
Writings on Cities. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing
________ 1991. The Production of Space. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing.
________ 1978. “Reflections on the Politics of Space.” In (ed.) Richard Peet, Radical
Geography: Alternative Viewpoints on Contemporary Social Issues. London: Methuen &
Co.
Leinberger, Christopher B. 2009. The Option of Urbanism: Investing in a New American Dream.
Washington: Island Press.
________ 2008. “The Next Slum?” Atlantic Monthly. March
Lippmann, Walter. 1949. Public Opinion. New York: The Free Press.
Locke, John. 1965. Two Treaties of Government. New York: Mentor Books.
Lofland, Lyn H. 1973. A World of Strangers: Order and Action in Urban Public Space. New
York: Basic Books.
Low, Setha. 2011. “Claiming Space for an Engaged Anthropology: Spatial Inequality and Social
Exclusion.” American Anthropologist. Vol. 113, No. 3, September.
________ 2006. “How Private Interests Take Over Public Space: Zoning, Taxes, and
Incorporation of Gated Communities.” In (eds.) Setha Low and Neil Smith, The Politics
of Public Space. New York: Routledge.
Low, Setha, Smith, Neil. 2006. The Politics of Public Space. New York: Routledge.
Maitland, Barry. 2013. Silver Meadow. New York: Arcade Publishing.
________ 1985. Shopping Malls: Planning and Design. London.
Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society. Boston: Beacon Press.
Marcuse, Peter. 2012. “Occupy and the Provision of Public Space: The City’s Responsibilities.”
In (eds.) Ron Shiffman, Rick Bell, Lance Jay Brown, and Lynne Elizabeth, Beyond
Zuccotti Park: Freedom of Assembly and the Occupation of Public Space. Oakland, CA.:
New Village Press.
Massey, Doreen. 1994. Space, Place, and Gender. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Mattson, Kevin. 2002. “Antidotes to Sprawl.” In (eds.) David Smiley and Mark Robbins, Sprawl
and Public Space: Redressing the Mall. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

298

McCarthy, Thomas. 1996. “Practical Discourse: On the Relation of Morality to Politics.” In (ed.)
Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
McCormick, Richard L. 1986. The Party Period and Public Policy. New York: Oxford
University Press.
McIlwain, John K. 2011. “Suburbs 2.0: The Evolving American Suburbs.” Urban Land. June.
McIntosh, Wayne, Cates, Cynthia. 1997. “Hard Travelin’: Free Speech in the Age of the
Information Superhighway.” New Political Science. No. 42, Fall.
McKenzie, Evan. 1993. “Trouble in Privatopia.” The Progressive. October.
McWilliams, Wilson Carey. 1974. The Idea of Fraternity in America. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Miles, Steven. 2010. Spaces for Consumption: Pleasure and Placelessness in the Post-Industrial
City. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.
Mill, John Stuart. 1956. On Liberty. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.
Milton, John. 1644. Aeropagitica.
Mitchell, Don, Staeheli, Lynn A. 2006. “Clean and Safe? Property Development, Public Space,
and Homelessness in Downtown San Diego.” In (eds.) Setha Low and Neil Smith, The
Politics of Public Space. New York: Routledge.
Mitchell, Don. 2004. “The Liberalization of Free Speech: Or, How Protest in Public Space is
Silenced.” Stanford Agora. Vol. 4, No. 1.
________ 2003. The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space. New
York: The Guilford Press.
________ 1995. “The End of Public Space? People’s Park, Definitions of the Public, and
Democracy.” In Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Vol. 85, No. 1.
Moe, Ronald C. 1987. “Exploring the Limits of Privatization.” Public Administration Review.
Vol. 47, No. 6 November/December.
Monkkonen. Eric. 1998. “Community on the Edge.” The Long Term View: Community and
Isolation. Vol. 4, No. 2 Spring.
Morris, Roberta. Sales, Bruce D., Shuman, Daniel W. 1997. Doing legal Research: A Guide for
Social Scientists and Mental Health Professionals. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage
Publications.

299

Mumford, Lewis. 1961. The City in History. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
Murphy, Walter F., Pritchett, C. Herman. 1986. Courts, Judges, & Politics: An Introduction
to the Judicial Process. New York: Random House.
Muzzio, Douglas, Halper, Thomas. 2002. “Pleasantville? The Suburb and its Representation in
American Movies.” Urban Affairs Review. Vol. 37, No. 4. March.
Nedelsky, Jennifer. 1990. Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Niedt, Christopher. (ed.) 2013. Social Justice in Diverse Suburbs: History, Politics, and
Prospects. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
O’Brien, David. (ed.) 1999. The Lanahan Readings in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.
Baltimore: Lanahan Publishers, Inc.
________ 1997. Constitutional Law and Politics Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. New York:
W.W. Norton & Co.
________ 1981. The Public’s Right to Knows The Supreme Court and the First Amendment.
New York: Praeger.
Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books.
________ 1979. Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press.
Oldenburg, Ray. 1999. The Great Good Place: Cafes, Coffee Shops, Bookstores, Bars, Hair
Salons and Other Hangouts at the Heart of a Community. New York: Marlowe &
Company.
Paine, Thomas. 1988. Common Sense The Rights of Man and Other Essential Writings of
Thomas Paine. New York: Penguin Books.
Pateman, Carol. 1988. The Sexual Contract. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
________ 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Pickus, Noah. 1996. “Hearken Not to the Unnatural Voice: Publius and the Artifice of
Attachment.” In (eds.) Diversity and Citizenship: Rediscovering American Nationhood.
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

300

Pilon, Roger. 1987. “Legislative Activism, Judicial Activism, and the Decline of Private
Sovereignty.” In (eds.) James A. Dorn and Henry Manne Economic Liberties and the
Judiciary.
Pitkin, Hanna F. 1981. “Justice: On Relating Private and Public.” Political Theory. Vol. 9, No. 3.
August.
________ 1973. “The Roots of Conservatism: Michael Oakeshott and the Denial of
Politics.” Dissent. Fall.
Piven, Frances Fox, Cloward, Richard A., 1979. Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed,
How They Fail. New York: Vintage Books.
Pohlman, Harry L. 1995. Constitutional Debate in Action: Civil Rights and Liberties. New York:
HarperCollins College Publishers.
________ 1993. Political Thought and the American Judiciary. Amherst, Mass.: University of
Massachusetts Press.
Pole, J.R. 1987. The American Constitution: For and Against. New York: Hill and Wang.
Purcell, Mark. 2013. “Possible Worlds: Henri Lefebvre and the Right to the City.” Journal of
Urban Affairs. Urban Affairs Association. June.
Putnam, Robert D. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of
Democracy. Vol. 6, No. 1. January.
Rabinow, Paul. 1984. The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon Books.
Rios, Michael. 2012. “Emplacing Democratic Design.” In (eds.) Ron Shiffman, Rick Bell, Lance
Jay Brown, and Lynne Elizabeth, Beyond Zuccotti Park: Freedom of Assembly and the
Occupation of Public Space. Oakland, CA.: New Village Press.
Robbins, Mark. 2002. “Redressing the Mall.” In (eds.) David J. Smiley and Mark Robbins,
Sprawl and Public Space: Redressing the Mall. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
Rosenberg, Gerald N. 1993. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Rossiter, Clinton. 1961. The Federalist Papers. New York: Mentor Books.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1968. The Social Contract. New York: Penguin Publishers.
________ 1960. Politics and the Arts: A Letter to D’Alembert. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press.

301

Ryan. Mary. 1997. Civic Wars Democracy and Public Life in the American City During the
Nineteenth Century. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.
________ 1996. “Gender and Public Access: Women’s Politics in the Nineteenth Century.” In
(ed.) Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Sandel, Michael 1996. Democracy’s Discontents: America in Search of a Public Philosophy.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Schmiechen, James, Carls, Kenneth. 1999. The British Market Hall: A Social and Architectural
History. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Schudson, Michael. 1998. The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life. Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press.
Scruton, Roger. 1987. “Public Space and the Classical Vernacular.” In (eds.) Nathan Glazer and
Mark Lilla, The Public Face of Architectures Civic Culture and Public Spaces. New
York: The Free Press.
Sennett, Richard. 1977. The Fall of Public Man. New York: Knopf.
Siegel, Fred. 1992. “Reclaiming Our Public Spaces.” The City Journal. Spring.
Smiley, David J., Robbins, Mark. 2002. Sprawl and Public Space: Redressing the Mall. New
York: Princeton Architectural Press.
Smiley, David J. 2002. “Addressing Redress.” In (eds.) David J. Smiley and Mark Robbins,
Sprawl and Public Space: Redressing the Mall. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
Smith, Neil, Low, Setha. 2006. “Introduction: The Imperative of Public Space.” In (eds.) Setha
Low and Neil Smith, The Politics of Public Space. New York: Routledge.
Smithsimon, Gregory. 2012. “’A Stiff Clarifying Test is in Order’: Occupying and Negotiating
Rights in Public Space.” In (eds.) Ron Shiffman, Rick Bell, Lance Jay Brown, and
Lynne Elizabeth, Beyond Zuccotti Park: Freedom of Assembly and the Occupation of
Public Space. Oakland, CA.: New Village Press.
Sorkin, Michael (ed.) 1997. Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of
Public Space. New York: Hill and Wang.
________ “See You in Disneyland.” In (ed.) Michael Sorkin, Variations on a Theme Park: The
New American City and the End of Public Space. New York: Hill and Wang.

302

Srygley, John. 2009. “Life on ‘The Avenue’: An Allegory of the Street in Early Twenty-First
Century Suburban America.” In (eds.) G. Backhaus and J. Murangi, Symbolic
Landscapes. New York: Springer Science + Business Media.
Staeheli, Lynn A., Mitchell, Don. 2008. The People’s Property? Power, Politics, and the Public.
New York: Routledge.
Storing, Herbert J. 1981. What the Anti-Federalists Were For: The Political Thought of the
Opponents of the Constitution. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Sullivan, Harold. 1987. “Privatization of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional
Rights.” Public Administration Review. Vol. 47, No. 6. November-December.
Talen, Emily (ed.) 2013. Charter of the New Urbanism, Second Edition. New York: McGraw
Hill.
Underhill, Paco. 2004. Call of the Mall: The Geography of Shopping. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Van Geel, T.R. 1997. Understanding Supreme Court Opinions. New York: Addison Wesley
Longman, Inc.
Ventriss, Curtis. 1995. “Modern Thought and Bureaucracy.” Public Administration Review. Vol.
55, No. 6 November/December.
Verba, Sidney. 1989. “On Revisiting the Civic Culture: A Personal Postscript.” In Gabriel
Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publishers.
Villa, Dana R 1992. “Postmodernism and the Public Sphere.” American Political Science
Review. Vol. 86, No. 3 September.
Walzer, Michael. 1986. “The Pleasures and Costs of Urbanity.” Dissent. Fall.
________ 1983. Spheres of Justice A Defense of P1uralism and Equality. New York: Basic
Books.
Warner, Sam Bass. 1968. “The Environment of Private Opportunity.” The Private City:
Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth. Philadelphia: The University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Warren, Mark. 2001. Democracy and Association. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Whyte, William H. 1988. City: Rediscovering the Center. New York: Anchor Books.

303

________ 1980. The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces. Washington, D.C.: The Conservative
Foundation.
Williams, Juan. 1998. Thurgood Marshall: American Revolutionary. New York: Times Books.
Williamson, June. 2013. “Protest on the Astroturf at Downtown Silver Spring: July 4, 2007.” In
(ed.) Christopher Niedt, Social Justice in Diverse Suburbs: History, Politics, and
Prospects. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Wilson, Woodrow. 1913. The New Freedom. New York: Doubleday.
Wolin, Sheldon S. 1994. “Hanna Arendt: Democracy and the Political.” In (eds.) Lewis P.
Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, Hanna Arendt: Critical Essays. Albany, N.Y.: State
University of New York Press.
________ 1989. The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
________ 1960. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Wortham, Jenna. 2013. “Hanging Out at the E-Mall: Sites Make Shopping Social Again, and
Investors Flock.” New York Times. August 17.
Wycherley, Richard Ernest. 1976. How the Creeks Built Cities The Relationship of Architecture
and Town Planning to Everyday Life in Ancient Greece. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company.
Yarborough, Tinsley E. 2000. The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Young, Iris Marion. 1989. “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal
Citizenship.” Ethics. Volume 99.
Zick, Timothy. 2009. Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First Amendment Liberties in Public
Places. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zukin, Sharon. 2010. Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places. New York:
Oxford University Press.
________1995. The Cultures of Cities. Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.
________1991. Landscapes of Powers From Detroit to Disney World. Berkeley, CA.: University
of California Press.

304

Law Reviews
Alexander, Mark C. 1999. “Attention Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping
Mall.” Arizona Law Review. 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 1.
Barbas, Samantha. 2011. “Creating the Public Forum.” Akron Law Review. 44 Akron L. Rev.
809.
Barber, Benjamim R. 1997. “Free Speech and Community: The Market as Censor, Freedom of
Expression in a Word of Consumer Totalism.” Arizona State Law Journal. 29 Ariz. St. L. J. 501.
Barak-Erez, Daphne. 1994. “A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization.” Syracuse Law
Review. 45 Syracuse L. Rev. 1169.
Batchis, Wayne. 2012. “Free Speech in the Suburban and Exurban Frontier: Shopping Malls,
Subdivisions, New Urbanism, and the First Amendment.” Southern California Interdisciplinary
Law Journal. Vol. 21, No. 301. April.
________ 2010. “Business Improvement Districts and the Constitution: The Troubling Necessity
of Privatized Government for Urban Revitalization.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. 38
Hastings Const. L.Q. 91.
Berger, Curtis J. 1991. “Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands.” New York
University Law Review. 66 NYU L. Rev. 633.
Bowman, James Marcus. 1980. “Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center: Free Speech Access to
Shopping Centers under the California Constitution.” California Law Review. 68 Cal. L. Rev.
641.
Buchanan, Sidney G. 1999. “The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum.” University of Illinois
Law Review, U. Ill. L. Rev. 950, 1999.
Coffin, Jennifer Niles. 2000. “The United Mall of America: Free Speech, State Constitutions,
and the Growing Fortress of Private Property.” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
33 U. Mich. J. L. 615.
Dienes, Thomas. 1988. “When the First Amendment is Not Preferred: The Military and Other
‘Special Contexts.’” University of Cincinnati Law Review. 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 779.
________ 1986. “The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems of First Amendment Analysis.”
In Washington University Law Review. 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 109.
Emerson, Thomas. 1966. “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment.” Yale Law
Journal. 72 Yale L. J. 877.

305

Epstein, Richard A 1984. “In Defense of the Contract at Will.” University of Chicago Law
Review. 51 U. Chi.. L. Rev. 947.
Estlund, Cynthia L. 1994. “Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere.” Stanford Law
Review. 46 Stan. L. Rev. 305.
Farber, James, Nowak, Samuel 1984. “The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis:
Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication.” Virginia Law Review. 70 Vir. L. Rev.
1219.
Fiss, Owen. 1986. “Free Speech and Social Structure.” Iowa Law Review. 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405.
Ford, Richard T. 1994. “The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis.” In
Harvard Law Review. 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1843.
Gey, Steven G. 1998. “Reopening the Public Forum: From Sidewalks to Cyberspace.” Ohio
State Law Journal. 58 Ohio St. L. J. 1535.
Gray, W. Robert. 1994. “Public and Private Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic
Convergence in Free Speech Values.” Texas Wesleyan Law Review. Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 1.
Harvey, William B. 1989. “Private Restraint of Expressive Freedom: A Post-Pruneyard
Assessment.” Boston University Law Review. 69 B. U. L. Rev. 929.
Helle, Steven. 1991. “Essay on the Bill of Rights: Whither the Public’s Right (Not) to Know?
Milton, Malls, and Multicultural Speech.” University of Illinois Law Review. 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1077.
Hutchison, Harry G. 1994. “Through the Pruneyard Coherently: Resolving the Collision of
Private Property Rights and Nonemployee Union Access Claims.” Marquette Law Review. 78
Marq. L. Rev. 1.
Goldberger, David. 1983. “Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases.” Buffalo Law Review. 32
Buff. L. Rev. 175.
Kiare, Karl E. 1988. “Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal
Reform.” Catholic University Law Review. 38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1.
Lenz, Timothy. 1996. “State Constitutional Commentary Article: The Restriction of Abortion
Protesters in Florida.” Albany Law Review. 56 Alb. L. Rev. 1685.
Livingston, Debra. 1997. “Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing.” The Columbia Law Review. 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551.
Matzger, Gillian E. 2003. “Privatization as Delegation.” Columbia Law Review. 103 Col. L. Rev.
1367.

306

Munzer, Stephen R 1997. “Ellickson on ‘Chronic Misconduct’ in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers,
Bench Squatters, and Day Laborers.” Harvard Civil Right-Civil liberties Law Review. 32 Harv.
C. R-C. L. L. Rev. 1 Winter.
Noble, Joni. 2001. “Case Note on New Jersey Constitution.” Seton Hall Constitutional Law
Journal, 11 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 913.
Okula, Stanley J. 1986. “Towards Rendering New York’s Free Speech Clause Redundant:
SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall.” St. John’s Law Review. 60 S. J. L. Rev. 799.
Peller, Gary, Tushnet, Mark. 2004. “State Action and a New Birth of Freedom.” Georgetown
Law Journal. 92 Geo. L.J. 779.
Quadres, Harold. 1986. “Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations.” Hasting Law Journal. 37
Hast. L. J. 439.
Rehnquist, William H. 1976. “The Notion of a Living Constitution.” Texas Law Review. 54
Texas L. Rev. 693.
Sisk, Gregory C. 2007. “Uprooting the Pruneyard.” Rutgers Law Journal. 38 Rutgers L. J. 1145.
Smith, Jr., J. Clay, Burrell, Scott. 1994. “Justice Thurgood Marshall and the First Amendment.”
Arizona State Law Journal. 26 Ariz. St. L. J. 461.
Steinberg, Terry Nicole. 1994. “Rival Union Access to Public Employees: The New First
Amendment Balancing Test.” George Mason Independent Law Review. 2 Geo. Mason Ind. L.
Rev. 361.
Stone, Geoffrey. 1974. “Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places.” Supreme Court Review. Sup.
Ct. Rev. 233.
Sullivan, Kathleen M. 1998. “The Rehnquist Years: A Supreme Court Retrospective: The
Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court.” Nova Law Review. 22 Nova L. Rev. 743.
Summers, Clyde W. 1986. “The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of
Democracy: Some Lessons form Labor Law.” University of Illinois law Review. 1986 U. Dl. L.
Rev. 689.
Sunstein. Cass. 1994. Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech New York: The Free Press
Tasso, Jon P. 1997. “Restoring Less-Speech-Restrictive Alternatives After Ward v. Rock Against
Racism” University of Chicago law Review. 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349.
Trollinger, Tona. 1994. “Reconceptualizing the Free Speech Clause: From a Refuse of Dualism
to the Reason of Holism.” George Mason Independent Law Review. 3 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 137.

307

Varat, Jonathan D. 1998. “Voices of the People: Transporting First Amendment Norms to the
Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse.” UCLA Law Review. 45 UCLA L. Rev.
1537.
Waldron, Jeremy. 1991. “Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom,” UCLA Law Review, 39
UCLA L. Rev. 1.
Weinberg, Paul J. 2009. “The Shopping Center as Hyde Park: Free Speech or Invasion of
Property Rights?” Zoning and Planning Law Report. Vol. 32, No. 11. December.
Werhan, Arnold. 1986. “The Supreme Court’s Public Forum Doctrine and the Return of
Formalism.” Cardozo Law Review. 7 Card. L. Rev. 335.
Williams, Joan. 1998. “The Rhetoric of Property.” Iowa Law Review. 83 Iowa L. Rev. 277.
Zick, Timothy. 2011. “Summum, The Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum.” Brigham
Young University Law Review. 9 BYU L. Rev. 54.
________ 2006. “Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography.” George Washington
University Law Review. 74 Geo. L. Rev. 439.
________ 2006. “Speech and Spatial Tactics.” Texas Law Review. 84 Texas L. Rev. 581.
________ 2005. “Property, Place, and Public Discourse.” St. Johns University Law Review. 11
S.J. L. Rev. 1.

308

Table of Cases

Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 398 U.S. 308
(1968)
Batchelder v. Allied Stores International, 445 N.E. 2d 590, Mass. (1983)
Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P. 2d 55, CO. (1991)
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
Central Hardware CO. v. National Labor Relations Board, 407 U.S. 539 (1972)
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897)
Fashion Valley Mall, LLC. v. National Labor Relations Board, 42 Cal. 4th 850 (2008)
Green Party of New Jersey and James Mohn v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., D/B/A The Mall
at Mill Creek, 164 N.J. 127 (2000)
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. (1976)
Initiative and Referendum Institute v. United States Postal Service. Certiorari denied. (2013)
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)
Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 502 U.S. 527 (1992)
Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)

309

Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)
Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
N.A.A.C.P v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East, et al. v. J.M.B. Realty Corporation, et al.,
138 N.J. 326 (1994)
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
Pruneyard Shopping Center, et al. v. Robins, et al., 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)
Robins, et al. v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, et al., 23 Cal. 3d. 899 (1979)
Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
SHAD Alliance, et al. v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y. 496 (1985)
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Committee, 780 P. 2d 1282, Wash.
(1989)
State v. Schmid, 423 N.J. A. 2d 615, 627 (1980)
State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W. 2d 793, Minn. (1999)
Stephen Downs v. Town of Guilderland, State of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Judicial Department, Docket No. 507428 (2010)
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)

310

